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ABSTRACT 
Ironically in the development of expertise, as expertise increases, an 
individual’s ability to communicate the knowledge associated with that expertise 
decreases. This lack of transferability can be beneficial (the knowledge is 
inimitable by competitors), but it can also be detrimental (the knowledge is not 
usable by colleagues and other stakeholders).  These differences likely arise 
from different types of causal ambiguity. Ambiguity about the attributes of a 
specific entrepreneurial opportunity represents a barrier to the transferability of 
knowledge to competitors (beneficial), while ambiguity about the relationship 
between a specific opportunity and value creation represents a barrier to the 
transferability of knowledge to stakeholders (detrimental). To reduce specific 
opportunity/value creation relationship ambiguity, I focus in this research on 
mechanisms thought to enhance entrepreneurial decision makers’ decision-
policy consciousness in opportunity evaluation decisions.  In a field experiment, I 
capture the opportunity evaluation decisions of 127 entrepreneurial decision 
makers in high potential technology ventures, and introduce a series of 
experimental manipulations hypothesized to increase the decision-policy 
consciousness of these individuals. The findings suggest that firm founders have 
lower decision-policy consciousness than non-firm founders; that codification 
increases decision-policy consciousness; that in increasing decision-policy 
consciousness, codification is more efficacious for founders than non-founders; 
that opportunity desirability, feasibility and environment play a significant role in 
 vii 
opportunity evaluation; and that as a result of specific individual cognitive factors, 
systematic differences exist across opportunity evaluation decision policies.  In 
addition to the practical implications of these results for new venture founding, 
they also contribute to both the entrepreneurial cognition literature and the 
strategic capabilities literature. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Question: How do you go about making a decision? 
Answer: Well I would like to say that I evaluate the pros and cons but I 
don't. I just let my intuition tell me what to do. This is not very 
scientific. Well I do really do the research. I make sure that I have 
the facts and not any of the crap in between . . . and then one day 
the light will go on and the decision is made . . . and once I make it, 
it sticks, I don't usually change my mind. That's a combination of 
the research and gut. People think that I am compulsive. But I am 
not. Cause they don't know. Just because I haven't talked about the 
decision doesn't mean that it hasn't been going on in my head for a 
long time. (Age 52) 
 
I introduce the above excerpt from a longer interview with an experienced 
entrepreneur to make three points. The first two are fairly well accepted in the 
research literature and provide necessary context. First, becoming an expert in a 
domain means that declarative knowledge—knowledge about facts and things—
often morphs into more automatic and intuitive procedural knowledge: knowledge 
about how to perform various cognitive activities (Mieg, 2001). Thus, as expertise 
increases, “knowing what” changes into “knowing how.” The process is called 
proceduralization. Both the research literature (e.g., Crossan, Lane, & White, 
1999) and the popular press (e.g., Gladwell, 2005) provide examples of the 
effects of this process. In entrepreneurship, the proceduralization process is 
thought to be particularly important because of its potential role in opportunity 
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identification and evaluation1 (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Mitchell, Friga, & 
Mitchell, 2005). 
Second, while individual experts can often recognize their own expertise—
albeit often modestly (Kruger & Dunning, 1999)—these experts are not 
necessarily able to communicate how this expert knowledge operates (Miller & 
Ireland, 2005). As Gordon (1992) suggested, 
By definition procedural knowledge cannot be directly verbalized. It is 
therefore counterproductive to ask an expert how he or she made a 
decision or solved a problem. The best that the expert can do is verbalize 
the thoughts that came to working memory as a product of the procedures 
and use declarative knowledge to conjecture what those procedures must 
have been (1992: 110). 
 
The experience of the entrepreneur quoted previously, seen by others as 
compulsive because of her inability to communicate the reasons for her decision, 
is consistent with this second point. 
The third point is not as well developed, and is therefore the focus of this 
research. It is that the intuitive, procedural knowledge underlying an individual’s 
decision about an entrepreneurial opportunity can be transferred, and that this 
transferability need not lessen its value. On the surface, it might seem that this 
point is in opposition to two distinct theoretical positions. On the one hand, the 
resource-based view suggests that the non-transferability of knowledge is 
beneficial because it increases the scarcity of knowledge resources—which 
result from unique historical conditions, causal ambiguity, and social 
complexity—limiting imitation of these resources leading to an increased 
                                                 
1 Procedural knowledge is not the same as knowledge about a set of procedures; rather, 
procedural knowledge consists of the knowledge required to perform a task (e.g., the cognitive 
task of evaluating an opportunity). 
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competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). On the other hand, 
there is the notion that causal ambiguity about the value of a specific resource 
leads to factor immobility (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), meaning that the resource 
cannot be shared within a firm which represents a problem because it can limit 
an individual’s ability to leverage resources that are critical to gaining competitive 
advantage (King & Zeithaml, 2001: 76). In this sense, non-transferable intuitive, 
procedural knowledge is both beneficial (i.e., protecting a knowledge resource) 
and detrimental (i.e., limiting the usefulness of that knowledge resource) at the 
same time. 
An explanation of how intuitive, procedural knowledge can be both 
beneficial and detrimental can be found in the work of King and Zeithaml (2001), 
who proposed (and then tested for) two types of causal ambiguity that are 
thought to differentially affect performance. The first of these, characteristic 
ambiguity, or ambiguity about the attributes of a specific competency, is related 
to scarcity. The second, linkage ambiguity, or ambiguity about the link between 
competency and competitive advantage, is related to factor immobility. In their 
study, King and Zeithaml found that characteristic ambiguity is positively related 
to performance, whereas linkage ambiguity is negatively related to performance. 
This finding is consistent with the suggestion of Kogut and Kulatilaka that: 
Scarcity itself does not determine the value of a competence. It is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. Rather, scarcity is interesting if the 
competence permits a firm to achieve a competitive position in the market 
place. (2001: 747) 
 
 4 
In other words, characteristic ambiguity about a specific competence is beneficial 
if linkage ambiguity related to that competence does not limit the ability to 
achieve advantage from the competence. 
These results are especially relevant in entrepreneurial environments 
where ambiguity is likely to be high (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). Characteristic 
ambiguity is likely to be high because an entrepreneurial opportunity is thought to 
involve new combinations of resources (Schumpeter, 1934), the newness of 
which results in a potential competency with attributes that are likely unknown (at 
least at the beginning) and therefore ambiguous. Building on this, linkage 
ambiguity is likely to be high because entrepreneurship also involves locating 
these new combinations and putting them into effect (Baumol, 1968: 65), thereby 
establishing the link between a potential competency and the advantage that can 
be gained from that competency. 
Linking the results of King and Zeithaml (2001) to the three points made 
previously, high ambiguity in entrepreneurship may be beneficial in some aspects 
of the process, but not all. So while a high degree of ambiguity about the 
attributes of an opportunity (characteristic ambiguity) may be beneficial because 
it can serve to protect the opportunity-based competency from imitation, a high 
degree of ambiguity of knowledge about the nexus of potential opportunities and 
the advantage to be gained from these opportunities (linkage ambiguity) may 
actually be detrimental because it may limit the applicability of the opportunity-
based competency within the organization.  
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In the context of opportunity evaluation decisions, the reduction of linkage 
ambiguity is manifest in an ability to accurately articulate a decision policy that 
links opportunities to action, a concomitant of high decision-policy consciousness 
(or the degree to which an individual is aware of a specific decision policy). This 
reduction of linkage ambiguity is beneficial because it allows entrepreneurs to 
articulate how the opportunities that they have recognized will lead to competitive 
advantage for the individual or firm. For example, an entrepreneur in a corporate 
venturing setting may recognize a potential opportunity; however, in order to get 
buy-in from his/her superior, the entrepreneur needs to articulate how the 
opportunity is linked to competitive advantage and thereby convey why it is 
beneficial to invest in the specific opportunity. 
Thus, consistent with the third point made previously, with this research I 
address the minimization of the detrimental effects of intuitive decision making in 
entrepreneurship, while preserving its beneficial effects. Specifically, I investigate 
the processes whereby an opportunity evaluation decision policy, or the rules an 
individual uses to make a decision about an opportunity (Priem, 1992), becomes 
more conscious so that it can be articulated (decreasing linkage ambiguity), and 
thus transferred to others. Moreover, I argue that decision-policy consciousness 
of the opportunity evaluation decision is an entrepreneurial resource 
(Mosakowski, 1998) because it plays a crucial role in the exploitation of profit 
opportunities (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Miller & Ireland, 2005), making it 
beneficial to new enterprise development at both the individual and firm levels. 
 6 
Two research questions guide this investigation. First, I seek to 
understand: how can entrepreneurial decision makers who rely heavily on 
intuitive, procedural knowledge in their decision making transfer this knowledge.  
Second, I ask: what is the specific content of the opportunity evaluation decision 
policy and how does this differ between entrepreneurial decision makers? 
Accordingly, this research consists of two related studies—each one addressing 
a specific research question. As depicted in Figure 1, study one (at the left of the 
figure) investigates the factors that are hypothesized to increase the decision- 
 
policy consciousness of these opportunity evaluation decisions, thereby 
decreasing the linkage ambiguity associated with these decisions to result in an 
entrepreneurial resource. Study two (at the right of the figure) examines the 
content of the opportunity evaluation decision policy as it relates to 
entrepreneurial action. 
I proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I utilize insights from the expert 
performance and expert information processing literatures to suggest a paradox 
related to entrepreneurial expertise and decision-policy consciousness and then 
Figure 1: Description of Studies 
Knowledge 
Relatedness
Number of 
Potential Op.
Potential 
Value 
Likelihood of 
Investing 
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Opportunity
Knowledge 
Codification 
Use of 
Analogy 
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Incentives 
Decision- 
Policy Cons.
Study One Study Two 
Individual 
Differences
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draw on the strategic capabilities and organization learning literatures to propose 
a model which represents a potential resolution of this paradox. This model leads 
to a series of hypotheses related to decreasing entrepreneurial decision makers’ 
linkage ambiguity through increasing decision-policy consciousness (study one). 
In Chapter 3, I refer to the entrepreneurial cognition and investment under 
uncertainty literatures to derive a series of hypotheses2 that describe an 
entrepreneurial decision maker’s opportunity evaluation decision policy (study 
two). In Chapter 4, I discuss the sample, the measures, the manipulations and 
the analytical techniques that I use to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 contains a 
report of the results. And in Chapter 6, I discuss the implications of the results for 
both research and practice.
                                                 
2 Because of the interrelated nature of both studies, the hypotheses of the second study build on 
the first and are numbered consecutively from six to nine. 
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CHAPTER II: DECISION-POLICY CONSCIOUSNESS – STUDY ONE 
This chapter contains three main sections. As background, within the first 
section, I introduce a paradox suggested by the expert performance and expert 
information processing literatures relating to expertise and knowledge. In the 
second section, I review the literature that concerns declarative and procedural 
knowledge and introduce the concept of decision-policy consciousness, 
complementing this review of the memory and consciousness literature. In the 
third section, I then review the strategic capabilities and organization learning 
literatures which inform how intuitive, procedural knowledge can be made more 
articulable, and I present a series of testable hypotheses related to increasing 
decision-policy consciousness. 
Expertise, Intuition and Ambiguity 
Within the expert performance and expert information processing 
literatures, a considerable amount of attention is devoted to differences between 
expert and novice knowledge structures (Glaser, 1984), which allow experts to 
perform at higher levels (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). In previous research an 
expert has been defined as “someone with a large knowledge base in a particular 
context” (Lord & Maher, 1990: 13). While novices (who rely on conscious, 
deliberate, and explicit thought) are easily able to express their knowledge, the 
process whereby an individual becomes an expert—indicative of the 
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proceduralization process—renders experts’ knowledge less expressible. As 
Crossan, Lane, and White suggested in their discussion of expert intuition: 
[Something] seems to happen on the way to expertise. What once 
required conscious, deliberate, and explicit thought no longer does. What 
once would have taken much deliberation and planning becomes the 
obvious thing to do (1999: 526). 
 
Such is the case with entrepreneurial intuition. As Mitchell, Friga and Mitchell 
(2005) noted in their article on entrepreneurial intuition: 
Intuition is . . . a dynamic process that initially (as it is developing) involves 
an explicit awareness of the coming-to-consciousness process, and which 
is subsequently experienced as “having a hunch” or “just knowing” 
something is an opportunity (2005: 666). 
 
Again, expertise is the primary mechanism underlying this dynamism in 
entrepreneurial intuition. Specifically, when expertise increases “the relevant 
functional level of consciousness of that individual decreases” (2005: 665). In this 
sense, entrepreneurial intuition can be thought of as: the proceduralized expert 
knowledge employed in decisions to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. 
As expertise in entrepreneurially-relevant domains increases, so too does 
intuition (Crossan et al., 1999; Gordon, 1992): knowledge based in this expertise 
becomes proceduralized, and as a result becomes harder to communicate. As 
acknowledged by Gordon, 
People becoming competent in a given domain move away from the use 
of symbolic or declarative knowledge and toward a reliance on perceptual, 
nonverbalizable procedural knowledge (1992: 101). 
 
Thus, those individuals who are most qualified to act in a given situation are the 
least able to accurately describe why they take such actions. And those 
individuals who are least qualified to act in a given situation are the most able to 
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accurately describe why they take such actions. Intuition is, in this sense, 
manifested through a negative relationship between the expertise associated 
with a decision policy and decision-policy consciousness. In other words, an 
expert will likely have low decision-policy consciousness about their decisions 
related to that expertise.  
In entrepreneurship, the relationship between founder status and 
entrepreneurial expertise is particularly salient with respect to decision-policy 
consciousness. Specifically, the founder of a firm arguably possesses a unique 
knowledge or expertise of the firm not possessed by others, particularly in 
connection with the opportunities upon which the firm was founded.  Such a view 
is consistent with suggestions that knowledge asymmetries across a population 
(Hayek, 1945) play a crucial role in the recognition of opportunities by specific 
individuals within that population (Shane, 2000).  Founders have knowledge that 
others do not. They possess the unique knowledge that allows them to recognize 
the opportunity, which serves as the foundation of the new firm.  Such notions of 
unique knowledge are also important in explanations of insight and intuition 
(Richman, Gobet, Staszewski, & Simon, 1996).  The knowledge and expertise 
(e.g., about a firm) developed over time and the result of experience and practice 
(Mieg, 2001; Richman et al., 1996) can result in recognition of a solution to a 
problem and is “usually accompanied by an inability of the solver to explain how 
the solution was found” (Richman et al., 1996: 180).  In other words, a founder’s 
expertise vis-à-vis entrepreneurial opportunities, is proceduralized.  Because 
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proceduralization is thought to result in lower decision-policy consciousness, it is 
expected that, 
Hypothesis 1: Firm founders will have lower decision-policy 
consciousness than non-firm founders.  
This suggests a paradox associated with decision-policy consciousness in 
entrepreneurship: it is likely to be lowest when, because it is based in expertise, it 
might be of most use to others. Said differently, causal ambiguity about a 
decision policy is highest when the underlying value of a decision policy is also 
high. And while there are times when it is good that causal ambiguity about a 
decision policy is high, this nonetheless presents a potential problem for 
entrepreneurs making decisions about opportunities. As is explained in the 
introduction, causal ambiguity can have differential effects on performance. While 
ambiguity about the characteristics of an opportunity is positive because it can 
prevent imitation of the opportunity by others, ambiguity about linkages between 
the opportunity and performance can be detrimental because it may limit the 
advantage that can be gained from the opportunity (King & Zeithaml, 2001). 
Thus, while decision-policy consciousness of the characteristics of a specific 
opportunity conveys the most advantage when it is low, decision-policy 
consciousness of how an opportunity is linked to competitive advantage is of the 
most advantage when it is high. When decision-policy consciousness about a 
linkage between an opportunity and the advantage to be gained from that 
opportunity is high, the entrepreneurial decision maker can articulate knowledge 
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about these links such that others are able to understand and benefit from this 
knowledge (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). 
Miller and Ireland (2005) illustrated this point with reference to the 1949 
Mann Gulch fire disaster (Weick, 1993), a true story about a smoke-jumping crew 
that became trapped in a gulch after the fire they were fighting moved from one 
side of the gulch to the other. Seeing this, the group’s leader, Wagner Dodge, 
recognized the peril of the situation. His first response was to suggest that the 
men try to work their way up the side of the gulch. However, because the fire was 
spreading more quickly than the men were moving, Dodge changed strategies. 
As Miller and Ireland related: 
Rather than continue to try to move away from the fire, now advancing 
through the tall grasses at approximately 600 feet per minute with 30-foot 
high flames, Dodge told his crew to drop their tools and join him in an area 
he had just set on fire. His tactic of burning grasses to reduce combustible 
fuel, and lying in the burned area while the primary fire passed, was not 
part of fire training at the time, nor had Dodge had any prior experience 
with it. Dodge needed to take a risk, create variance from plan, and 
experiment with a new direction. His hunch, based on past experience 
with fire but not a straightforward replay of past learning, proved wise 
(Miller & Ireland, 2005: 23). 
 
Miller and Ireland noted that because Dodge was not able to explain the thinking 
behind his decision to his crew, the crew decided not to heed his counsel. 
Rather, they continued to the top of the ridge and the majority of them did not 
make it (while Dodge did survive). Miller and Ireland drew a parallel to more 
common circumstances in which an individual tries to “sell a hunch” to others, 
without being able to communicate the reasons the hunch makes sense. This 
often results in a lack of others’ commitment to the hunch, at least in the short 
run (2005: 23). 
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Procedural knowledge is frequently difficult to communicate (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994). As the previous example shows, however, for intuitive, 
procedural knowledge to be fully utilized it paradoxically often must be 
transferable through the reduction of underlying ambiguity about the knowledge. 
Yet while such transferability is difficult, the strategic capabilities and organization 
learning literatures nonetheless hint at ways that an individual’s ambiguity can be 
reduced such that this knowledge might nevertheless be elicited, resulting in high 
decision-policy consciousness. For example Schön (1983; 1987) suggested that 
reflection on a specific action can facilitate a better description of knowledge that 
is difficult to communicate. The process of knowledge codification (Zander & 
Kogut, 1995) is thought to facilitate such reflection (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Nonaka (1994) also suggested anecdotal evidence that use of analogy aids in 
the communication of hard-to-communicate knowledge. This is important 
because to the extent that intuitive, procedural knowledge about an opportunity 
can be communicated, it represents a resource that an entrepreneurial decision 
maker can offer to others. Moreover, articulable knowledge represents a possible 
capability for a firm because of its potential to become an organizational routine 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002). And once understood, the processes whereby intuitive 
procedural knowledge is made transferable also represent a potential dynamic 
capability for a firm (Winter, 2003) because skill at transferability processes can 
be used to develop and adapt other strategic capabilities and routines (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002).  
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Within this chapter I therefore investigate possible methods of increasing 
the decision-policy consciousness of entrepreneurial decision makers so that 
intuitive procedural knowledge can be articulated and the entrepreneurial 
decision makers who possess such knowledge can use it as a resource that is 
available to themselves and others. I do so in the context of the opportunity 
evaluation decision. I have chosen this decision because of the increasingly 
prominent role that opportunity identification plays in entrepreneurship research 
(Mitchell et al., 2005; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & Venkataraman, 2003; Shane 
& Venkataraman, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). And in particular, as the 
experience of the previously-quoted entrepreneur suggests, the decision to 
pursue a specific opportunity is a decision context that is often not understood by 
key stakeholders (e.g., investors, family, friends, etc.), and thus represents a 
fruitful context in which higher decision-policy consciousness may result in better 
utilization of an entrepreneurial decision maker’s time, money and effort. 
Knowledge and Decision-Policy Consciousness 
Procedural and Declarative knowledge. In 1949, Ryle introduced the 
epistemological notion that know how is distinct from know that.3 While the idea 
that there are different types or dimensions of knowledge is now reasonably well 
accepted in the research literature (e.g., Alavi & Leidner, 2001), there is, 
nonetheless, debate about how different types of knowledge should be 
conceptualized. For instance, while some suggest that the various types of 
knowledge (e.g., procedural, declarative, etc.) are distinct and coequal (Cook & 
Brown, 1999), others see “formistic thinking” about knowledge—the classification 
                                                 
3 To which others have added know why, know when and know with (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). 
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of knowledge into distinct forms or typologies—as fundamentally limiting 
(Tsoukas, 1996). 
In this study I view typologies to be beneficial to scientific theory.4 I 
specifically refer to two types of knowledge: declarative knowledge and 
procedural knowledge, both of which are two parts of a larger whole. Avoiding an 
epistemological debate about the nature of knowledge, I follow traditional 
epistemology and view knowledge as a kind of justified belief (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001; Nonaka, 1994). In this view, knowledge is seen “as a dynamic human 
process of justifying personal beliefs toward the ‘truth’” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995: 58). Accordingly, declarative knowledge is a justified belief about facts and 
things (e.g., knowledge that Paris is the capitol of France); and procedural 
knowledge is a justified belief about how to perform various cognitive activities5 
(e.g., knowledge of how to read) (Mieg, 2001). While possibly not self-evident, 
the notion of justified belief as applying to procedural knowledge is rooted in the 
idea that procedural knowledge is “justified” through the initiation of the 
procedures that compose procedural knowledge (Gordon, 1992).  
As is evidenced by its juxtaposition with declarative knowledge, and as is 
alluded to in previous paragraphs, procedural knowledge based on expertise in a 
specific domain is difficult to articulate.  This quality of procedural knowledge 
varies on a continuum: for instance, articulating procedural knowledge relating to 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with Stinchcombe (1968: 47) who suggested that typologies have two 
fundamentally different roles in scientific theory. The first, and primary, function of typologies is to 
simplify scientific theory. A secondary function of typologies is that they provide a simple way to 
present interaction effects. The typology used within this study (i.e., declarative vs. procedural 
knowledge) performs the first of these functions. 
5 Although a great deal of research has been done on procedural knowledge in the domain of 
motor skills, definitions of procedural knowledge extend beyond motor skills alone (Wallis, 2004), 
also including cognitive skills and procedures. 
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an ability to read, while difficult, is more easily done than articulating procedural 
knowledge related to solving a complex problem.  As the previous discussion 
about intuition denotes, procedural knowledge related to opportunity identification 
tends toward the difficult-to-articulate end of the spectrum. It is for this reason 
that I frequently refer to such procedural knowledge as intuitive, procedural 
knowledge.  Of course, this is not to say that it cannot be articulated; but rather, it 
is simply difficult to articulate. The purpose of this research is to examine the 
mechanisms that facilitate such articulation. 
In the management literature, declarative and procedural knowledge are 
often considered to be related to explicit knowledge, which is easily 
communicated, codified and shared, and tacit knowledge, which is completely 
unavailable to the knower, respectively. For instance, Cohen and Bacdayan 
(1994) pointed out that one property of procedural knowledge is that it is less 
explicitly accessible than declarative knowledge. Thus, while not synonymous 
with tacit knowledge, procedural knowledge and tacit knowledge share a similar 
quality (i.e., both are difficult to articulate). As such, I refer to previous research 
on tacit knowledge to inform this study of procedural knowledge. 
While research concerning explicit and tacit knowledge in the 
management literature most frequently addresses knowledge at the level of the 
organization, most researchers studying organizational knowledge also 
recognize that such knowledge begins with individuals (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 
1992; March, 1991; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). A notable 
example of this is theory developed by Nonaka, who placed the individual as “the 
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prime mover in the process of organizational knowledge creation” (1994: 21) and 
recognized that the enlargement of an individual’s knowledge is core to the 
knowledge creation process. It is for this reason that insights provided by Nonaka 
(1994), as well as those of other organization learning researchers, may inform 
the processes whereby hard-to-communicate knowledge is made more 
articulable at the individual level of analysis. 
But because knowledge is personalized, it often must be capable of being 
expressed to others in an interpretable manner for it to be useful to them (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001: 110), such as when others are hesitant to commit resources to a 
specific opportunity until the entrepreneur articulates the reasoning behind 
his/her decision. When knowledge is declarative in nature, its interpretable 
expression to others is easily achieved. But when knowledge is of a procedural 
nature, this is not as easy (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gordon, 1992; Mieg, 
2001).  
Previous research in entrepreneurship contains examples where intuitive, 
procedural knowledge is not accessible to be communicated. For instance a 
number of studies have shown that venture capitalists are unable to accurately 
communicate how they make decisions (Shepherd, 1999b; Zacharakis & Meyer, 
1998) and that such venture capitalists frequently overstate the least important 
decision criteria and understate the most important criteria vis-à-vis their actual 
decision policies (Shepherd, 1999b: 83). This phenomenon in entrepreneurship 
research is consistent with other research in social judgment theory which 
suggests that people’s stated knowledge about their own decisions is often an 
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inaccurate representation of their actual decisions (Priem, 1992; Priem & 
Harrison, 1994). Argyris and Schön (1974) linked such disparities to differences 
between “espoused” and “in-use” theory.  
Espoused theory is theory “to which [an individual] gives allegiance, and 
which, upon request, communicates to others” (Argyris & Schön, 1974: 7). In this 
regard, espoused theory is a type of declarative knowledge possessed by an 
individual about his/her actions. In-use theory, on the other hand, is the theory 
“that actually governs [an individual’s] actions” (1974: 7). To the extent that in-
use theory governs actions about performing various cognitive activities, it is a 
kind of procedural knowledge which is of interest to this study. Because I am 
interested in investigating decision making, I use the terms espoused decision 
policy and in-use decision policy to refer to different types of knowledge about 
decision making. This approach fits with the suggestion by Argyris and Schön 
that espoused and in-use theories should include knowledge about behavior in 
“every domain of human activity” (1974: 7). 
In speaking of the relationship between espoused and in-use theory, 
Argyris and Schön noted that in-use theories “may or may not be compatible with 
[an individual’s] espoused theory . . . [and] the individual may or may not be 
aware of the incompatibility of the two theories” (1974: 7). This finding—that 
people’s espoused knowledge about their own decisions is often inaccurate—
represents a significant dilemma for the application of Nonaka’s (1994) 
knowledge creation framework to decision making. Because the communication 
of tacit knowledge anchors one end of a proposed “spiral of organizational 
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knowledge creation” (Nonaka, 1994: 20), errors in communicated knowledge 
may only be magnified as the knowledge creation process unfolds. Similar 
outcomes might be expected in other organizational knowledge frameworks (e.g., 
Kim, 1998). 
Within this study I therefore evaluate the decision-policy consciousness of 
procedural knowledge related to decisions about entrepreneurial opportunities, 
because in entrepreneurship, the ability to communicate the reasons for a 
decision to pursue a specific opportunity or to further explore its feasibility is often 
critical in gaining the support of critical resource providers (Miller & Ireland, 2005: 
13-14). 
Decision-Policy Consciousness. The extent to which individuals are 
aware of their in-use decision policy is their decision-policy consciousness. Prior 
to providing a more precise definition of decision-policy consciousness, however, 
it is necessary to put the term consciousness in context. In psychology research, 
the consciousness construct is one of the more difficult terms to define (Baars, 
1992; Carlson, 1992; Schacter, 1989). Thus, following Schacter (1989), rather 
than defining consciousness, I describe uses of the term. I offer two. The first use 
of the consciousness term is the “deliberate or intentional initiation of information 
retrieval” (Schacter, 1989: 373). The second use of the term is consciousness as 
“phenomenal awareness” (Schacter, 1989: 356).  
Both of these related, but distinct, uses of the consciousness term inform 
this discussion of decision-policy consciousness in the sense that an 
understanding of both can clarify processes that result in the articulation of an 
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individual’s in-use decision policy. Consciousness as the deliberate or intentional 
initiation of information retrieval is directed by an executive cognitive system, 
which mediates and organizes information flow, guides and organizes 
information retrieval (Gordon, 1992: 108), and most closely reflects the cognitive 
system that governs individuals’ purposeful retrieval of their espoused decision 
policy. Consciousness as phenomenal awareness is not explicitly directed by an 
executive cognitive system, but rather refers to “the running span of subjective 
experience” (Dimond, 1976: 377; Schacter, 1989: 356). This second use of the 
consciousness term is indicative of the proposed processes whereby an 
individual begins to consciously understand their in-use decision policies, which 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
With an understanding of the importance of espoused and in-use decision 
policies as a background and with use of the consciousness notion put into 
context, it is now possible to define decision-policy consciousness. This definition 
draws on notions of congruence (Argyris & Schön, 1974), or the difference 
between an individual’s espoused and in-use decision policies. Decision-policy 
consciousness is therefore defined for research purposes to be: the degree of 
congruence between the declarative knowledge about a specific decision policy 
(the espoused decision policy) and the procedural knowledge that directs the 
actual decision (the in-use decision policy). Accordingly, individuals with high 
decision-policy consciousness have a better understanding of their intuitive, 
procedural knowledge than those with low decision-policy consciousness, and 
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are thus able to better express this knowledge to others. In this sense, decision-
policy consciousness can be viewed as a potential resource.6  
Returning to Miller and Ireland (2005), when an individual tries to “sell a 
hunch” to others without being able to communicate the reasons the hunch 
makes sense, the result is often a lack of commitment from others. Such is often 
the case in an entrepreneurial environment, which is frequently characterized by 
information asymmetries (Hayek, 1945) between economic actors. While such 
asymmetries often lead to new opportunities, they can present challenges in 
communicating these new opportunities. In the next section, I discuss the ways in 
which an individual’s intuitive, proceduralized, tacit, in-use theories might be 
elicited (Argyris & Schön, 1974). 
Increasing Decision-Policy Consciousness 
The processes whereby the decision-policy consciousness of 
entrepreneurial decision makers can be increased are of particular importance to 
this study. Research on strategic capabilities, which investigates how knowledge 
can be made available for wider and more productive use within the organization 
(e.g., Zander & Kogut, 1995; Zollo & Winter, 2002), offers insight into processes 
that facilitate this productive spread of knowledge within an organization. 
Organization learning research, which examines the ways whereby knowledge is 
created and transferred within the organization (e.g., Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & 
                                                 
6 Argyris and Schön (1974) made a valid point when speaking of the more general notions of 
espoused theory and in-use theory. They suggested that there is no particular virtue in a high 
degree of congruence alone; this assertion is due to the possibility of having congruence of 
ineffective theory. Within this study, the focus is communicating procedural knowledge, whether 
or not this knowledge is effective is outside the boundaries of this study; however, inasmuch as 
expertise is at the heart of procedural knowledge, a degree of effectiveness is taken for granted. 
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Takeuchi, 1995), can also inform discussions about how individual knowledge 
can be made available to others. Within this section, I utilize insights provided by 
these literatures to propose a model that suggests ways in which entrepreneurial 
decision makers can increase decision-policy consciousness of their opportunity 
evaluation decisions. As Figure 2 depicts, the decision-policy consciousness of 
the opportunity evaluation decision is thought to be affected by founder status 
(previously discussed), knowledge codification, the presence of incentives and 
use of analogy, to which I now direct attention.  
 
Knowledge Codification. In their more general work on evolutionary 
economics, Nelson and Winter (1982) put forth the notion that much of the 
operational knowledge underlying organizational routines is tacit. At the individual 
level, such knowledge is similar to procedural knowledge, as the possessor “is 
not fully aware of the details of the performance and finds it difficult or impossible 
to articulate a full account of those details” (1982: 73). It should be noted that the 
tacitness of knowledge is not absolute, but is rather a matter of degree (Winter, 
Incentives 
Use of 
Analogy 
Decision-
Policy Consc.
Founder 
Status 
H5a-d 
Knowledge
Codification
H1 
H3a-b
H4
H2
Figure 2: Study One Model 
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1987). In discussing knowledge as an asset, Winter (1987) presented a 
taxonomy for understanding the strategic importance of a specific piece of 
knowledge that is useful for understanding tacit knowledge. His first dimension, 
ranging from highly tacit knowledge to fully articulable knowledge (as depicted in 
Figure 3) is quite telling. Note that the first sub-dimension (not teachable-
teachable) does not perfectly overlap the tacit-articulable dimension, nor does it 
perfectly overlap the not articulated-articulated sub-dimension. This suggests that 
even tacit knowledge might be taught. But if so, how? 
 
Nonaka suggested four modes of explicit- and/or tacit-knowledge 
conversion which have implications for how tacit knowledge is taught (1994: 19). 
The first and the last of these are particularly relevant to questions of making tacit 
knowledge teachable. The first mode of organizational knowledge conversion, 
socialization, refers to the conversion of tacit knowledge possessed by one 
individual into tacit knowledge possessed by another. This mode represents a 
kind of apprenticeship in which individuals learn tacit knowledge from others by 
engaging in the same activities as them. This is highly effective, but quite 
inefficient. The second mode of knowledge conversion, combination, is not 
relevant to this discussion because it only comprises explicit, not tacit knowledge; 
not articulated    articulated 
Source: Winter (1987) 
Figure 3: Tacit-Articulable Knowledge Dimensions 
 
Tacit                           Articulable 
not teachable               teachable 
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nonetheless it is important to note: it involves the conversion of an individual’s 
explicit knowledge into new explicit knowledge. The third mode of knowledge 
conversion, internalization, is similar to the proceduralization process described 
previously and is most like traditional views of learning (Crossan et al., 1999; 
Gordon, 1992). It involves the conversion of an individual’s explicit knowledge 
into tacit knowledge. The last mode of knowledge conversion, externalization, 
refers to the conversion of an individual’s tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. 
It is this process that is most relevant to this study because it is this type of 
conversion that is involved in the transferring of intuitive, procedural knowledge. 
Externalization occurs through dialogue, which facilitates the process 
whereby tacit “field specific” perspectives are converted into explicit concepts by 
activating externalization at individual levels (Nonaka, 1994: 25). In like manner, 
Zollo and Winter (2002) proposed that tacit knowledge can be articulated through 
collective discussions, debriefing sessions and performance evaluation 
processes. They suggested that: 
By sharing their individual experiences and comparing their opinions with 
those of their colleagues, organization members can achieve an improved 
level of understanding of the causal mechanisms intervening between the 
actions required to execute a certain task and the performance outcomes 
produced (2002: 341-342). 
 
Taking this a step further, these authors suggested that knowledge codification 
can result in an even greater understanding of tacit knowledge than can be 
achieved through articulation alone. “Through the writing process, one is forced 
to expose the logical steps of one’s arguments, to unearth hidden assumptions, 
and to make the causal linkages explicit” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 342). Indeed, 
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knowledge codification efforts require that explicit conclusions be drawn about 
experience, which articulation alone does not do (2002: 349). 
The extent to which knowledge can be codified refers to whether or not 
that knowledge can be structured into identifiable rules and relationships that are 
easily articulable (Kogut & Zander, 1992). “Codifiabilty is a question of the degree 
that there exists an implied theory by which to identify and symbolically represent 
knowledge” (1992: 387). Procedural knowledge about a specific decision is 
codifiable insofar as it is possible to derive an in-use decision policy from a 
decision maker (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Within this study, I define knowledge 
codification to be: the process of converting procedural knowledge into 
identifiable rules and relationships about a specific decision policy which are then 
recorded such that they can be communicated (Cowan & Foray, 1997; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). Because increases in decision-policy consciousness can facilitate 
gaining commitment from important others, knowledge codification is thought to 
be important to entrepreneurial decision makers. Additionally, knowledge 
codification is important because it can, by facilitating both the generation and 
adaptation of operating routines, result in the creation of dynamic capabilities 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002), which are considered important to wealth creation (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
The knowledge codification process is thought to consist of three elements 
(Cowan, 2001; Cowan & Foray, 1997) that may help to increase decision-policy 
consciousness of opportunity evaluation decisions, thereby reducing linkage 
ambiguity. First, knowledge codification begins with the development of a model 
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of the knowledge to be codified, resulting in the identifiable rules and 
relationships that are easily articulable (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Second, 
knowledge codification also frequently requires the development of language that 
can be used to describe the model. Third, knowledge codification culminates in 
the writing of the model, which (as was noted) can reveal hidden assumptions 
and make causal linkages explicit (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 342). Based on these 
elements, 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurial decision makers who engage in 
knowledge codification will possess higher decision-policy 
consciousness than entrepreneurial decision makers who do not 
engage in knowledge codification. 
Incentive. In addition to knowledge codification, incentive is thought to 
affect the articulation of knowledge. As Nelson and Winter suggested: 
Incentives, too, clearly matter: when circumstances place a great premium 
on effective articulation, remarkable things can sometimes be 
accomplished (1982: 78). 
 
How can circumstance place a premium on effective articulation? Nelson and 
Winter (1982) give the example of a pilot on the ground who can successfully 
communicate the knowledge required for a non-pilot to land a small airplane. In 
this “emergency” circumstance, effective articulation is the difference between life 
and death. In entrepreneurship, although not as extreme a circumstance, 
incentives also matter.7 They are thought to be highly correlated with residual 
risk—a measure of “the ex post valuation of a firm’s overall entrepreneurial 
capability” (Mosakowski, 1998: 632, emphasis in original)—which is generally 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that entrepreneurship cannot be extreme. 
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borne by the entrepreneur8 (1998). In entrepreneurial circumstances, effective 
articulation can bring about commitment from important stakeholders (e.g., 
resource providers) (Miller & Ireland, 2005) which can mean the difference 
between the life and death of the firm. As a result, entrepreneurs frequently have 
a high incentive to increase decision-policy consciousness such that the 
knowledge behind a specific decision is articulable (referred to as decision 
communication incentives). Thus,  
Hypothesis 3a: Entrepreneurial decision makers with high decision 
communication incentives will have higher decision-policy 
consciousness than entrepreneurial decision makers with low 
decision communication incentives. 
Regulatory-focus theory further illuminates the role of incentives with 
respect to decision-policy consciousness. In particular, regulatory-focus theory 
specifies that an incentive can be framed in terms of either gains/non-gains  or 
losses/non-losses (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) to stimulate a different 
cognitive response.  Similar to the hedonic principle, which states that people 
seek pleasure and avoid pain, regulatory-focus theory also suggests that the 
cognitive mechanisms that lead them to do so are different (Higgins, 1997). Said 
differently, the ways to approach or avoid a desired outcome can differ.  Higgins 
noted that: 
Regulatory-focus theory proposes that self-regulation to strong ideals 
versus strong oughts differs in regulatory focus. Ideal self-regulation 
                                                 
8 Mosakowski (1998) noted that even in situations where, due to wealth constraints, the 
entrepreneur does not bear all the risk, “high-powered incentives” (Williamson, 1985) will still link 
incentives to residual risk. 
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involves a promotion focus, whereas ought self-regulation involves a 
prevention focus (1997: 1281-1282). 
 
A promotion focus is related to the achievement of an ideal; whereas a 
prevention focus is related to avoiding what ought not to be done.  Moreover, 
regulatory focus can be either chronic or situational: 
Regulatory focus theory, then, distinguishes between two kinds of goal 
attainment that vary in chronic focus: attainment of aspirations and 
accomplishments (promotion focus) and attainment of responsibilities and 
safety (prevention focus). According to the theory, momentary situations 
can also temporarily induce either a promotion or a prevention focus on 
goal attainment.  For example, feedback messages or task instructions 
can communicate gain–nongain information (promotion focus) or nonloss–
loss information (prevention focus) (Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998: 
1116). 
 
In this research, a situational approach is taken in the sense that regulatory focus 
is manipulated in terms of the type of decision communication incentives (gain-
framed versus non-loss-framed) entrepreneurial decision makers receive.9 When 
framed in terms of a gain, an incentive is thought to stimulate a promotion focus; 
when framed in terms of a non-loss, an incentive is thought to stimulate a 
prevention focus (Förster et al., 1998). 
Two sets of findings in regulatory-focus theory are particularly relevant to 
study one. First, situationally manipulated regulatory focus has been found to 
result in differences in behavior related to desired and actual outcomes.  
Specifically, when promotion focus ideals are primed, research participants tend 
to seek matches between desired and actual outcomes; conversely, when 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that previous findings suggest that individuals with a chronic promotion 
focus respond better to incentives framed in terms of gains and non-gains and individuals with a 
chronic prevention focus respond better to incentives framed in terms of losses and non-losses 
(Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). In this study, however, chronic regulatory focus was not 
matched with situationally manipulated regulatory focus, but was rather controlled for through 
random assignment to incentive conditions. 
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prevention focus oughts are primed, research participants tend to avoid 
mismatches between desired and actual outcomes (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 
Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). This is important because the incentive 
manipulation in this study places high levels of decision-policy consciousness as 
the outcome of interest (in effect a match), leading to the expectation that those 
in the gain-framed promotion-focus condition will behave differently towards the 
achievement of decision-policy consciousness than those in the non-loss framed 
prevention-focus condition.   
Second, in their testing of differences in promotion-framed and prevention-
framed tasks, Crowe and Higgins (1997) found that participants working on a 
difficult task tend to perform better when primed for promotion focus than those 
who are primed for prevention focus; and that in an alternative generation task, 
those individuals primed for promotion focus tend to generate a greater number 
of alternatives than those individuals primed for prevention focus. Taken with the 
first set of regulatory-focus findings above, it might be expected, then, that the 
tendency of participants in a match-seeking promotion-focus condition to 
outperform those in the mismatch-avoiding prevention-focus condition will lead 
those in the gain-framed promotion-focus condition to have higher decision-policy 
consciousness than those in the non-loss framed prevention-focus incentive 
condition. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3b: Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment will be higher for individuals whose decision 
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communication incentives are framed in terms of gains than those 
whose incentives are framed in terms of non-losses. 
As will be discussed in more depth, a manipulation check is included to verify the 
efficacy of the incentive manipulation on situational regulatory focus. 
Use of Analogy. Another way in which tacit knowledge can be made 
more explicit (suggesting possibilities for increasing an entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s decision-policy consciousness) is through use of metaphor10 and 
analogy (Nonaka, 1994). In a general sense, analogy can be defined to be: 
similarity in relational structure that applies across domains (Gentner, 1983; 
Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993). In the management literature, reasoning 
by analogy has been suggested as a way to define problems characterized by 
complexity and ambiguity (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). We reason by analogy 
when “we make a decision about something new in our experience by drawing a 
parallel to something old in our experience” (Sternberg, 1977: 99). This allows us 
to more easily understand new situations or information (Kedar-Cabelli, 1988) 
and can help to anchor beliefs when evidence about these beliefs is weak or 
contradictory (Steinbruner, 1974: 115). In this sense, use of analogical thinking 
can help individuals articulate knowledge that is otherwise difficult to 
communicate by linking it to knowledge that is already articulable. 
Additionally, analogy plays an important role in learning and knowledge 
transfer in the sense that people are better able to solve a problem if they have 
                                                 
10 Because metaphor can be seen as a type of analogical process (Gentner, 1983; Johnson, 
1988), and because “metaphors, similes, and so on are our linguistic vehicles for conveying 
analogies” (Kedar-Cabelli, 1988: 66), the following discussion of reasoning by analogy refers to 
the concepts of both metaphor and analogy.  
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previously solved similar problems (Gentner et al., 1993). But while notions of 
similarity are essential to analogy, similarity does not always imply analogy. That 
is, not all types of similarity are created equally. As Gentner et al. described: 
In analogy, only relational predicates—low-order and higher order—are 
shared. In literal similarity (overall similarity), both relational predicates 
and object-attributes are shared. In surface matches (or mere-appearance 
matches), only object-attributes and low-order relations are shared . . . 
Although these distinctions are continua, not dichotomies, it is nonetheless 
useful to lay out the dimensions (1993: 527, emphasis in original). 
 
Said differently, the degree of similarity among objects—problems, decisions, 
situations, etc.—can be based on common structure (analogy), based on 
common surface features (mere-appearance matches), or based in both 
structural and surface similarity (literal). 
Interestingly, the various types of similarity are of differential value in 
knowledge transfer depending on which component of knowledge transfer is in 
use. Similarity-based knowledge transfer is thought to consist of four11 main 
components (Gentner et al., 1993; Kedar-Cabelli, 1988). First, knowledge 
transfer using analogies typically begins with an individual’s retrieval of prior 
potential analogies. Second, the individual next engages in a matching process, 
wherein prior knowledge about the base (i.e., the known domain) is matched with 
the target (i.e., the new domain). Third, the individual then maps additional 
inferences from the base onto the target, effectively finishing the analogy, which 
is, fourth, subsequently evaluated for soundness (validity). 
                                                 
11 Two additional learning components can also occur in the knowledge transfer process, 
although they are not always present. The individual can first, adapt inferences about the base to 
fit the target, and second, extract the common structure of the analogy for later use (Gentner et 
al., 1993; Kedar-Cabelli, 1988). 
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Regarding the idea that different types of similarity have differential effects 
on the various components of knowledge transfer, Gentner et al. (1993) reported 
that surface similarity strongly affected analogy retrieval (access) processes, 
whereas structural similarity weakly affected these processes. Conversely, 
structural similarity strongly influences evaluations of soundness (validity), while 
surface similarity had no influence on these evaluations.  
These findings have implications for this study. As is previously noted, 
analogies may be useful mechanisms for making tacit knowledge explicit 
(Nonaka, 1994). As was described previously, similarity across the different types 
of analogy is a matter of degree. Thus, because surface similarity plays a role in 
accessing a potential analogy, but not in assessing the soundness of the analogy 
(suggesting possible misfires), analogy based primarily on surface similarity may 
not increase decision-policy consciousness—the analogy used may simply be 
irrelevant. However, because structural similarity figures prominently in matching 
and mapping processes (Gentner & Toupin, 1986), and because structural 
similarity plays a role in assessing the soundness of matching and mapping 
processes, analogy primarily rooted in structural similarity is likely to increase 
decision-policy consciousness by linking knowledge that is difficult to articulate to 
information that is already articulated.  
This is particularly important in entrepreneurship, because entrepreneurial 
phenomena are frequently difficult to define and describe; as a result, analogy is 
often used instead (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). When analogy rooted in 
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structural similarity is used to describe an entrepreneurial decision, descriptions 
of this decision policy may be more accurate. Hence,  
Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurial decision makers who use structurally 
similar analogies to describe their decision policies will possess 
higher decision-policy consciousness than entrepreneurial decision 
makers who do not use structurally similar analogies. 
Interactions among Factors.  Just as founder status is hypothesized to 
have an impact on decision-policy consciousness, so too might it influence the 
potential effects of knowledge codification, incentives and use of analogy on 
decision-policy consciousness.  That is, founders are expected to benefit more 
from knowledge codification, incentives and use of analogy than non-founders 
because they have been shown to think (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005) 
and perform (Begley, 1995; Begley & Boyd, 1987) differently than their 
managerial counterparts.  In the following paragraphs, I present the rationale and 
hypotheses for each of these interaction effects. 
In their work on strategic decision making, Busenitz and Barney (1997) 
observed that founders and managers differ in their use of decision-making 
heuristics. At one end of their decision-making continuum are firm founders, who 
are more prone to rely on the representativeness heuristic than the managers at 
the other end of the continuum.  The reason given for this effect is that founders 
operate under conditions of higher uncertainty than managers: where managers 
can make decision based on historical trends and past performance, founders’ 
decisions are made with little information about historical trends or past 
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performance (Busenitz & Barney, 1997: 13). These findings are particularly 
relevant in this study because of what can be understood about the formation of 
views about firm-related opportunities by firm founders compared to non-
founders (who likely fall somewhere in the middle of the founder/manager 
continuum).   
The representativeness heuristic has its roots in the work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1971; 1974). They suggested that use of the representativeness 
heuristic involves decision making based on generalized probabilities. Two of the 
underlying reasons that they provided for use of this effect are particularly 
relevant here. First, Tversky and Kahneman suggested that use of the 
representativeness heuristic is, in part, the result of insensitivity to predictability, 
which is manifest through inattentiveness to “the reliability of the evidence and to 
the expected accuracy of the prediction” (1974: 1126). In other words, individuals 
who rely on the representativeness heuristic do not evaluate the dependability of 
the information that motivates their decision, but simply assume predictability. A 
second reason that Tversky and Kahneman gave for use of the 
representativeness heuristic in decision making was the illusion of validity. 
Specifically, they suggested that: 
The confidence [people] have in their prediction depends primarily on the 
degree of representativeness (that is, on the quality of the match between 
the selected outcome and the input) with little or no regard for the factors 
that limit predictive accuracy . . . The unwarranted confidence which is 
produced by a good fit between the predicted outcome and the input 
information may be called the illusion of validity (1974: 1126). 
 
Said differently, individuals who rely on representativeness do not evaluate the 
extent to which the information provided is meaningful vis-à-vis the predicted 
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outcome; rather, they assume a link between information input and predicted 
outcome. 
As previously stated, a central feature of knowledge codification is that of 
model building: a process that involves the organization of identifiable rules and 
relationships (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and requires an individual to expose the 
logical steps of his or her argument, to unearth hidden assumptions, and to make 
causal linkages explicit (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 342). Thus, in the case of the 
representativeness heuristic, codification is expected to reveal an individual’s 
assumptions related to insensitivity to predictability and to illusions of validity, 
thereby resulting in a more accurate and thoughtful assessment of  opportunity-
related information.   
Because of differences in the views about opportunities between founders 
and non-founders relative to codification, the importance (and resulting efficacy) 
of codification is expected to differ for both groups.  In the case of founders, 
views about firm-related opportunities form at the birth of a firm where use of 
codification in the decision to “join” a firm is lower because there is no firm and, 
as a result, not much information to codify.  And as noted previously, it is at this 
time that uncertainty is highest and assumptions about opportunities ubiquitous, 
leading founders to rely heavily on the representativeness heuristic in their 
decision making. Conversely, in the case of non-founders, views about firm-
related opportunities form when they decide to join a previously-founded firm, 
where use of codification in the decision to “join” a firm is higher because of the 
presence of codifiable information about that firm’s existing performance. And 
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again as noted, at this time uncertainty is less prevalent than during the founding 
process, leading non-founders to rely less on the representativeness heuristic in 
their firm-related opportunity decision making.  In this sense, non-founders utilize 
codification in their firm-related opportunity decision making to a greater extent 
than founders, ceteris paribus. Combining this with the expected impact that 
knowledge codification has on checking the assumptions that underlie use of the 
representativeness heuristic, it is anticipated that, 
Hypothesis 5a: Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers engage 
in codification of their knowledge, but does so at a faster rate for 
founders than for non-founders. 
As Mosakowski (1998) observes, the residual risk related to a firm’s 
entrepreneurial capability is generally borne by the entrepreneur. This is 
especially likely in the case of the founder, since firm founder CEOs have been 
shown to posses more than twice the equity stake in a firm than non-founder 
CEOs (Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992).  In this way, founders who continue to 
lead their firms following startup have a greater incentive than non-founders to 
ensure firm survival. And while both founder and non-founder alike bear a 
significant share of the risk related to that opportunity (Mosakowski, 1998), the 
greater stake that the founder has may explain why founders feel a more 
pronounced pressure to succeed (Begley & Boyd, 1987).  
This pressure to succeed is also thought to be impacted by the importance 
of effective articulation, which in entrepreneurial environments facilitates 
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commitment from important stakeholders (Miller & Ireland, 2005) and is critical to 
the success of the firm.  It is for this reason that decision communication 
incentives are expected to be more effective for those that have high a higher 
stake in a firm.  Accordingly, as a result of founders’ larger stake in the firm, 
decision communication incentives should influence founders to a greater degree 
than non-founders. As such, 
Hypothesis 5b: Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers’ decision 
communication incentives increase, but does so at a faster rate for 
founders than for non-founders. 
In relating regulatory-focus theory to entrepreneurship, Brockner, Higgins 
and Low (2004) suggested that both promotion and prevention orientations can 
be beneficial in the entrepreneurial process. They propose that promotion focus 
is particularly beneficial when creativity is at a premium.  Conversely, they 
suggest that a prevention focus is beneficial when accuracy is needed.  
Moreover, Brockner, Higgins and Low (2004) referred to previous regulatory-
focus research which suggests that the efficacy of promotion or prevention focus 
can depend on the fit between dispositional and situational factors. In this sense, 
an individual’s perception of the organization and the organizational climate may 
affect whether a promotion or a prevention focus is more efficacious.  Founders 
may not respond to non-loss framed prevention-focus incentives because they 
do not consider that the company is going to fail (Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 
1988).  Similarly, non-founders may be less inclined to respond to gain-framed 
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promotion-focus incentives because the venture—which they did not create—
may represent a market position that must be protected (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990) from loss.  Accordingly, founders may respond to gain- and loss-focus 
incentives differently than non-founders. Thus,  
Hypothesis 5c: Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers receive 
decision communication incentives framed in terms of gains, but 
does so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders. 
Founders are also thought to benefit from use of analogy to a greater 
extent than non-founders. This is because founders and non-founders differ in 
their experiences related to the founding of a firm.  While firm founders are 
present at the beginning of a firm and as a result experience the entire creation 
process, non-founders are not present at firm founding and, thus, only observe 
the firm as founded.  In this sense, firm founders possess a greater degree of 
experience-based expertise (Reuber & Fischer, 1994) than non-founders; and as 
a result are endowed with expert knowledge that is of a deeper quality (i.e., 
procedural knowledge) than others with less experience at their firm (Leonard & 
Swap, 2004).  
In her work on differences in analogical transfer for experts and novices, 
Novick (1988) found that in the case of structurally similar analogies, positive 
transfer from analogy base to analogy target was more likely for experts than for 
novices. In this sense, founders with greater experience-based expertise 
regarding the opportunities related to the firm will likely benefit more from 
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structurally similar analogies than will non-founders with less experience-based 
expertise.  And because structural similarity is thought to increase decision-policy 
consciousness through matching processes (Gentner & Toupin, 1986) that link 
knowledge that is difficult to articulate to information that is already articulated,   
Hypothesis 5d: Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers utilize 
structurally similar analogies to describe their decision policies, but 
does so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders. 
I now turn to the opportunity evaluation decision policy in which the 
preceding hypotheses are tested. 
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CHAPTER III: OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION DECISION – STUDY TWO 
For entrepreneurial decision makers to fully benefit from an opportunity, 
linkage ambiguity (i.e., ambiguity about how advantage might be gained from the 
opportunity) may need to be reduced. Within the previous chapter, I have 
discussed some possible ways in which this can be done (i.e., through 
knowledge codification, incentives, and use of analogy). The reduction of linkage 
ambiguity in the context of opportunity evaluation results in an entrepreneurial 
decision maker’s ability to articulate the procedural knowledge that he/she uses 
in making an opportunity evaluation decision. To investigate opportunity 
evaluation, I draw on the entrepreneurial cognition and investment under 
uncertainty literatures, focusing specifically on decisions to act entrepreneurially. 
Likewise, I employ both the entrepreneurial cognition and investment under 
uncertainty literatures to understand the opportunity evaluation decision because 
the characteristics of investments made in an uncertain environment permit 
explicit focus on distinct elements of the opportunity-pursuing decision. This 
decision is important because it is the decision that can bridge the gap between 
decision making in exploration of an opportunity and decision making in 
exploitation of that opportunity, which are both important to success (March, 
1991).  
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of entrepreneurial decision 
making, and how it relates to opportunity evaluation, followed by a brief review of 
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the literatures related to entrepreneurial action. I then present factors suggested 
in the literature to be relevant to entrepreneurial action as investment and 
introduce hypotheses about the relationships between these factors and 
entrepreneurial action. 
Entrepreneurial Decision Making and Entrepreneurial Action 
Entrepreneurial Decision Making. A good deal of research in 
entrepreneurship has investigated the factors that may lead to differences in 
decision making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. For instance, 
McClelland (1961) investigated decision making in the context of risk taking by 
entrepreneurs, finding that high-achieving entrepreneurs were not necessarily 
high-risk-taking entrepreneurs. Similarly, Brockhaus (1980) found that risk-taking 
propensity is not a distinguishing difference between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs.  More recently, Busenitz and Barney (1997) found that while there 
may not be differences in the risk-taking propensities between entrepreneurs and 
their manager counterparts, there is a difference in the heuristics—and resulting 
biases—that operate in each group’s decision making. Taking an expert 
information processing approach, Mitchell, Smith, Seawright and Morse (2000) 
considered the effects of entrepreneurial expertise on the venture creation 
decision and found that three types of expert scripts—arrangement scripts, 
willingness scripts and ability scripts—are associated with the venture creation 
decision. But a decision alone is not sufficient. As McMullen and Shepherd 
(2006) noted: 
Entrepreneurship requires one, not just to decide, but to decide to act . . . 
entrepreneurial action refers to behavior in response to a judgmental 
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decision under uncertainty about a possible opportunity for profit. Whether 
entrepreneurial action occurs, however, depends upon how much one 
must rely upon his or her judgment, which in turn depends upon the 
degree of uncertainty experienced in the decision of whether to act (2006: 
134, emphasis in original).  
 
Two points are important. First, it is the decision to act that is important in 
opportunity evaluation. And second, whether or not an entrepreneur decides to 
act on an entrepreneurial opportunity is affected by the uncertainty surrounding 
that entrepreneurial opportunity. Utilizing the insights of McMullen and Shepherd, 
and drawing on the investment under uncertainty literature, I elaborate on this 
assertion in the following section. 
Entrepreneurial Action. Entrepreneurial action can take many forms. In 
their presentation of a typology of the entrepreneurial opportunity, Dean and 
McMullen (2002) suggested a number of entrepreneurial actions on 
entrepreneurial opportunities, each of which is a kind of reaction to market 
failure.  
Because mathematical economists have shown that a Pareto efficient 
outcome is dependent on the validity of the assumptions of competitive 
equilibrium, departures from these assumptions represent potential market 
failures. Thus, the primary classes of market failure discussed in the 
welfare economics literature are derived directly from these assumptions, 
and include imperfect information, monopoly power, public goods, 
externalities, and inappropriate government intervention (2002: F2, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Thus, entrepreneurial action in the context of market failure can include 
discovering and exploiting information, destroying monopoly positions, privatizing 
public goods, creating markets for externalities and eliminating inappropriate 
government intervention. In each case of entrepreneurial action an investment of 
money, effort or time is implied. And in each case, entrepreneurial action can 
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also lead to the creation of additional value through a Pareto improvement or a 
transaction that can make both parties to the transaction better off without 
making anyone else worse off (Varian, 2003: 17). In this sense, entrepreneurial 
action as investment has the potential to create new value that would not 
otherwise exist. Thus, building on the definition of entrepreneurial action provided 
by McMullen and Shepherd, I define entrepreneurial action to be: an investment 
“in response to a judgmental decision under uncertainty about a possible 
opportunity for profit” (2006: 134). 
In spite of the importance of research on entrepreneurial action, current 
thinking about this concept has a relatively short history. In the early 1990’s, 
research in entrepreneurship shifted in focus (e.g., Gartner, 1989). Rather than 
concentrating on entrepreneurial traits (e.g., Carland, Hoy, Boulton, & Carland, 
1984), researchers began to focus more on entrepreneurial behaviors and 
actions (e.g., Carter, Gartner, & Reynolds, 1996). Rather than looking at who the 
entrepreneur was, entrepreneurship researchers began to look at what the 
entrepreneur did. With this shift, researchers in entrepreneurship also began to 
examine entrepreneurial action in conjunction with cognitive factors related to the 
entrepreneur (e.g., Shaver & Scott, 1991). As Shaver and Scott argued: “A 
comprehensive psychological portrait of new venture creation will ultimately have 
to show how the individual’s cognitive representations of the world get translated 
into action” (1991: 27). In this regard, entrepreneurial action is the result of the 
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entrepreneur’s perceptions of both potential opportunities and factors related to 
these opportunities.12 
This view accords with the theory of entrepreneurial action suggested by 
McMullen and Shepherd (2006), who proposed two stages of entrepreneurial 
action: opportunity attention and opportunity evaluation. Opportunity attention 
involves questions of why opportunities are recognized and acted upon in 
general (referred to as third-person opportunities). Opportunity evaluation 
involves questions of why opportunities are recognized and acted upon by 
specific individuals (referred to as first-person opportunities). McMullen and 
Shepherd noted that perceptions of uncertainty have a preventative role in both 
processes. Perceived uncertainty in the opportunity attention stage can prevent 
the recognition of the opportunity in general. Similarly, perceived uncertainty in 
the opportunity evaluation stage prevents action on an opportunity by specific 
individuals. In other words: “uncertainty prevents action by obfuscating (1) the 
need or possibility for action, (2) the knowledge of what to do, and (3) whether 
the potential reward of action is worth the potential cost” (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006: 139).  
Opportunity Evaluation 
This study focuses on the second stage of entrepreneurial action, 
opportunity evaluation, because of the low decision-policy consciousness that is 
frequent in opportunity evaluation decisions. And as is noted in chapter 1, low 
decision-policy consciousness in the context of opportunity evaluation may 
                                                 
12 From the perspective of explaining whether an individual engages in an entrepreneurial action 
or not, I note that it is unimportant whether these perceptions are objectively accurate since it is 
the entrepreneur’s subjective experience that leads to action (Krueger, 1993). 
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negatively affect performance because the inability to articulate how advantage 
might be gained through action on an opportunity can limit the usefulness of the 
opportunity.   Opportunity evaluation begins with the recognition of a third-person 
opportunity, a result of opportunity attention. As potential entrepreneurs decide to 
invest in the opportunity, the third-person opportunity becomes a first-person 
opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). It is the decision to move from a third-
person opportunity to a first-person opportunity that is described in Figure 4. 
 
Perceptions of desirability and feasibility of the opportunity affect this 
decision to invest. In opportunity evaluation the decision to invest is also affected 
by the presence of uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), especially with 
respect to the nature of the environment. Additionally, individual difference 
factors are also thought to influence the decision to invest in an entrepreneurial 
opportunity (e.g., entrepreneurial self-efficacy) and will be investigated in more 
depth as part of the analysis. In the following section, I complement research on 
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entrepreneurial action with studies from the investment under uncertainty 
literature to justify each aspect of the opportunity evaluation decision. To this I 
turn.  
Potential Value of an Opportunity. The desirability of an opportunity is in 
large part based on the value to be gained from investing in an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. This value is based on two relevant benchmarks: “(1) the absolute 
level of economic performance that provides a return for enterprising effort, and 
(2) the social contribution of the individual’s effort” (Venkataraman, 1997: 132). 
The first of the two benchmarks is determined by subtracting the cost of 
economic effort from the economic advantage created, to result in either an 
advantage surplus or an advantage loss (Venkataraman, 1997). In addition to 
opportunity costs and premiums for risk and uncertainty, the cost of enterprising 
effort is a lack of liquidity—consisting of money, effort and time, and “only the 
surplus above this minimum can be counted as the entrepreneurs reward” (1997: 
132-133). Accordingly, the potential value of an opportunity is defined to be: the 
predicted financial advantage of entrepreneurial action after the predicted 
expenses (i.e., time, money and effort) incurred in entrepreneurial action have 
been taken into account. As Krueger and Brazeal noted, in Ajzen’s theory of 
planned behavior, intentions to act are in part based on perceived desirability 
(Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994). And insofar as a large financial 
advantage can compensate opportunity seekers for their efforts (Venkataraman, 
1997) thereby meeting some threshold of desirability; and insofar as strength of 
 47 
intentions is thought to be related to action (Kim & Hunter, 1993), potential value 
is likely to relate to entrepreneurial action on an opportunity. Hence, 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the potential value (desirability) of an 
opportunity, the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to 
invest in (act on) that opportunity. 
While self-evident, this hypothesis also plays an important part in other aspects 
of the opportunity evaluation decision policy, which is explained further in the 
following sections. 
Knowledge Relatedness. Opportunity evaluation is also thought to be 
influenced by entrepreneurs’ perceptions of feasibility with respect to a specific 
opportunity. Perception of feasibility refers to an individual’s perception that they 
have the requisite knowledge to successfully perform a specific behavior 
(Krueger, 1993). In this sense, perceptions of feasibility are linked to the question 
of whether the knowledge required to capture (or exploit) an opportunity is 
related to the knowledge already possessed by the entrepreneur. Thus, it is the 
relatedness of knowledge required by the opportunity that is important. In this 
study, knowledge relatedness is defined to be: the extent to which the knowledge 
that is perceived as necessary to exploit an opportunity is similar to the 
knowledge already possessed. The higher the knowledge relatedness, the more 
feasible a potentially valuable opportunity seems; and as was the case with 
desirability, perceived feasibility of an opportunity is linked to the intention to act 
on that opportunity (Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994). Thus, 
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Hypothesis 7a: The higher the knowledge relatedness (feasibility) 
of an opportunity, the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker 
is to invest in (act on) that opportunity. 
There is, however, more to the story. In discussing perceived desirability, 
perceived feasibility and intention to act, Krueger (1993) suggests a non-linear 
relationship between these factors. This implies that the potential value of an 
opportunity and the knowledge relatedness of the opportunity may interact in 
their effect on the decision to invest in an opportunity. When considering 
opportunities with high potential value, potential entrepreneurs may be more 
likely to act in situations where the knowledge that they possess is closely related 
to the knowledge that is thought to be required, than in situations where the 
knowledge they possess is not related to the knowledge that is perceived as 
required. The importance of knowledge relatedness is in line with findings that 
firms who “stick to their knitting” outperform firms who do not  (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982).Thus, 
Hypothesis 7b: The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an 
opportunity increases with the potential value (desirability) of an 
opportunity, but does so at a faster rate when knowledge 
relatedness (feasibility) of the opportunity is high. 
The expected form of the interaction effect between potential value and 
knowledge relatedness of an opportunity is depicted in figure 5a. 
As is depicted in figure 4, hypotheses 8a, 8b, 9a and 9b—concerning the 
main and moderating roles of window of opportunity and number of potential 
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opportunities—are related to environmental factors. In the following sections I 
develop the logic that leads to these hypotheses. 
Window of Opportunity Availability. As was previously emphasized, 
opportunity evaluation decisions occur under conditions of uncertainty, the 
coping with which is thought to be “the essence of the administrative process” 
(Thompson, 1967: 159). The notion of uncertainty has been an important topic 
related to value creation since Knight introduced the notion of “true” uncertainty 
or uncertainty that is not susceptible to measurement, but that can account for 
“the peculiar income of the entrepreneur” (1921: 232). In the management 
literature, uncertainty has generally been defined as the inability of an individual 
to perceive something accurately (Milliken, 1987: 136).  
One of the key insights in the investment under uncertainty literature is 
that investments in an opportunity can be postponed until uncertainty about the 
investment is minimized (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). This is not to say, however, that 
an opportunity does not expire. While opportunity expiration is often 
indeterminate, imprecise, and rarely linked to a finite date (Janney & Dess, 2004: 
61), the closing of the window of an opportunity—when it does occur—is usually 
the result of “competitive action or an environmental shift” (McGrath, 1996: 104) 
within the already uncertain environment. In this study, window of opportunity 
availability is defined to be: the length of time that is left for an entrepreneurial 
decision maker to profitably act on an opportunity. A narrow window of 
opportunity availability is indicative of opportunity-related time pressure: 
decisions about opportunities in such circumstances cannot be delayed without 
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risking loss of those opportunities. Because deadlines are likely to require more 
immediate decisions (Moore, 2004a), narrower windows of opportunity 
availability are likely to result in entrepreneurial action.  Accordingly,  
Hypothesis 8a: The narrower the window of opportunity availability 
(environment), the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is 
to invest in (act on) that opportunity. 
Additionally, as Moore (2004b) noted (in the context of negotiation), 
individuals with less time available to negotiate have lower demands than those 
individuals with more time available, leading those with less time to be more 
prone to negotiate than those with more time. This finding is applicable to the 
context of action on an entrepreneurial opportunity in that one might expect 
individuals with narrower windows of opportunity availability to have lower 
demands of an opportunity than those with more time available. A related finding 
is reported by Ku, Malhotra and Murnighan, (2005) who found that time pressure 
can lead to overpayment in auctions; and while opportunity evaluation decisions 
differ in many respects from auctions, the effect of time pressure on human 
behavior exhibited in auctions is also expected in opportunity evaluation 
decisions.  Specifically, a tendency for overpayment in an auction (which reduces 
the overall net-buyer benefit of a purchase (Ghemawat, 1991)) can be viewed as 
analogous to a reduction of demands in opportunity evaluation decisions (which 
reduces the overall benefit of an opportunity investment).   
Taken together, these findings suggest that as the pressure to decide on 
an investment increases, the personal requirements for the outcome of that 
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investment decrease. This is consistent with the findings of Ahituv, Igbaria and 
Sella (1998) who found that time pressure in decision making frequently impairs 
performance. In this regard, time pressure in the form of narrow windows of 
opportunity may have a differential effect on an entrepreneurial decision maker’s 
propensity to invest in high-value versus low-value opportunities. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8b: The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an 
opportunity increases with the potential value of an opportunity, but 
does so at a faster rate when the window of opportunity availability 
(environment) is narrow. 
The expected form of the interaction effect between potential value of an 
opportunity and the window of opportunity availability is depicted in figure 5b. 
Number of Potential Opportunities. Perceived opportunities do not 
necessarily exist in isolation. Rather, a recognized third-person opportunity may 
be one of many perceived opportunities. In this study, I define the number of 
potential opportunities to be: the total number of third-person opportunities 
recognized by a given entrepreneur. In speaking of opportunities in a real options 
context, McGrath and Nerkar (2004) observed that firms who possess a portfolio 
of real options on opportunities (which consists of investments in more than one 
option at a time) behave differently than those who do not have portfolios of real 
options. Moreover, they found that the assessment of an option on an opportunity 
in a portfolio is interdependent with the rest of the portfolio (McGrath & Nerkar, 
2004: 17). The same might be true of third-person opportunities: the presence of 
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multiple third-person opportunities may complicate individual choice about these 
opportunities.  
Moreover, entrepreneurial firms operate under conditions of resource 
constraints (Aldrich, 1999); and while limited resources have been shown to lead 
to increases in performance in private firms (George, 2005) (a result of increased 
creativity in the use of resources (Baker & Nelson, 2003)) such resource 
constraints can also affect decisions about specific opportunities because the 
pursuit of one opportunity can tie up resources in entrepreneurial firms such that 
pursuit of other opportunities may not be possible.  Thus, when an 
entrepreneurial decision maker invests in one opportunity, it may be at the 
expense of other viable opportunities. Conversely, when there is but one 
opportunity available, entrepreneurial decision makers in high velocity 
environments may feel compelled to invest in that opportunity because of their 
lack of choice simply due to uncertainty surrounding the future. Such action on 
the part of entrepreneurial decision makers is consistent with previous assertions 
that uncertain environments (e.g., environments with changing technologies) lead 
to managerial action (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 1997).  As a 
result, a low number of potential opportunities will increase the likelihood of 
investing in one of these opportunities. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 9a: The fewer the number of potential opportunities 
available (environment), the more likely an entrepreneurial decision 
maker is to invest in (act on) that opportunity. 
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Eisenhardt reported an interesting finding related to number of potential 
opportunities. Specifically, she found that the greater the number of alternatives 
considered, the faster the decision making (1989: 556). This finding is contrary to 
previous research which found greater numbers of potential opportunities to 
evaluate might slow decision-making processes (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). 
Her explanations for this effect were fourfold. First, she suggested that 
alternatives viewed in isolation are difficult to evaluate (e.g., buying a car after 
only seeing one). Second, having multiple opportunities reduces escalation-of-
commitment problems. 
Decision makers who pursue multiple options have a lower psychological 
stake in any one alternative and thus can quickly shift between options if 
they receive negative information on any alternative (1989: 558). 
 
Third, she noted that having more than one opportunity can provide a fallback 
position, meaning that if one alternative fails, there is another alternative in the 
wings. And fourth, she noted that “the view that multiple alternatives are time-
consuming does not distinguish between the number of alternatives and the 
depth of analysis” (1989: 558).  
Taken together, these findings would seem to indicate that the 
expectations of entrepreneurial decision makers evaluating multiple opportunities 
may be higher than entrepreneurial decision makers evaluating few 
opportunities.  Moreover, because attention is more focused when there are 
fewer distractions (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989), increases in the potential value 
of the opportunity may be more salient when the number of potential 
opportunities is low, than when the number of potential opportunities is high. In 
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this sense, the number of potential opportunities available may have a differential 
effect on investment with respect to the potential value of an opportunity. 
Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 9b: The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an 
opportunity increases with potential value of an opportunity, but 
does so at a faster rate when the number of potential opportunities 
available (environment) is few. 
The expected form of the interaction effect described in hypothesis 9b is depicted 
in figure 5c.   
Individual Differences. As is noted previously, a number of individual 
differences may affect the opportunity evaluation decision. Within this section I 
discuss a number of these differences and, through a series of propositions, 
suggest possible ways in which they may be related to the decision to invest in 
an opportunity. Specifically, I explore how fear of failure, entrepreneurial self-
efficacy and human capital affect the decision to invest.   
Numbered among the interesting insights provided to entrepreneurship by 
the investment under uncertainty literature (real options theory, specifically) is the 
notion that by waiting to invest, entrepreneurs can manage the costs of failure, 
rather than focus on avoiding failure (McGrath, 1999). This insight is particularly 
interesting because much of the early research in entrepreneurship focused on 
achieving success (Vesper, 1980) or avoiding failure (Dickinson, 1981). The 
potential benefits of failure (Sitkin, 1992) were seldom included in early 
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entrepreneurship discourse.13 In recent research, however, the tendency to focus 
solely on the benefits of success and the drawbacks of failure has been replaced 
with a more equitable treatment of both success (e.g., Miller, 1994) and failure 
(e.g., McGrath, 1999; Sitkin, 1992). 
However, despite this progress toward a more balanced treatment of both 
success and failure, there still seems to exist a general bias against failure and 
for success (McGrath, 1999).14 When manifest at the individual level, this bias is 
thought to introduce “errors in learning and interpretation processes,” which 
paradoxically “often make failure more likely and more expensive than it need to 
have been” (McGrath, 1999: 16). Thus, this bias against failure, which is 
manifested as failure avoidance or fear of failure, is likely reflected in 
entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation decisions. 
Entrepreneurial decision makers who are thus biased against failure may behave 
in ways that are inconsistent with what theories based on assumptions of 
rationality may suggest. For instance, they may focus more on factors related to 
failure (e.g., window of opportunity availability) and less on factors related to 
upside potential (e.g., potential value of opportunity). Their decision policies may 
be simpler (e.g., less weight on the interaction terms), or may contain 
qualitatively different kinds of interactions. Additionally, holding all else constant, 
entrepreneurial decision makers who are biased against failure may be less likely 
                                                 
13 For a notable exception see Stacey (1983). 
14 See Hogarty (1993) and Osborne (1993) for representative examples. 
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to invest in entrepreneurial opportunities than entrepreneurial decision makers 
who are not, because investing can lead to failure.15 Thus,  
Proposition 1: Entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity 
evaluation decision policies will differ based on their attitudes about 
failure. 
The notion of self-efficacy is based on social learning theory (Bandura, 
1977) and is defined as an individual’s perceived ability to execute some target 
behavior (Krueger, 2000: 11; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994: 94). In entrepreneurship, 
self-efficacy has been linked to entrepreneurial intentions and actions (Boyd & 
Vozikis, 1994). Additionally, Boyd and Vozikis suggest that entrepreneurs who 
report higher self-efficacy set more challenging goals for themselves than 
entrepreneurs who have lower self-efficacy (1994). In their study on 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy, Chen, Green and Crick (1998) note that 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy is positively related to intentions to start a business, 
also finding that the entrepreneurial self-efficacy of founders is higher with 
respect to innovation and risk-taking than it was for non-founders. 
Based on these findings, one might expect in the current context that 
individuals with high degrees of entrepreneurial self-efficacy will be more prone 
to invest in opportunities than those with low degrees of entrepreneurial self-
efficacy. In addition, self-efficacy is closely related to perceptions of feasibility 
and knowledge relatedness. And whereas knowledge relatedness is a function of 
the opportunity, self-efficacy is a function of the person and is thought to be 
                                                 
15 While a missed opportunity can also be considered a failure in the form of a sin of omission, the 
focus of this study is on a bias against failure in the form of a sin of commission. 
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situation specific (Krueger & Brazeal, 1994). Consequently, individuals who have 
high entrepreneurial self-efficacy might be less likely to view low knowledge 
relatedness in a particular opportunity situation as problematic. Moreover, 
because entrepreneurial self-efficacy is not dependent on the characteristics of 
the opportunity, and because individuals with higher self-efficacy are more likely 
to take risks (Krueger & Dickson, 1994), entrepreneurial decision makers with 
high entrepreneurial self-efficacy may be more inclined to invest, ceteris paribus, 
because they simply believe that they can do it.  Therefore, 
Proposition 2: Entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity 
evaluation decision policies will differ based on their perceived 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy. 
Human capital is a third factor that is likely to affect an individual’s 
decision to invest in an opportunity.  Broadly viewed, human capital includes an 
individual’s ability as well as their acquired skills (Markman & Baron, 2003): the 
greater the investment in human capital, the greater the return for that investment 
(Becker, 1975).  More precisely defined, human capital is specified as either 
general or specific (Becker, 1975). General human capital typically refers to an 
individual’s educational experience on the whole, whereas specific human capital 
refers to an individual’s educational experience within a certain firm or industry.  
In entrepreneurship, human capital has been linked to entry into 
entrepreneurship (Davidsson & Honig, 2003); general and specific human capital 
have been linked to firm survival and growth (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 
1994; Pennings, Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998); and general human capital has 
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been linked to opportunity portfolio performance of venture capitalists (Dimov & 
Shepherd, 2005). 
Within this study, I follow Dimov and Shepherd (2005) in defining general 
and specific human capital: general human capital refers to education and 
specific human capital refers to industry experience.  And based on the 
previously discussed importance of human capital in the entrepreneurial process, 
it is expected that both general human capital (overall educational experience) 
and specific human capital (industry experience) will also affect the decision to 
invest in an opportunity. Thus, it is expected that, 
Proposition 3: Entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity 
evaluation decision policies will differ based on their general human 
capital (educational experience) and specific human capital 
(industry experience). 
Additional individual level factors are also included in the study, but are 
not discussed in depth here as they are only to be used as descriptive/control 
variables in the study. These include environmental dynamism and other 
demographic information such as age and gender. 
In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology used to test the hypotheses 
related to decision-policy consciousness (Hypotheses 1-5) and the opportunity 
evaluation decision policy (Hypotheses 6-9). 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS  
This chapter has two main sections. In the first section, I discuss the 
methods used to test the hypotheses in study one; in the second section, I 
address the methods used to test the hypotheses in study two. I hasten to note 
that because the testing of the hypotheses related to increasing decision-policy 
consciousness (study one) is done through a series of manipulations that are 
carried out during measurement of the opportunity evaluation decision policy 
(study two), there will be some overlap between sections.  
Study One – Decision-Policy Consciousness 
Sample.  The selection of the sample began with a series of focused 
interviews with four entrepreneurial decision makers, each in a different industry. 
During these interviews, each entrepreneurial decision maker was asked 
questions regarding: (1) their approach to entrepreneurial opportunities within 
their specific industry, (2) their approach towards opportunities in general, (3) the 
factors that they consider when looking at investing in entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and (4) their approach to failure (this last question being used to 
develop/select a measurement instrument that relates to entrepreneurial failure). 
Appendix A contains the interview guide, which plays an indispensable part of 
the interview process (Merton & Kendall, 1946).  
Based on their responses to the first three questions, it was evident that a 
sample of high potential technology-related ventures would be appropriate to test 
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the hypotheses. This is because the fast-changing nature of technology leads 
decision makers in technology-related industries to report a frequent need to 
make decisions about new or changing opportunities (Hughes, 1990).  Thus, a 
sample of technology companies was selected from the OneSource CorpTech 
database. This database is well-known in the information services industry for 
being a leading provider of information on technology-related companies (Kassel, 
1999) and has been extensively used in the management literature as a data 
source (Gardner, 2005; Kickul & Gundry, 2001; Schilling & Steensma, 2002). 
Specific benefits of this database are that it includes the name and contact 
information for the president/CEO/owner of each firm, the number of employees 
of each firm as well as the founding date for each firm. 
Due to the experimental (and consequent face-to-face) nature of the 
research design, distance was a primary consideration in selecting which 
companies to contact. A preliminary list of 948 companies within three 
surrounding area codes (i.e., within a three hour drive) was generated.  Because 
the focus of the study is on opportunity evaluation decision policies, and because 
the president/CEO/owner in small-medium sized companies is likely to have a 
larger role in making decisions about which opportunities to pursue than a 
president/CEO/owner in a large company, the list was further narrowed to 
companies with 10-500 employees—a range that approximates U.S. and 
European definitions of small and medium-sized enterprises (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003; Barreto, 2004).  There were 677 companies that 
met this requirement in the database. Lastly, only companies that gave the 
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contact information for the president/CEO/owner were included, meaning that 
records which only contained contact information for a chairman of the board, a 
manager, a plant manager, a general manager or a vice president were 
excluded. Again, this is because such individuals were thought to be less likely to 
be the primary decision maker vis-à-vis entrepreneurial opportunities. All told, 
there were 459 companies that met the above criteria.   
Because of the complexity of data collection (i.e., an in-person visit to 
each company location), but also because of the experimental nature of this 
research, a target sample size of approximately 120 was set in order to provide 
sufficient power to test the hypotheses, but also remain a manageable data 
collection undertaking consistent with other studies using experiments (e.g., 
McNatt & Judge, 2004) and conjoint analysis (e.g., Shepherd, 1999a). To arrive 
at the final sample and to ensure that this was representative of the larger 
sample, each company was randomly assigned to one of four waves of data 
collection. I then contacted the entrepreneurial decision makers based on the 
wave they were assigned until the target sample size was met. Thus, an 
insufficient response by the presidents/CEOs/owners of the 240 companies in 
the first wave would have resulted in recruitment materials being sent to the 
smaller second wave and so on. 
To recruit entrepreneurial decision makers, two letters were generated. 
The first letter was from the director of the University-affiliated entrepreneurship 
center. This was done for two reasons. First, the entrepreneurship center director 
is well respected by the business community and it was thought that this would 
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increase participation rates. Second, a letter from the entrepreneurship center 
director provides a critical link to practitioners.  Hence, in this letter, the director 
introduced the researchers, briefly described the purpose and benefits of the 
research for both theory and practice and requested participation on the part of 
the letter recipient. The second letter included with the recruitment materials was 
from the primary researchers (i.e., dissertation committee chair and the author). 
This letter described in more depth the purpose of the research, explained the 
reason that the recipient was contacted and informed the recipient that I would 
call them to request their participation within a few days. Copies of both letters 
are included in Appendix B1 and Appendix B2, respectively.  
So as to produce a constant but manageable flow of interviews, 
recruitment materials were mailed in groups of approximately twenty-five (based 
on geographical proximity). Within a week of the mailing, a follow-up phone call 
was made to the letter recipients (i.e., the president/CEO/owner of the company) 
in order to set-up a time to meet. A copy of the follow-up phone script is included 
in Appendix B3.  Data were collected over a five month period in late 2005 and 
early 2006. Of the companies contacted in the first wave, four were no longer in 
business. Because of university institutional review board policy, potential 
entrepreneurial decision makers could be contacted (i.e., sending 
correspondence by mail, corresponding with on the phone or leaving a phone 
message) a maximum of five times. Within the first wave of companies, 127 
individuals agreed to participate. Each individual who participated was a key 
decision maker in their organization. All but four of these individuals were the 
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president, CEO or owner at the company with which they are associated; and the 
four who were not in one of these positions participated at the request of the 
president, CEO or owner, once the purpose of the study was made clear. 
The remaining entrepreneurial decision makers in the first wave were not 
available during the five month data collection period (n = 11), could not be 
reached (n = 74), or declined to participate when asked (n = 24). This results in a 
response rate of 54 percent, a very respectable rate of response for this kind of 
research.  A logistic regression of entrepreneurial decision makers’ response on 
firm age, firm size and firm type was used to test for response bias.  None of the 
factors in the regression were significant, providing no significant evidence of 
response bias. The mean age of entrepreneurial decision makers’ firms was 35 
years (median age was 24 years) and the mean size of entrepreneurial decision 
makers’ firms was 98 employees with $23 million in sales (median size was 40 
employees with $5 million in sales).  The majority of entrepreneurial decision 
makers in the sample were men (95 percent), the mean sample age was 52 
years, and 58 percent of the entrepreneurial decision makers were firm founders.  
Research Task. Entrepreneurial decision makers engaged in a decision-
making task in which they were asked to evaluate a series of hypothetical 
opportunities and decide whether or not to invest in the full-scale exploitation of 
each opportunity.  In discussing techniques for investigating decisions, Priem and 
Harrison (1994) suggested two kinds: decomposition techniques (which break 
decisions down into smaller parts) and composition techniques (which build up a 
decision based on verbal descriptions).  Decomposition techniques (which 
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include conjoint analysis and policy capturing) focus on the content of the 
decisions that are made, while composition techniques (which include verbal 
protocol analysis and causal mapping) focus on the cognitive processes 
underlying these decisions. Because the focus of this study is the content of 
entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation decisions, I take a 
decomposition approach and utilize conjoint analysis. Specifically, I use metric 
conjoint analysis because it: (1) allows the researcher to obtain real time (versus 
post hoc) assessment of a respondent’s cognitive system, (2) accommodates the 
investigation of the underlying structure of an individual’s cognitive system (in-
use decision policy) while also allowing measurement of the observable features 
of a cognitive system (espoused decision policy) through self-report techniques, 
and (3) permits the detection of interactions between specific aspects of a 
decision policy.   
In its implementation, metric conjoint analysis “requires respondents to 
make a series of judgments based on a set of attributes (cues) from which the 
underlying structure of their cognitive system can be investigated” (Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1997: 211).  Consistent with this approach, four theoretically relevant 
attributes made up the hypothetical opportunities or profiles that entrepreneurial 
decision makers evaluated in this study: potential value of an opportunity, 
knowledge relatedness of an opportunity, window of opportunity availability, and 
number of potential opportunities. Each attribute was varied at two levels.  Based 
on the specific combinations of these attributes, the entrepreneurial decision 
makers decided their likelihood of investing in a specific opportunity. To measure 
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the likelihood investment, I used a 9-point scale anchored by very likely to invest 
in this opportunity (9) and very unlikely to invest in this opportunity (1). When 
making these decisions entrepreneurial decision makers were asked to assume 
that: (1) other than the information provided in the profiles, the hypothetical 
opportunities presented are similar to other entrepreneurial opportunities they 
have “seen” in all respects;(2) they have the resources (or access to the 
resources) to invest in an opportunity, if they choose to do so; (3) they are 
making decisions about these opportunities for their current firm; and (4) they are 
making decisions about these opportunities in their current industry and 
economic environment. 
While the specific operationalizations of the four decision-task attributes 
will be given in the description of the methods related to study two, it is important 
to reemphasize that each was varied at two levels. Because a conjoint 
experiment with a fully crossed factorial design involving four attributes at two 
levels requires 16 (24) profiles, an orthogonal fractional factorial design—
meaning no correlation between attributes—was used  to make the decision-
making task more manageable (Green & Srinivasan, 1990), which results in 8 
profiles (Hahn & Shapiro, 1966).  In this fractional factorial design, all of the main 
effects are testable as well as three two-way interaction effects.  This means that 
for each entrepreneurial decision maker, only three of six possible interaction 
effects can be tested.16 This is seen as sufficient, however, for measuring 
                                                 
16 The fractional factorial design allows for all of the hypothesized effects within study two to be 
tested. 
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decision-policy consciousness because decision policies with more than three 
contingent relationships are rare (Louviere, 1988). 
Each of the 8 profiles was fully replicated, permitting estimates of 
individual subject error for use in subsequent analysis (Shepherd, Zacharakis, & 
Baron, 2003). To avoid order effects, both the original and the replicated sets of 
profiles were randomly assigned. Entrepreneurial decision makers were then 
familiarized with the task through use of a practice profile. In addition, three 
additional profiles were created for use in the experimental manipulations (to be 
discussed in the next section), resulting in a total of 20 profiles. 
Figure 6 outlines the data collection process.  It highlights the flow of the 
experimental session with entrepreneurial decision makers.  As is noted in the 
figure, the experimental design used required entrepreneurial decision makers to 
engage in the opportunity evaluation decision-making task both before and after 
the experimental manipulations. Prior to the experimental manipulations, 
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entrepreneurial decision makers evaluated 16 profiles, plus 3 additional profiles 
which were used in the manipulations; while after the manipulation 
entrepreneurial decision makers only evaluated the 16 profiles. Immediately 
following both decision-making tasks, which measured the entrepreneurial 
decision makers’ in-use decision policies, self-report measures were also 
collected that reflect their espoused decision policies. 
Manipulations and Measures.  The experiment was conducted with 
entrepreneurial decision makers in person (at their place of work in all cases but 
one).  Two experimental manipulations were used in this study: knowledge 
codification and decision communication incentive. In the case of knowledge 
codification, entrepreneurial decision makers were randomly assigned to either 
high or the low conditions. In the case of decision communication incentive, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were randomly assigned to the promotion/gain-
focus, prevention/loss-focus, or no decision communication incentive conditions. 
Use of analogy was also measured; but because distinctions between types of 
similarity used in analogy are not dichotomies, this variable is not manipulated; 
rather, all entrepreneurial decision makers are asked the same questions, the 
responses to which were coded for inclusion in the analysis. A copy of the verbal 
protocol for the experiment is contained in Appendix C. 
Knowledge Codification 
The first manipulation, knowledge codification, involved conversion of 
proceduralized expert knowledge into identifiable rules and relationships that can 
be easily communicated (Cowan & Foray, 1997; Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
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Knowledge codification consists of three elements: (1) model building, (2) 
language creation and (3) the writing of messages (Cowan & Foray, 1997). 
Because the language used in the decision context is provided in the conjoint 
activity, manipulation of knowledge codification only included model building and 
the writing of messages through visual depiction. 
In the high knowledge codification condition, entrepreneurial decision 
makers were asked to visually describe their decisions using visual depictions of 
the attributes that were included in the opportunity profiles.  Specifically, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were given: (1) five labeled wood blocks—four 
of which corresponded to the four opportunity evaluation decision attributes and 
the fifth denoting the decision to invest, and (2) three sets of both uni-directional 
and bi-directional wooden arrows—one small set, one medium set and one large 
set. Using these weighted arrows, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked 
to use these depictions of factors to visually describe how they make investment 
decisions, with the large arrows representing high importance, the small arrows 
representing low importance and the bi-directional arrows representing one factor 
depending on another. This resulted in a codified model of their opportunity 
evaluation decision policy—similar to a cognitive map (Huff & Jenkins, 2002). 
Once a visual model had been created, entrepreneurial decision makers were 
then presented, in turn, with each of the 3 additional conjoint profiles that they 
had evaluated during the first decision task combined with their evaluation (i.e., 
likelihood to invest) of each profile.  Entrepreneurial decision makers were asked 
to use the visual model that they had created to talk through each of the profiles 
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that they had previously scored. Pictures of the materials used in the high 
knowledge codification manipulations are contained in Figure 7.  
 
Entrepreneurial decision makers in the low knowledge codification 
condition were asked to talk about how their decisions relate to their firm.  
Specifically, entrepreneurial decision makers were given: (1) eleven labeled 
blocks—each denoting a separate aspect/level of firm structure (e.g., 
president/CEO, marketing, etc.), and (2) three sets of both uni-directional and bi-
directional wooden arrows—one small set, one medium set and one large set.  
Using the wood blocks and arrows, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked 
to visually describe who in their firm has an important role in making decisions 
about whether or not to invest in an opportunity, with large arrows representing 
Figure 7: High Codification Materials 
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high importance, the small arrows representing low importance and the bi-
directional describing joint decisions.  Entrepreneurial decision makers in this 
condition were not presented the three additional conjoint profiles that they had 
evaluated during the first decision task. Pictures of the materials used in the low 
knowledge codification manipulations are contained in Figure 8. 
 
Decision Communication Incentive 
The second manipulation, decision communication incentive, involved a 
set of circumstances that can incite individuals to take some action (Neufeldt & 
Guralnik, 1997). Three forms of incentive motivation are suggested in the 
performance literature that are theoretically relevant to the current decision: (1) 
Figure 8: Low Codification Materials 
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monetary rewards, (2) social recognition and (3) performance feedback 
(Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). As is previously suggested, monetary incentives 
related to residual risk are relevant in entrepreneurship. But because the 
individuals involved in this study were entrepreneurial decision makers who were 
voluntarily participating in this study, money would likely have little effect as a 
manipulation and, thus, was not used as a part of the incentive motivation 
manipulation. Rather, the decision communication incentive manipulation was 
achieved through social recognition (personal attention, mostly conveyed 
verbally, through expressions of interest, approval, and appreciation for a job well 
done (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001:582)) and performance feedback about the 
process (information regarding a level of performance and/or the manner and 
efficiency in which performance processes have been executed (Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 2001:583)).  
As is described previously, incentives can be framed in terms of either 
gains/non-gains (promotion focus) or losses/non-losses (prevention focus). Both 
framings were included in the experimental manipulation, as well as a control 
condition with no decision communication incentives.  There were five parts to 
the promotion-focus incentive motivation manipulation. First, at the beginning of 
the study, entrepreneurial decision makers in this condition were told: “You 
should do very well.” Second, throughout the study, entrepreneurial decision 
makers in this condition were told that the process was going well (a total of five 
times17). Third, following the first portion of the study, entrepreneurial decision 
                                                 
17 The language varied: (1) well done, (2) perfect!, (3) this is exactly right, (4) this is going well, 
and (5) this is going smoothly. 
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makers were told: “You did a great job, well done. This is going marvelously and 
will be very helpful to my research. Thank you for your help.” Fourth, during the 
presentation of the knowledge codification and use of analogy manipulations, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were informed that: “What we are going to do 
now is quite important. It is the focus of the study, the part that I am most 
interested in and the part where you can help the most.” Fifth, prior to the 
reporting their espoused decision policy during the second half of the study, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that: “Based on the previous 
discussion of your decisions, it is important that you successfully report the 
factors that most closely represent your actual decisions. Again, this is the 
essential part of the study. Thank you for taking it so seriously.” 
Similarly, there were five parts to the prevention-focus incentive motivation 
manipulation. First, at the beginning of the study, entrepreneurial decision 
makers in this condition were told: “You shouldn’t do poorly at all.” Second, 
throughout the study, entrepreneurial decision makers in this condition were told 
that the process was not going poorly (a total of five times18). Third, following the 
first portion of the study, entrepreneurial decision makers were told: “Not bad at 
all. I don’t think this will spoil my results. Thank you.” Fourth, during the 
presentation of the knowledge codification and use of analogy manipulations, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were informed that: “What we are going to do 
now is quite important. It is the focus of the study, the part that I am most 
interested in and where I need you to be most careful.” Fifth, prior to the reporting 
                                                 
18 The language varied: (1) not bad!, (2) not bad at all!, (3) that is definitely not wrong, (4) this isn’t 
going badly, and (5) this isn’t going poorly at all.  
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their espoused decision policy during the second half of the study, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that: “Based on the previous 
discussion of your decisions, it is important that you do not mistakenly report the 
factors that don’t most closely represent your actual decisions. Again, this is the 
critical part of the study. Thank you.” 
Entrepreneurial decision makers in the low decision communication 
incentive condition did not receive: (1) instruction regarding the quality of the 
process or their performance, (2) a show of gratitude for their participation (until 
after data collection), (3) information on the importance of specific activities, or 
(4) information regarding the importance of accurately reporting the factors that 
most closely represent their actual decision policy. Entrepreneurial decision 
makers did, however, receive standard instructions for the various activities.  
A pre-test of the manipulation was included during pilot testing and the 
manipulations were evaluated and modified based on the findings of these pilot 
tests. A manipulation check was also included in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. 
Analogy 
Use of analogy involves the comparison of a new situation to a more 
familiar situation in order to better understand the new situation (Sternberg, 
1977). As is discussed previously, structural similarity figures prominently in both 
matching and mapping processes (Gentner & Toupin, 1986) as well as in 
assessing the soundness of matching and mapping processes, whereas surface 
similarity is only helpful in analogy retrieval processes. Structural similarity is thus 
 75 
thought to be more instrumental in increasing decision-policy consciousness than 
surface similarity and is thus the focus of this variable.  
Measurement of use of analogy involved asking entrepreneurial decision 
makers to describe their opportunity evaluation decisions using analogy. 
Specifically, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked to describe a decision 
in another area of their life that might be like their decisions about opportunities—
whether it’s a family decision, a political decision or a decision about hobbies or 
interests—and then to describe how this decision was like their decisions about 
opportunities. These responses were recorded, transcribed and subsequently 
coded by trained raters—two Ph.D. students not otherwise involved in the 
execution of the study—for use of structural analogical similarity between 
decisions using a seven point continuous scale anchored by high structural 
similarity (7) and low structural similarity (1). In addition to structural similarity, 
other analogy-related information was coded by the raters (e.g., surface 
similarity) that is not used in testing the hypotheses related to study one. 
As is noted previously, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked to 
make investment decisions based on a combination of four factors, each varied 
at two levels. In this decision context, structural similarity was based on the 
underlying similarities between entrepreneurial decision makers’ decisions that 
were like their decisions to invest and the factors that were used in their in-use 
investment decisions. Thus, raters were provided with a numeric breakdown of 
the significant factors in the actual investment decisions (prior to the 
experimental manipulations). The numeric breakdowns were generated through 
 76 
regression (main and interaction effects) of each entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s investment decisions on the decision policy attribute; and included the 
percentage that each attribute contributed in the total decision as well as the 
direction of the effect.   
Raters scored an entrepreneurial decision maker’s response as having 
high structural similarity (7) if the response (the transcription of their target 
decision) was related to 80-100% of the actual decision factors/decision factor 
interactions. Raters scored an entrepreneurial decision maker’s response as 
having high-medium structural similarity (4 to 6) if the entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s response was related to 50-80% of the decision factors/decision factor 
interactions. Raters scored an entrepreneurial decision maker’s response as 
having low-medium structural similarity (2 to 4) if the entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s response was related to 20-50% of the decision factors/decision factor 
interactions. Lastly, raters scored an entrepreneurial decision maker’s response 
as having low structural similarity (1) if the entrepreneurial decision maker’s 
response was related to none of the decision factors/decision factor interactions.  
The analogy coding instructions are included in Appendix D. 
Inter-rater agreement, agreement defined as a difference in ratings of two 
or less between raters, was 87 percent. To evaluate the reliability of the 
measures of structural similarity, intraclass correlations for structural similarity 
were evaluated. To calculate the intraclass correlation coefficients, I used a two-
way mixed model (SPSS, 2004), defining agreement in terms of absolute 
agreement (instead of consistency). I took this approach for two reasons. First, a 
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two-way mixed ANOVA model controls for systematic variability among raters in 
cases when raters can be treated as fixed factors, restricting inferences about 
the reliability to the raters (Nichols, 1998), which in this case was limited to two 
Ph.D. students. Second, an absolute agreement measure was used in order to 
account for systematic differences between raters (Nichols, 1998). In a sense, 
the absolute agreement intraclass correlation coefficient takes into account the 
possibility that one rater's scores were higher than the scores of the other rater. 
In this sense, a two-way mixed ANOVA model, with an absolute agreement 
measure of agreement provides the strongest test of inter-rater reliability.  Using 
this method, the intraclass correlation coefficient for the measure of structural 
similarity was 0.72 (p < .01), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75. These scores fall 
within acceptable ranges for reliability measures (Nunnally, 1978).  
In order to meaningfully sum the raters’ scores, the sixteen cases with 
differences in ratings of greater than two were reconciled through independent 
rater agreement. The independent agreement method—as opposed to a forced 
rater agreement method—is important because the underlying statistical 
procedures of reliability assume independence.  To facilitate the process, the two 
raters met to discuss their scoring rationale for each of the sixteen cases.  
Following discussion of each case, the individual raters then chose whether or 
not to change their original score.  In half of the cases, either one of the two 
raters kept the original score, suggesting that reconciliation was not simply just 
regression to the mean. In all sixteen cases, raters’ reconciled scores were within 
the limits of agreement. Following reconciliation, the interclass correlation 
 78 
coefficient for structural similarity was 0.86 (p < .05), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.86. Raters’ scores were then summed to provide a measure of use of analogy. 
Founder Status 
Founder status was measured in the post-experiment questionnaire 
(which is described in more depth in a later section). Entrepreneurial decision 
makers were asked: “Are you the (or one of) the principal founder(s) of your 
current firm.” Responses were contrast coded with yes coded as .5 and no coded 
as -.5. 
Decision-Policy Consciousness 
The dependent variable, decision-policy consciousness was measured by 
taking the difference between entrepreneurial decision makers’ espoused and in-
use decision policies at both time one and time two.  To accomplish this, both the 
espoused decision policy and the in-use decision policy had to be expressed 
quantitatively. Discussed in more detail in subsequent paragraphs, the 
quantitative expression of the espoused decision policy was based on 
entrepreneurial decision makers’ self-report descriptions of their decision making, 
while the quantitative expression of the in-use decision policy was based on 
regression weights stemming from entrepreneurial decision makers’ decisions in 
the conjoint analysis. I discuss each in turn.  
Entrepreneurial decision makers’ espoused decision policies were 
uncovered through use of self-report (espoused) measures. While the 
measurement of espoused main effects on the decision to invest—potential 
value, knowledge relatedness, number of potential opportunities and window of 
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opportunity—was fairly straightforward (e.g., what factors do you consider in 
making a specific decision), the measurement of interaction effects was not as 
simple. In their investigation of methods for obtaining subjective descriptions of 
decisions, Cook and Stewart (1975) presented seven different methods for 
obtaining subjective ratings of decisions. While their findings suggest that the 
seven subjective methods do not significantly differ in their effectiveness, the 
second method they discussed, rating attributes on a 100-point scale, seemed 
most appropriate for this study because it balanced the need for a quantitative 
measure of espoused decision policy and the need to minimize the complexity of 
espoused decision-policy measurement. 
In taking this approach, entrepreneurial decision makers were first asked: 
“When assessing the previous profiles, what things did you consider when 
making your investment decisions?” This open-ended question allowed 
entrepreneurial decision makers to more accurately espouse their true decision 
policies, free from suggestive cuing.  Once entrepreneurial decision makers had 
reported the effects that they considered to play a significant role in their 
decisions, the sign/direction of these effects was determined by asking 
entrepreneurial decision makers whether they were more likely to invest when an 
attribute was at a high level (e.g., high knowledge) or the low level (e.g., low 
knowledge). An interaction effect between two attributes was recorded when 
entrepreneurial decision makers suggested that the importance of one attribute 
depended on another and was clarified by asking if the entrepreneurial decision 
makers were describing the effect of attribute A on attribute B. When such an 
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effect was present, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked if having a high 
level of attribute A was more important or less important when attribute B was at 
a high level, which helped determine the sign/direction of the interaction effect. 
Entrepreneurial decision makers were then asked to assign a score 
between 0 and 100 for each of the attributes they used in their decisions based 
on its importance to their decisions (including any combination/interaction effects 
that they had reported). These scores represent the weighted espoused 
importance of each attribute which, combined with the sign/direction of the effect, 
allowed for comparison with the in-use effects. The materials associated with the 
measurement of the espoused decision policy are included in Appendix E. 
The in-use decision policy was determined by first establishing which 
attributes were significant19 for each entrepreneurial decision maker’s in-use 
decision policy. Because conjoint analysis requires each individual to make a 
series of decisions, a properly designed study allows a researcher to create 
separate regression equations for each participant. The individual beta weights of 
these regression equations represent the importance of each attribute or 
combination of attributes in the decision. 
In-use effects for each entrepreneurial decision maker were first 
calculated for the decision task at time one. Because the decision task used a 
fractional factorial design, only orthogonal combinations of three (of the possible 
six) interaction effects were estimable in a regression equation for each 
entrepreneurial decision maker. As such, two orthogonal regression models were 
estimated per entrepreneurial decision maker—each containing four main effects 
                                                 
19 p-value < 0.05 
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and three interaction20 effects—to determine which attributes were significant for 
each entrepreneurial decision maker.  Based on these models, a final regression 
equation was then created for each entrepreneurial decision maker with only the 
significant effects. Because only three of the six possible interaction effects could 
be included, this was done by giving first priority to the significant in-use 
interaction effects that matched an entrepreneurial decision maker’s espoused 
model at time one. After verifying the equation against the entrepreneurial 
decision maker’s espoused model at time two (to ensure that the model was 
calculable at time two as well), secondary priority was given to significant in-use 
effects that matched the entrepreneurial decision maker’s espoused model at 
time two. Lastly, significant effects were then included in the equation based on 
theoretical relevance, including significant in-use interaction effects that matched 
the hypothesized interaction effects (hypotheses 7b, 8b, and 9b).   The same 
process was used to calculate the in-use effects at time two, except in creating 
the second equation the time-two espoused model was used as the governing 
model in determining which significant interaction effects should be included. 
Once an in-use decision policy was determined for each entrepreneurial 
decision maker for both times one and two, the significant standardized 
regression coefficients for each entrepreneurial decision maker were summed 
resulting in a measure of the total significant effects that explain the in-use 
decision policy. Each significant individual standardized coefficient was then 
                                                 
20 The first model included the main effects and interaction between: potential value/knowledge 
relatedness, potential value/window of opportunity, and potential value/number of potential 
opportunities. The second model included interaction effects between knowledge 
relatedness/window of opportunity, knowledge relatedness/number of potential opportunities, and 
window of opportunity/number of potential opportunities. 
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divided by the measure of total in-use variance to result in a percent of the total 
effects explained by each in-use weight. A similar process was undertaken for 
the espoused weights. The espoused scores were summed, resulting in a 
measure of the total variance accounted for by the espoused decision policy. 
Each individual espoused score was then divided by the measure of total 
espoused variance to result in a percent of explained variance by each effect that 
makes up an espoused decision policy. Each in-use percentage weight was then 
matched with and subtracted from the corresponding percentage weight of the 
espoused decision policy. The absolute value of each difference represented the 
gap between the espoused and in-use decision policy for each respective 
attribute. These gaps were summed to result in a total gap between an 
entrepreneurial decision maker’s espoused and in-use decision policy. Because 
a smaller gap suggests a greater decision-policy consciousness, the scores were 
then multiplied by minus one to result in a decision-policy consciousness 
measure in which a larger score indicates greater decision-policy consciousness. 
Data Analysis. Ordinary least squares regression was used to test the 
hypotheses related to study one. This technique was selected over repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)—the seemingly logical choice in a 
pretest-posttest control group design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963)—because 
ANOVA is not particularly well suited for use of continuous variables (which in 
this case is the use of analogy variable).  An additional consideration that was 
used in selecting regression over ANOVA is that a repeated measures ANOVA 
can also lead to an erroneous understanding of the efficacy of treatment effects 
 83 
(Huck & McLean, 1975). Huck and McLean suggested two alternate approaches 
to a repeated measures analysis of variance: (1) utilization of the pre-test scores 
to compute gain scores and (2) utilization of pre-test scores as a covariate within 
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) (1975: 516). In comparing the two 
alternatives Huck and McLean noted that the covariate method actually “results 
in a more sensitive test of possible differences among treatments” (1975: 516). 
As such, the regression equivalent of ANCOVA—which is a special case of 
regression (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003)—was used in this study. 
Specifically, entrepreneurial decision makers’ decision-policy consciousness 
scores at time one controlled through inclusion in the data analysis as a 
covariates in the regression equation. 
Additionally, inasmuch as entrepreneurial decision makers’ espoused 
decision policies are prone to fluctuation for reasons other than the 
manipulations—resulting in unexplained variance—I included an espoused 
change score to control for these fluctuations. The espoused change score was 
the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the espoused scores 
at time one and those at time two. Because an analysis of this variable 
suggested that it was not normally distributed, but rather had a heavy or long 
tailed distribution (Cohen et al., 2003), a square root transformation was used 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). The resulting variable was then 
standardized for use as a control variable in the final regression equation.  To 
investigate the possibility of systematic differences in this score across 
conditions, I regressed the resulting espoused change score on knowledge 
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codification and decision communication incentive. As Table 1 denotes, the 
results indicate that changes in espoused decision policy: (1) were not 
significantly different between entrepreneurial decision makers in the high 
knowledge codification and the low knowledge codification conditions, (2) were 
not significantly different between entrepreneurial decision makers in the high 
decision communication incentive and low decision communication incentive 
conditions and (3) were not significantly different between entrepreneurial 
decision makers in the gains-focus and loss-focus incentive conditions. 
Table 1: Results of Regression Analysis for Espoused Changea
Variables Mean s.d Β
Codification Contrast 0.00 0.50 0.09
Incentive Contrast 1: Low vs. High 0.00 0.47 0.08
Incentive Contrast 2: Loss vs. Gain 0.00 0.41 -0.06
R 2 0.02
F 0.72
n 127
a  Standardized coefficients are reported
 
Study Two – Opportunity Evaluation Decision Policy 
Because of the overlap in the studies, there are many similarities between 
the methods described in study one and the methods described in study two. In 
this section, I focus on the methods that are unique to study two. 
Research Participants and Task.  The same one hundred and twenty-
seven individuals participated in study two as participated in study one.  Because 
the details about the sample are contained in the previous section, they will not 
be repeated here.  As is described in study one, conjoint analysis was used to 
investigate the content of entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation 
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decision policies. A description of the conjoint task is also included in the 
previous section and is thus not repeated here. It is, however, important to note 
that while the testing of the hypotheses related to study one utilized the 
entrepreneurial decision makers’ results of the decision making at both time one 
and time two, the testing of the hypotheses related to study two is done using the 
decision-making task at time one only. 
Manipulations and measures. The development of the measurement 
instrument occurred in two stages. In the first stage, experimental materials were 
developed based on extant theory (see Appendices F1-F3 for study two 
experimental materials) and then evaluated and modified based on focused 
interviews with entrepreneurial decision makers and pre-testing of the materials. 
In stage two, a post-experiment questionnaire was developed that includes 
measures related to the investigation of propositions 1-3. This questionnaire is 
also included in Appendix G.   
Stage One. Within stage one, materials were developed, pre-tested and 
modified for final use in the experiment. Although the pre-testing process is 
described in the following paragraphs, only the experimental materials that were 
used in the study are presented here. As is noted previously, within this decision-
making task a set of hypothetical opportunity profiles were presented to 
entrepreneurial decision makers who then decided their likelihood of investing in 
each specific hypothetical opportunity. Again, each opportunity profile consisted 
of a combination of four independent variables, each varied at two levels: 
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potential value of an opportunity, knowledge relatedness, window of opportunity 
availability, and number of potential opportunities.  I will discuss each in turn. 
Potential Value 
In the conjoint experiment, potential value took two forms: higher and 
lower. Entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that higher potential 
value meant that: “The predicted profit from investment in the full-scale 
exploitation of this potential opportunity is higher than other opportunities you 
have successfully pursued after the predicted expenses (i.e., time, money and 
effort) have been taken into account.” Conversely, entrepreneurial decision 
makers were instructed that lower potential value meant that: “The predicted 
profit from investment in the full-scale exploitation of this potential opportunity is 
lower than other opportunities you have successfully pursued after the predicted 
expenses (i.e., time, money and effort) have been taken into account.”  
Knowledge Relatedness 
Similarly, in the decision-making task knowledge relatedness took two 
forms: high and low. Entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that high 
knowledge relatedness meant that: “The knowledge that is necessary to exploit 
this potential opportunity is very similar to the knowledge that you already 
possess.” Conversely, entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that low 
knowledge relatedness meant that: “The knowledge that is necessary to exploit 
this potential opportunity is very different from the knowledge that you already 
possess.”  
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Window of Opportunity Availability 
Window of opportunity availability took two forms in the conjoint 
experiment: wide and narrow. Entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed 
that wide windows of opportunity meant that: “The next six months are free from 
changing conditions in the environment that will considerably shorten the length 
of time available to profitably invest in this potential opportunity.” Entrepreneurial 
decision makers were instructed that narrow windows of opportunity meant that: 
“The next six months will bring about changes in the environment that will 
considerably shorten the length of time available to profitably invest in this 
potential opportunity.” 
Number of Potential Opportunities 
Lastly, in the decision-making task number of potential opportunities took 
two forms: many and few. Entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that 
many potential opportunities meant that: “There are several potential 
opportunities with unknown potential value, knowledge relatedness and 
opportunity windows that you could choose to invest in and exploit.” 
Entrepreneurial decision makers were instructed that few potential opportunities 
meant that: “There is one potential opportunity that you could choose to invest in 
and exploit, the potential value, knowledge relatedness and opportunity windows 
of which are given in the opportunity profile.”  
Once the experimental materials were developed, they were evaluated 
and modified based on focused interviews with entrepreneurial decision makers 
and pre-testing of the materials. As is noted in the description of the methods for 
 88 
study one, Appendix A contains a copy of the interview guide that was used in 
developing the materials. Based on the interviews with four entrepreneurs, some 
minor modifications were made to the materials to better facilitate the 
understanding of the entrepreneurial decision makers.  Similarly, following the 
modification of the materials, the experimental materials and procedures were 
pilot tested using nine graduate students and one owner of a technology firm 
(similar to the firms in the sample). This was done to ensure that the instructions, 
materials and procedures would be clear to entrepreneurial decision makers and 
that the conjoint materials did not contain nonsense profiles. As was the case 
following the interviews, some minor modifications were required following the 
pilot tests that improved the data collection process and refined the experimental 
instructions, materials and procedures.   
Stage Two. The post-experiment questionnaire was designed to measure 
factors thought to be related to the opportunity evaluation decision. Specifically, 
in addition to the aforementioned decision communication incentive manipulation 
check, the questionnaire included measures of: environmental dynamism, firm 
demographics, entrepreneurial and general self-efficacy, attitudes about failure, 
use of intuition, industry experience, education, age, gender and overconfidence.  
I discuss each variable in turn. 
The manipulation check assessed the efficacy of the decision 
communication incentive manipulation.  In this manipulation check, 
entrepreneurial decision makers were asked whether they were more concerned 
about/interested in avoiding loss or seeking gain. Four questions were included, 
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each measured on a 7-point scale anchored by loss-avoidance phrases, e.g., 
avoiding mistakes (1) and gain-seeking phrases, e.g., getting it right (7). The 
reliability of this scale is (α = 0.045). Such a low reliability score suggests a 
problem with this scale, which I address in a later section. 
Environmental dynamism was measured using a 7-item scale that is a 
variant of the Miller and Friesen (1982) dynamism scale and is similar to that 
used by Covin, Green and Slevin (2006). Entrepreneurial decision makers 
indicated on 7-point Likert-type scale the extent to which they strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7) with a series of statements regarding the competitive 
nature of the environment (Miller & Friesen, 1982). The reliability of the 
environmental dynamism scale, although low, was within acceptable ranges (α = 
0.73).  
Information about the age, size and type of each entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s firm was also gathered. The firm age was calculated by subtracting the 
current year from the year of firm founding provided by entrepreneurial decision 
makers. Firm size was measured by asking entrepreneurial decision makers to 
provide: (1) the approximate number of full-time employees, or full-time 
equivalent employees, including owners who work for the company, and (2) the 
expected total sales for this year.  These variables were not used in the analyses 
related to either study one or study two, but were included to provide an accurate 
portrait of the sample. 
General self-efficacy was measured using a scale provided by Chen and 
Klimoski (2003). This 7-point Likert-type scale was anchored by strongly agree 
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(1) and strongly disagree (7).  The reliability for this scale was within acceptable 
ranges (α = 0.80).   Entrepreneurial self-efficacy was measured using a scale 
developed for use in this study. The items in this scale were based on the stages 
of entrepreneurship provided by Vesper (1996). Similar to the general self-
efficacy scale, the eight items in the entrepreneurial self-efficacy scale were 
measured on a Likert-type scale anchored by strongly agree (1) and strongly 
disagree (7).  The reliability of this scale was acceptable (α = 0.83). 
Attitudes regarding failure were measured using an instrument provided 
by Conroy (2001) developed to measure fear of failure. While not originally 
designed for use in entrepreneurship, this instrument measures five dimensions 
related to fear of failure that, based on the interviews prior to data collection, 
seemed relevant. These dimensions are: fear of experiencing shame and 
embarrassment, fear of devaluing one’s self-estimate, fear of having an uncertain 
future, and fear of important others losing interest, fear of upsetting important 
others.  The sum of the five dimensions results in an overall fear of failure. The 
twenty-five questions intended to measure fear of failure use a 7-point Likert-type 
scale anchored by Do not Believe at all (1) and Believe 100% of the time (7).  
The reliability for the overall fear of failure scale was high (α = .91). 
Use of intuition variable was measured using three items included in the 
post-experiment questionnaire.  The first of the items asked: How important are 
intuitive feelings in decisions about opportunities; rated on a scale anchored by 
not at all important (1) and very important (7). For the second item, 
entrepreneurial decision makers responded to the statement: My ‘gut’ tells me 
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when a given strategy I use will be most effective; rated on a scale anchored by 
not very much like me (1) and (7) very much like me. Using a similar scale, the 
third items required entrepreneurial decision makers to respond to the statement: 
I depend on my intuition to help me formulate strategies.  The reliability for this 
scale was (α = 0.86). 
Industry work experience was captured by asking entrepreneurial decision 
makers to report their total years of work experience in the same industry as the 
primary industry of their current firm. This variable represents specific human 
capital.  Similarly, founder status was measured by asking entrepreneurial 
decision makers if they are a principal founder of their current firm. Responses 
were contrast coded with yes coded as .5 and no coded as -.5. 
Education was measured by asking entrepreneurial decision makers to 
select the category of the highest level of formal education completed. The 
categories are: did not complete high school, high school, some 
university/college, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, some graduate study, 
master’s degree, and doctoral degree. General human capital was measured as 
a difference between those who did receive a four year university degree and 
those that did not. Responses were contrast coded with university degree as .33 
and no university degree as -.67. 
Overconfidence was measured in a consistent manner with previous 
research on overconfidence (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 1997; e.g., Forbes, 2005). 
In essence, entrepreneurial decision makers were asked to respond to a series 
of five business trivia questions. Each question has five choices, one of which 
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was a correct answer. Entrepreneurial decision makers were then asked to 
indicate, on a scale of 20% to 100% their confidence in their answer (20% 
confidence being pure chance, 100% confidence being absolute certainty). 
Because entrepreneurial decision makers were informed that 20% indicated pure 
chance, any confidence rating that an entrepreneurial decision maker provided 
below 20% was automatically increased to 20% to avoid biasing later 
calculations. An overall measure of overconfidence was calculated in four steps. 
First, entrepreneurial decision makers’ answers to the questions were then 
checked for correctness. Second, for each question that an entrepreneurial 
decision maker answered correctly, they were given a score of 100 and for each 
answer they answer incorrectly, they were given a score of zero. This score 
represents accuracy for each question. Third, entrepreneurial decision makers’ 
confidence ratings (percentages) were subtracted from their accuracy to result in 
a measure of over- (and potentially under-) confidence for each question. Fourth, 
these scores were then summed and divided by five to result in an overall 
measure of overconfidence.  As Forbes notes, this measure is not meant to test 
an individual’s knowledge, but rather to test an individual’s awareness of the 
limits of their knowledge (2005: 632).  
Data Analysis.  In study two, data were collected at two distinct levels of 
analysis: at the decision level and at the individual level. In the context of 
decision making, the term level of analysis refers to “the unit to which the data 
are assigned for hypothesis testing and statistical analysis” (Rousseau, 1985: 4).  
In order to accurately draw conclusions about the results, it is important that the 
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level of analysis be properly and accurately specified, both in the framing and 
testing of hypotheses and in the actual analyses of the data.  To ensure that this 
is done, researchers can avoid aggregation of data across levels, correctly 
specify the level of a relationship between variables, and correctly specify the 
influence of outside factors on a relationship between variables (Rousseau, 
1985: 5-9).  So doing ensures that sufficient care is given to level differences 
such that the conclusions drawn are theoretically, methodologically and 
statistically sound.   
Because opportunity evaluation decisions are nested within the individual 
making these decisions and because the decisions made by that individual are 
not independent of that individual, correct specification of level related to theory 
and method is easily dealt with.  Correct theoretical specification of level was 
done through the development of hypotheses that focused on the individual 
making the decisions, not the decisions themselves.  Correct specification of 
level related to methods was done inasmuch as the individuals in the study were 
asked to make a series of decisions; and then were separately asked to answer 
a series of questions about themselves as individuals.   
Correct statistical specification of level is more complex in that traditional 
statistical techniques such as ANOVA and regression analysis are not able to 
take into account nested data.  While data can often be aggregated (or 
disaggregated) to accommodate either of these techniques, the result is either 
weak statistical power and ignored variance (in the case of aggregation) or 
biased estimates of standard errors (in the case of disaggregation) (Hofmann, 
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1997; Seibert, Silver, & Randolph, 2004).  Consequently, to accommodate the 
nested nature of the data, I used Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to test 
hypotheses 6-9 and propositions 1-3. In addition to accommodating nested data, 
HLM allows the researcher to explicitly model variance both within and between 
levels (Hofmann, 1997: 726), which controls for (and, in the case of propositions 
1-3, tests for) differences between individuals, thereby facilitating a deeper 
understanding of the hypothesized effects.  In HLM, the output—the intercept 
and slope of the equation—at one level serve as the dependent variable for a 
second level.  At each level, a significant parameter estimate denotes an effect 
that is significantly different from zero. Thus, in study two a significant parameter 
estimate at level one denoted a decision-level effect (e.g., potential value) on the 
likelihood to invest; and a significant parameter estimate at level two indicated a 
significant individual-level effect (e.g., entrepreneurial self-efficacy) (Hofmann, 
1997; Seibert et al., 2004). 
The time-one decisions were used to test the hypotheses related to study 
two. This is because the time-one data reflected entrepreneurial decision makers’ 
decisions prior to the major experimental manipulations related to decision-policy 
consciousness.  Due to missing data for individual level items,21 121 cases were 
used in the HLM analysis.  Because each of the 121 entrepreneurial decision 
makers made a series of 16 decisions at time one, the decision level of analysis 
consisted of 1936 observations. 
                                                 
21 There were 3 cases with incomplete measures for the fear of failure measure and 3 cases with 
missing data for the environmental dynamism measure. 
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS  
In this section I describe the results of the previous two studies. I do this in 
two sections. The first contains the results related to study one, while the second 
section contains the results related to study two. 
Study One – Decision-Policy Consciousness 
Data Screening. Prior to testing the hypotheses, it was important to 
investigate the data to check for missing data, examine the cases for outliers and 
validate that the assumptions of regression are upheld.  I consider each of these 
in the next sections. 
Missing data.  Of the 127 entrepreneurial decision makers in the study, 
two entrepreneurial decision makers had an in-use decision policy at either time 
one or time two that contained no significant effects.  In addition, the responses 
of both of these entrepreneurial decision makers in the conjoint analysis were 
unreliable in either time one, time two or both.  Although the responses of some 
of the other entrepreneurial decision makers were also not reliable, only the two 
cases that were not reliable and did not have significant in-use decision policies 
were dropped from the analysis for study one.  Additionally, missing data in the 
independent variables in study one were not a problem. This is because of the 
experimental nature of study one, in which each entrepreneurial decision maker 
was randomly assigned to a treatment condition, received that treatment, and 
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gave a response to the coded analogy question. Additionally, all entrepreneurial 
decision makers answered the question relating to founder status. 
Outliers.  Hair et al. defined outliers as: “observations with a unique 
combination of characteristics identifiable as distinctly different from the other 
observations” (1998).  Outliers represent a potential problem because they can 
have a “profound impact on the estimates of the regression coefficients and their 
standard errors, as well as on the estimate of the overall prediction, R2” (Cohen 
et al., 2003: 390).  Outliers may represent errors in data entry, a rare 
observation, or a rare combination of factors related to a specific observation.   
Several steps were taken to protect against outliers due to data entry 
error.  First, significant parts of the data were entered electronically by 
entrepreneurial decision makers during the experiment. Specifically, 
entrepreneurial decision makers completed the conjoint task on a laptop 
computer.  Second, those data that were not entered by entrepreneurial decision 
makers were instead input electronically with the help of an assistant.  The role of 
the assistant was to verify the data that were entered during data collection (i.e., 
the espoused decision policy weights), and to dictate questionnaire data 
following completion of the study. The process of dictation facilitated greater 
accuracy because of an ability to verify the correctness of the data during the 
data input process.  
Next, to evaluate whether or not any of the cases were outliers for reasons 
other than data entry error, I followed Cohen et al. (2003) who suggested that 
outliers are either due to leverage, discrepancy or influence. An investigation of 
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leverage involves an analysis of the extent to which a set of independent 
variables are unusual. One statistic that is useful in the investigation of leverage, 
and that is recommended by Cohen et al. (2003), is the centered leverage value. 
Essentially, this case level statistic measures the degree to which the observed 
values for a set of independent variables differ from the mean values for those 
independent variables. Those cases that are substantially higher than the 
remaining cases are thought to require additional analysis.  A centered leverage 
value index plot was created (contained in Appendix H1) to facilitate the analysis 
of the centered leverage values.  Based on this plot, it would seem that one case 
(see Table 2) may have undue leverage on the fit of the regression equation; 
thus, this case will be further evaluated. 
Discrepancy was evaluated using the externally studentized residuals 
(SDRES). Essentially, an analysis of externally studentized residuals sheds light 
on the effects of removing a specific case from the regression. Cohen et al. 
(2003) noted that a visual inspection through use of an index plot can indicate 
which cases need particular attention. These authors also suggested that using a 
cutoff value can be informing, specifically noting that standard cutoff values for 
externally studentized residuals can range from ±2.0 to ±4.0. Inspection of an 
index plot of the externally studentized residuals (contained in Appendix H2) did 
not seem to indicate large gaps between cases; however, using a cutoff value of 
±2.0, eight cases (see Table 2) were identified that may represent discrepancy-
based outliers. These cases will be further examined in conjunction with the other 
potential outliers. 
 98 
Influence was evaluated using the Cook’s D statistic, which provides 
information on the impact of a case on the overall model fit; and, as Hair et al. 
noted, is “considered to be the single most representative measure of influence 
on overall fit” (1998: 225). Similar to the SDRES, Cook’s D is determined by 
looking at the properties of a regression equation with and without each case. It 
does so, however, by taking into account the influence of outlying studentized 
residuals as well as the leverage for that case.  Again, a large gap—apparent 
upon visual inspection of an index plot—can indicate a problem (Cohen et al., 
2003).  Analysis of the index plot (contained in Appendix H3) indicated the 
possibility of one influence-based outlier. 
Table 2: Study One Regression Diagnostics
Case # SDRES LEV Cook's D
19 2.023 0.125 0.051
27 -2.867 0.098 0.076
32 -2.221 0.071 0.034
50 -2.258 0.090 0.044
51 2.145 0.061 0.028
56 -2.479 0.060 0.036
74 -2.451 0.061 0.036
75 0.234 0.226 0.001
84 2.077 0.072 0.030
 
Table 2 contains those cases that require further consideration as outliers 
based on the above analyses, along with the regression diagnostic statistics 
corresponding with these analyses.  It is apparent from this table that case 27 is 
an outlier due to its high influence (Cook’s D) and discrepancy (SDRES) 
statistics.  This case was evaluated in more depth in attempt to understand the 
reasons that this case had such a high degree of influence. It was discovered 
that the in-use decision policy at time two for case 27 was not reliable.  While 
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there were other cases with low reliability, none of the others had such a high 
degree of influence on the regression equation. Consequently, this case was 
removed from further analysis. 
Assumptions of regression.  There are a number of assumptions in 
regression that need to be checked prior to drawing conclusions about the data; 
specifically, I evaluate the following four suggested by Cohen et al. (2003): the 
assumption of normality, the assumption of no measurement error, the 
assumption constant variance in the residuals (homoscedasticity), and the 
assumption of independence of the residuals. In addition, I test for 
multicollinearity among the independent variables.   
Normality was addressed through an analysis of a series of q-q plots, 
which provide “an excellent method of determining whether the data follow a 
normal distribution” (Cohen et al., 2003: 138). Because this is an experiment, 
only three variables are checked for normality: time-one decision policy, change 
in espoused decision policy, and structural similarity (note that the first and 
second of these are used as controls in the analysis). The q-q plots are 
contained in Appendices H4-H7. As has been noted previously, the error terms 
for the raw change in espoused decision policy score are of a non-normal 
distribution. Consequently, this variable was transformed using a square root 
transformation which was then standardized for use in the analysis.  As can be 
seen in the lack of substantial variance from the superimposed line in the q-q 
plots, this transformed variable (along with the other variables) is near normal. 
Thus, no further remedial action was taken. 
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The assumption of no measurement error is mitigated by the experimental 
nature of this study. More specifically, of the variables included in the regression 
equation only one—structural similarity—required evaluation from a reliability 
standpoint; this is because the other variables were either experimental 
manipulations (i.e., knowledge codification and decision communication 
incentives) or were manifest variables wherein reliability was not an issue (i.e., 
decision-policy consciousness, founder status, and change in espoused decision 
policy).  As has been noted previously, structural similarity had an acceptable 
level of inter-rater reliability (0.86). 
The assumption constant variance in the residuals or homoscedasticity is 
“the assumption that dependent variable(s) exhibit equal levels of variance 
across the range of predictor variable(s)” (Hair et al., 1998: 73).  To test this 
assumption, a series of residual plots were created. Specifically, I plotted the 
standardized residuals against the independent variables.  Following the 
suggestion of Cohen et al. (2003), I included a random (fuzzy) number in the 
plots of the dichotomous variables to make any patterns between the residuals 
and the independent variables more visible.  These graphs (contained in 
Appendix H8) suggested that heteroscedasticity may be a problem in the case of 
structural similarity. A series of transformations were performed on the structural 
analogy variable (e.g., inverse, log and square root) as an attempt to remedy the 
potential problem (Hair et al., 1998), but in each case the transformation 
exacerbated the problem. Thus, inasmuch as heteroscedasticity did not seem to 
be extreme, the original structural similarity variable was retained in the model.  
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There were no indications that any of the other variables violated the assumption 
of homoscedasticity. 
The assumption of independence of residuals is not likely to be a problem 
in study one because the dependent variable is an entrepreneurial decision 
maker’s decision-policy consciousness, which is independent of the decision-
policy consciousness of other entrepreneurial decision makers. However, one 
possible test for independence of the residuals is the Durbin-Watson test. A 
value of 2 suggests complete independence.  In this case, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic was 1.935 suggesting that there was not likely a problem with non-
independence of the residuals. 
Multicollinearity among the predictor variables is a potential problem in this 
study. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, time-one decision-policy 
consciousness was used as a control variable in the study, in addition to a score 
representing a change in the espoused decision policy.  Albeit highly unlikely, 
both variables could theoretically be related. Second, calculations of the 
interaction effects were, obviously, based on the main effects that were 
hypothesized to interact. While steps have been taken to minimize the potential 
for multicollinearity—such as centering main effect variables prior to calculating 
interaction effect variables—it was nonetheless important to test for the presence 
of multicollinearity. This is done through an investigation of the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) associated with each independent variable.  The largest of these was 
1.195, which falls well below the generally accepted VIF limit of 10 (Cohen et al., 
2003). 
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Hypothesis Testing. Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations and 
intercorrelations for all of the variables in study one. Before testing the 
hypotheses, it is necessary to report the results of the decision communication 
incentive manipulation check. As was previously noted, this manipulation check 
was included to verify the efficacy of the decision communication incentive 
manipulation.  However, because the reliability of the scale used in the 
manipulation check was below acceptable ranges, a single item was used that 
most closely represented the theoretical rationale of the manipulation check. 
Specifically, I used an item that asked: In this activity I was more concerned with: 
avoiding mistakes (1) or getting it right (7).  Because there were three decision 
communication incentive conditions, analysis of variance was used to check the 
efficacy of the manipulation. The results of the ANOVA were marginally 
significant (p < .09). The mean manipulation check scores for the gain-focus, 
loss-focus and low conditions were, respectively 5.77, 5.54 and 5.20. This fits 
with the underlying theory of the manipulation. Namely, entrepreneurial decision 
makers in the gain-focus condition are expected to be closer to the “getting-it-
right” end of the scale than those in the loss-focus condition. Conversely, 
entrepreneurial decision makers who receive no feedback are likely to be closer 
to the “avoiding-mistakes” end of the scale than the others due to the lack of any 
active feedback, leading to increased concern that negative (as opposed to 
positive) performance is the cause of the absence in decision communication 
incentives. 
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                              Table 3: Study One Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
Variables Mean s.d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Time 2 Gap DV -0.68 0.30
2. Time 1 Gap (control) -0.74 0.31 0.34 **
3. Espoused Change Z-score (control) 0.00 1.01 -0.40 ** -0.25 **
4. Founder Statusb 0.07 0.50 -0.28 ** -0.10 0.03
5. Codification: Control vs. Experimentalc 0.01 0.50 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.06
6. Incentive: Low vs. Highd -0.01 0.48 0.10 0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.01
7. Incentive: Loss vs. Gaine 0.00 0.41 0.12 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.00
8. Structural Similarity 4.45 1.55 -0.02 -0.07 0.17 * 0.07 0.14 0.06 -0.04
a  n = 124
b  Contrast coded: -.5 = non-founder; .5 = founder
c  Contrast coded: -.5 = control; .5 = experiment  
d  Contrast coded: -.67 = low; .33 = high
e  Contrast coded: -.5 = loss; .5 = gain; 0 = low
*  p  ≤ .05
** p  < .01
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Prior to testing the hypotheses, it was important to understand the nature 
of decision-policy consciousness. As has been discussed previously, decision-
policy consciousness is representative of intuitive thinking.  To provide evidence 
of the link between intuition and decision-policy consciousness, but to also 
include the possible role of false intuition, decision-policy consciousness at time 
one was regressed on use of intuition, general self-efficacy, entrepreneurial self-
efficacy, and overconfidence.  
A similar process to that described previously was used in the 
investigation of outliers for this regression.  Based on the centered leverage 
values, externally studentized residuals and the Cook’s D values, four items were 
determined to be outliers. These are contained in Table 4. However, the analysis  
Table 4: Intuition Check Regression Diagnostics
Case # SDRES LEV Cook's D
9 -0.726 0.106 0.014
43 -2.077 0.041 0.043
54 0.432 0.109 0.005
58 -3.739 0.014 0.056
63 1.593 0.114 0.070
66 -2.055 0.038 0.039
75 2.117 0.006 0.012
91 -2.346 0.047 0.062
92 -2.133 0.014 0.020
104 1.758 0.104 0.077
116 -0.395 0.107 0.004
 
with and without outliers was different only in the significance of the intuition 
variable; namely the significance of this variable increased from marginally 
significant to significant upon deletion of the outliers. Because no theoretical 
reason seemed to exist for removing outliers, I report the regression results 
calculated with all of the cases. Table 5 displays these results.  The marginally 
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significant negative effect of reported use of intuition on decision-policy 
consciousness, combined with non-significant effects for the other three variables 
provided support for the notion that decision-policy consciousness is 
representative of intuition: lower decision-policy consciousness corresponded 
with higher reported use of intuition. 
Table 5: Results of Intuition Check Regression Analysisa
Variables Mean s.d Β
Use of Intuition 15.49 3.69 -0.17 †
General Self-Efficacy 47.31 4.57 0.06
Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy 43.89 5.39 0.05
Overconfidence 0.33 21.16 -0.04
R 2 0.03
F 1.05
n 125 b
a  Standardized coefficients are reported
b  Two observations could not be included due to missing values
†  p  < .10
 
Table 6 summarizes the OLS regression results for decision-policy 
consciousness.  According to hypothesis 1, firm founders will have lower 
decision-policy consciousness than non-firm founders. As can be seen in model 
2, founder status was negatively related to decision-policy consciousness (B = -
.25; p < .01). This finding provides support for hypothesis 1.  
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    Table 6: Results of Regression Analysis for Decision-Policy Consciousnessa
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Time 1 Gap (control) 0.26 ** 0.24 ** 0.21 ** 0.23 **
Espoused Change Z-score (control) -0.34 ** -0.34 ** -0.36 ** -0.36 **
Founder Status -0.25 ** -0.24 ** -0.24 **
Codification Contrast 0.15 † 0.12
Incentive Contrast 1: Low vs. High 0.09 0.03
Incentive Contrast 2: Loss vs. Gain 0.05 0.02
Structural Similarity 0.00 0.02
Founder X Codification 0.16 *
Founder X Incentive 1: Low vs. High 0.05
Founder X Incentive 2: Loss vs. Gain -0.06
Founder X Structural Similarity -0.09
∆R 2 0.06 0.03 0.03
R 2 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.35
F 17.74 ** 16.08 ** 7.79 ** 5.55 **
n 124 124 124 124
a  Standardized coefficients are reported.
†  p  < .10
*  p  < .05
** p  < .01
 
Hypothesis 2 states that entrepreneurial decision makers who engage in 
knowledge codification will possess higher decision-policy consciousness than 
entrepreneurial decision makers who do not engage in knowledge codification.  
As is shown in model 3, the effect of knowledge codification on decision-policy 
consciousness was marginally significant and positive (B = .15; p < .10). This 
finding provides cautious support for hypothesis 2.22 
                                                 
22 I hasten to note that in a model excluding all eight potential outliers, there is strong support for 
hypothesis 2; however, to err on the side of caution only the model that excludes one theoretically 
justifiable outlier is reported. 
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According to hypothesis 3a, entrepreneurial decision makers with high 
decision communication incentives will have higher decision-policy 
consciousness than entrepreneurial decision makers without high decision 
communication incentives.  However, as can be seen in model 3, decision 
communication incentives were not significantly related to decision-policy 
consciousness (B = .09; p > .05). Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
The argument of hypothesis 3b is that decision-policy consciousness 
about opportunity assessment will be higher for individuals whose decision 
communication incentives are framed in terms of a promotion focus (gains) than 
those whose decision communication incentives are framed in terms of a 
prevention focus (losses). As was the case with the previous hypothesis, the 
insignificant coefficient in model 3 (B = .05; p > .05) does not provide evidence 
that the type of decision communication incentives used impact decision-policy 
consciousness. Thus, hypothesis 3b is not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 states that entrepreneurial decision makers who use 
structurally similar analogies to describe their decision policies will possess 
higher decision-policy consciousness than entrepreneurial decision makers who 
do not use structurally similar analogies.  However, the non-significant coefficient 
in model 3 (B = .00; p > .05) does not provide evidence that use of structurally 
similar analogies impacts decision-policy consciousness. Thus, hypothesis 4 is 
not supported. 
Hypotheses 5a-d address the interaction effects of founder status on the 
three mechanisms hypothesized to increase decision-policy consciousness. 
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According to hypotheses 5a, decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers engage in greater 
codification of their knowledge, but does so at a faster rate for founders than for 
non-founders. As expected, the positive and significant coefficient in model 4 (B 
= .16; p < .05) provides evidence for the interaction effect.  Figure 9 displays the 
form of the interaction, confirming hypothesis 5a.  
 
Hypothesis 5b states that decision-policy consciousness about opportunity 
assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers’ decision 
communication incentives increase, but does so at a faster rate for founders than 
for non-founders. And according to hypothesis 5c, decision-policy consciousness 
about opportunity assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers 
receive decision communication incentives framed in terms of a promotion focus 
(gains), but does so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders. As can be 
seen in model 4, the interaction effects were not significant between founder 
Figure 9: Knowledge Codification x Founder Status 
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status and presence of decision communication incentives (B = .05; p > .05) and 
decision communication incentive type (B = -.06; p > .05). Thus, hypotheses 5b 
and 5c are not supported. 
According to hypothesis 5d, decision-policy consciousness about 
opportunity assessment increases as entrepreneurial decision makers utilize 
structurally similar analogies to describe their decision policies, but does so at a 
faster rate for founders than for non-founders.  As is evident in model 4, the 
interaction effect between founder status and analogy was not significant (B = -
.09; p > .05). Thus, hypothesis 5d is not supported. 
Study Two – Opportunity Evaluation Decision Policy 
Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics for the level-two (decision) 
variables. Because the design for study two is a fraction factorial orthogonal 
design the descriptive statistics for the level-one variables are not included.  Note 
that the mean of the dependent variable at level one (likelihood of investment) is 
4.47 and the standard deviation is 2.48 (n = 1936).   
Table 7: Study Two Means, Standard Devations, and Correlations at Level Twoa
Variables Mean s.d 1 2 3 4
1. Fear of Failure 78.32 22.00
2. Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy 44.10 5.24 -0.07
3. Educationb 0.13 0.41 0.07 -0.15
4. Industry Experience 21.89 10.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.13
5. Environmental Dynamism 24.60 8.14 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10 0.15
a  n = 121
b  Contrast coded: -.67 = no university degree; .33 = university degree
  
As is noted previously, HLM was used to test hypotheses 6-9.  As already 
mentioned, a unique aspect of HLM is that it allows for the partitioning of 
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variance both within and between groups.  In study two, a group consists of a 
series of decisions made by an individual.  Thus, while the majority of the 
literature on HLM refers to within- and between-group variance, I instead refer to 
within- and between-individual variance for the sake of clarity in hypothesis 
testing. 
In order to test the hypotheses related to study two, it is first necessary to 
verify that there is systematic variance both within and between individuals.  This 
can be done through an investigation of a null model, or a model that includes 
neither level-one predictors nor level-two predictors.  In this case, the null model 
partitions variance in likelihood of investment both within- and between-
individuals. A χ2 test on the null model (χ2 = 255, df. = 120, p < .001) suggests 
that likelihood of investment varied significantly both within and between 
individuals.  Moreover, calculation of an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
allows the researcher to understand the degree of between-individual variance. 
This is done using the within- and between-individual variance statistics.23  The 
resulting ICC indicates that 6.6 percent of the variance in the likelihood of 
investment lies between individuals (Hofmann, 1997; Whitener, 2001). 
A second question to be asked prior to testing the hypotheses using HLM 
is the extent to which the level-one factors (e.g., potential value) explain variance 
in the likelihood of investment across entrepreneurial opportunities, within 
individuals.  This can be determined by calculating an R2 statistic using the 
between-individual variance for the null model and the between-individual 
                                                 
23 The formula is τn / (τn + σ2n) where τn equals the between-individual variance of likelihood to 
invest (LTI) in the null model and σ2n equals the within-individual variance of LTI in the null model. 
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variance for the level-one models.24  The resulting statistics indicate that: (1) the 
main effects model explains 62 percent of the variance in the between individual 
differences in likelihood of investing; and (2) a main/interaction effects model 
explains 64 percent of the variance.   
A third question to be asked prior to testing the hypotheses (and 
investigating the propositions) using HLM is the extent to which level-two factors 
(e.g., fear of failure) explain between-individual variance. This is determined by 
first calculating the proportion of between-individual variance explained by the 
level-two factors. 25 The resulting statistic (.011) is then divided by the ICC (.066), 
to indicate that 16.7 percent of the total between-individual variance is explained 
by the level-two factors.   
Hypotheses 6-9 were tested using the level-one HLM models referenced 
in the previous paragraphs.  Specifically, significant t-values for each of the level-
one parameters indicate the significance of that factor in the likelihood of 
investment, holding differences within individuals constant (Hofmann, 1997; 
Whitener, 2001).  Table 8 contains the results of the HLM estimation used to test 
hypotheses 6-9.   
Hypothesis 6 states that the higher the potential value of an opportunity, 
the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to invest in that opportunity.  
As is expected and as is shown in model 2, the effect of value on likelihood of 
                                                 
24 The formula is (σ2n - σ2one) / σ2n where σ2n equals the within-individual variance of (LTI) in the 
null model and σ2one equals the within-individual variance of (LTI) in the level-one factors. 
25 The formula is (τone - τtwo) / τone where τone equals the between-individual variance of (LTI) in the 
level-one intercepts and τtwo equals the between-individual variance of (LTI) in the level-two 
intercepts. 
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investing was significant and positive (coefficient = 2.577; p < .001).  This finding 
provides support for hypothesis 6.   
Table 8: Results of HLM Estimation for Likelihood of Investment (Hypotheses 6-9)a
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 4.466 ** 4.466 ** 4.466 **
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Potential Value 2.577 ** 2.577 **
(0.102) (0.102)
Knowledge Relatedness 2.542 ** 2.542 **
(0.099) (0.099)
Window of Opportunity Availability 0.441 ** 0.441 **
(0.076) (0.076)
Number of Potential Opportunities 0.274 * 0.274 *
(0.100) (0.100)
Potential Value * Knowledge Relatedness 1.159 **
(0.141)
Potential Value * Window of Opportunity Availability 0.088
(0.122)
Potential Value * Number of Potential Opportunities 0.010
(0.107)
Deviance 8970.62 7224.38 7156.36
Deviance Difference -1746.24 -68.02
Proportion of Variance Explained 62% 64%
n = 1936 at the decision level; n = 121 at the individual level
a  Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p  < .01
** p  < .001
 
According to hypothesis 7a, the higher the knowledge relatedness of an 
opportunity, the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to invest in that 
opportunity.  As is seen in model 2, the effect of knowledge relatedness on 
likelihood of investment was significant and positive (coefficient = 2.542; p < 
.001). This finding provides support for hypothesis 7a.   
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Hypothesis 7b states that the likelihood of investing in an opportunity 
increases with the potential value of an opportunity, but does so at a faster rate 
when knowledge relatedness of the opportunity is high.  As the significant and 
positive coefficient in model 3 suggests (coefficient = 1.159; p < .001), knowledge 
does affect the relationship between potential value and likelihood to invest; and 
as figure 10, suggests the form of the interaction is as expected in the 
hypothesis. These findings provide support for hypothesis 7b. 
 
According to hypothesis 8a, the narrower the window of opportunity 
availability, the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to invest in that 
opportunity.  As can be seen in model 2 the coefficient, while significant, is in the 
opposite direction of that which is hypothesized (coefficient = .441; p < .001). 
Thus, hypothesis 8a is not supported.  
The argument of hypothesis 8b is that the likelihood of investing in an 
opportunity increases with the potential value of an opportunity, but does so at a 
Figure 10: Potential Value x Knowledge Relatedness 
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faster rate when the window of opportunity availability is narrow.  However, the 
non-significant effect contained in model 3 provides no significant evidence that 
window of opportunity availability impacts the relationship between potential 
value and likelihood of investment (coefficient = .088; p > .05). Accordingly, 
hypothesis 8b is not supported. 
According to hypothesis 9a, the fewer the number of potential 
opportunities available, the more likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to 
invest in that opportunity.  As can be seen in model 2 the coefficient, while 
significant, was in the opposite direction of that which is hypothesized (coefficient 
= .274; p < .001). Thus, hypothesis 9a is not supported.   
Hypothesis 9b states that the likelihood of investing in an opportunity 
increases with potential value of an opportunity, but does so at a faster rate when 
the number of potential opportunities available is few. However, the non-
significant effect in model 3 provides no significant evidence that number of 
potential opportunities impacts the relationship between potential value and 
likelihood of investment (coefficient = .010; p > .05). Accordingly, hypothesis 9b 
is not supported. 
An exploration of propositions 1-3 should only happen if the results of the 
previous two analyses are indicative of cross-level effects: that is, there are 
significant differences both within and between individuals, and the level-one 
slopes and intercepts are significant.  In light of the previous analyses, it would 
seem appropriate to test for effects of individual-level factors on the likelihood to 
invest.  As is previously noted, cross-level effects are tested through use of an 
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equation that includes the level one intercepts and slopes as outcome variables.  
A significant coefficient of the level-two predictors (e.g., fear of failure) on the 
level-one intercept indicates that the level-two factor directly influences likelihood 
of investment—a kind of cross-level main effect.  Similarly, a significant 
coefficient of the level-two predictors (e.g., fear of failure) on the level-one slopes 
(e.g., potential value) indicates that the level-two factor influences the 
relationship between level one factors—a kind of cross-level interaction effect. 
Table 9 contains the results of the cross-level HLM estimation.  Consistent 
with propositions 1, 2, and 3 (in part), attitudes about failure, entrepreneurial self-
efficacy and general human capital, respectively, affect specific aspects of the 
opportunity evaluation decision, controlling for environmental dynamism.   
Consistent with proposition 1, the significant coefficients for fear of failure 
relative to the slopes of potential value (coefficient = .011; p < .001) and number 
of potential opportunities (coefficient = -.009; p < .05) suggest that attitudes about 
failure do impact entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation 
decisions.  Figure 11 depicts the form of the effect that fear of failure has on the 
relationship between potential value and likelihood of investment. It suggests that 
compared to those with a low fear of failure, those with a high fear of failure are 
less likely to invest in opportunities with lower value; for opportunities with higher 
value, however, those with a high fear of failure are equally likely to invest as 
those with a low fear of failure.  
Similarly, Figure 12 depicts the form of the effect that fear of failure has on 
the relationship between number of potential opportunities and likelihood of 
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                        Table 9: Results of HLM Estimation for Likelihood of Investment (Propositions 1-3)a
Variable Slopes / Level 2 Predictors
Level 1 Intercept 4.466 *** -0.009 -0.003 0.002 -0.420 -0.006
(0.077) (0.009) (0.003) (0.017) (0.228) (0.008)
Potential Value 2.577 *** 0.005 0.011 ** 0.045 0.565 * -0.005
(0.097) (0.011) (0.004) (0.024) (0.286) (0.009)
Knowledge Relatedness 2.542 *** -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 0.126 0.001
(0.099) (0.012) (0.005) (0.020) (0.292) (0.010)
Window of Opportunity Availability 0.441 *** -0.011 0.004 0.000 -0.077 -0.002
(0.075) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.182) (0.008)
Number of Potential Opportunities 0.274 ** 0.000 -0.009 * -0.021 -0.289 0.006
(0.097) (0.011) (0.004) (0.021) (0.298) (0.010)
Potential Value * Knowledge Relatedness 1.159 *** 0.006 0.002 0.020 0.826 * 0.021
(0.136) (0.016) (0.005) (0.022) (0.373) (0.014)
Potential Value * Window of Opportunity Availability 0.089 -0.004 -0.002 0.021 -0.266 0.000
(0.122) (0.017) (0.005) (0.025) (0.338) (0.011)
Potential Value * Number of Potential Opportunities 0.010 -0.021 0.002 -0.048 * -0.090 0.008
(0.104) (0.012) (0.005) (0.021) (0.305) (0.010)
n = 1936 at the decision level; n = 121 at the individual level
Deviance = 7329.85
a  Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
b  Contrast coded: -.67 = no university degree; .33 = university degree
*   p  < .05
**  p  < .01
*** p  < .001
Education 
(Gen. HC)b
Industry Exp. 
(Spec. HC)
Level 2 
Intercept
ENV. 
Dynamism Fear of Failure
ENT Self-
efficacy
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investment.  It suggests that compared to those with a lower fear of failure, those 
with a high fear of failure are less likely to invest when the number of potential 
opportunities are many; but when the opportunities are few, those with a high 
fear of failure are equally likely to invest as those with a low fear of failure.  
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Similarly, the significant coefficient for entrepreneurial self-efficacy relative 
to the slope of the interaction between value and number of potential 
opportunities (coefficient = -.048; p < .05) provides evidence for proposition 2, 
which suggests that entrepreneurial self-efficacy influences entrepreneurial 
decision makers opportunity evaluation decisions.  Figure 13, depicts the form of 
the effect that entrepreneurial self-efficacy has on the hypothesized interaction 
(albeit insignificant) between potential value and number of potential 
opportunities. It suggests that the positive relationship between potential value 
and likelihood to invest is enhanced more by a high number of opportunities 
when entrepreneurial self-efficacy is low than when it is high.   
 
Lastly, the significant coefficients for education relative to the slopes of 
potential value (coefficient = .564; p < .05) and the interaction between potential 
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value and knowledge relatedness (coefficient = .826; p < .05) lends partial 
support for proposition 3, which suggests that entrepreneurial decision makers’ 
general human capital will have a significant effect on their opportunity evaluation 
decisions.  Figure 14 depicts the form of the effect that general human capital 
(GHC) has on the relationship between potential value and likelihood of 
investment. It suggests that compared to those with high general human capital, 
those with low general human capital are more likely to invest in opportunities 
with lower value; but for opportunities with higher value, those with low general 
human capital are equally likely to invest as those with high human capital. 
 
Figure 15, depicts the form of the effect that general human capital has on 
the hypothesized interaction between potential value and knowledge relatedness. 
It suggests that the positive relationship between potential value and likelihood to 
invest is enhanced more by knowledge relatedness when general human capital 
is high then when it is low. 
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The lack of significant effects for industry experience, however, suggests a 
partial lack of evidence for proposition 3.  In the discussion section I will attend to 
the implications of these proposition-related findings in more depth.  
Figure 15: General Human Capital x Knowledge  
Relatedness x Value 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
to
 In
ve
st
 
Potential Value 
Lower         Higher
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
to
 In
ve
st
 
Potential Value 
Lower         Higher
Low Knowledge       High Knowledge
Relatedness       Relatedness 
 
Low Knowledge       High Knowledge
Relatedness       Relatedness 
 
Low General Human Capital High General Human Capital 
 121 
 
 
CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION 
In two studies, I have addressed two primary research questions.  The first 
research question addressed how entrepreneurs, who rely heavily on intuitive, 
procedural knowledge in their decision making, can transfer this knowledge; the 
second question asked how opportunity evaluation decisions are made by 
entrepreneurial decision makers and how these might differ between 
entrepreneurial decision makers.  These two questions are fundamental to new 
enterprise development because their answers inform venture founding and 
growth processes that are, as yet, not completely understood in research and in 
practice.   
I addressed the first research question through a field experiment that 
investigated the decision-policy consciousness of entrepreneurial decision 
makers in 127 technology companies.  In support of extant theory, the results 
indicate that founders have lower decision-policy consciousness than non-
founders, meaning that they are less able to articulate their intuitive procedural 
knowledge than non-founders.  However, the results lend support to the 
proposition that knowledge codification can enhance decision-policy 
consciousness in general, but was more efficacious in affecting the decision-
policy consciousness of founders versus non-founders. 
I addressed the second research question through a conjoint study of the 
127 entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation decisions. These 
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results support extant theory on the factors that make up individuals’ opportunity 
evaluation decisions.  Specifically, as hypothesized, I found that increases in the 
potential value of an opportunity lead to a higher likelihood of investment. 
Similarly, the greater the knowledge relatedness of an opportunity, the more 
likely an entrepreneurial decision maker is to invest in that opportunity.  In 
addition, I found that likelihood of investment based on the potential value of an 
opportunity increases at a faster rate when knowledge relatedness is higher 
versus when it is lower.  This suggests the importance of joint consideration of 
both desirability (potential value) and feasibility (knowledge relatedness) in 
investigations about opportunity evaluation. In an interesting set of results, I also 
found that, entrepreneurial decision makers are more likely to invest in 
opportunities with wide, versus narrow, windows and are also more likely to 
invest when there are many, as opposed to few, opportunities to choose from.   
Moreover, in study two I also found that differences in individual level 
factors affect entrepreneurial decision makers’ decisions to invest in an 
opportunity. Specifically, I found that fear of failure affects the relationship 
between potential value and likelihood to invest such that a high fear of failure 
leads to a lower likelihood of investment for lower value opportunities relative to 
higher value opportunities.  I also found that fear of failure also impacts the 
relationship between number of available opportunities and likelihood of 
investment in the sense that a high fear of failure results in a lower likelihood of 
investment when there are many opportunities to choose from relative to when 
there are few opportunities to choose from.  The findings also suggest that 
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entrepreneurial self-efficacy impacts the effect of potential value on likelihood of 
investment such that the positive relationship between potential value and 
likelihood to invest is enhanced more by a high number of opportunities when 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy is low than when it is high. Lastly, I found that 
general human capital impacts the relationship between potential value and 
likelihood of investment in that high general human capital leads to a lower 
likelihood of investment for lower value opportunities relative to higher value 
opportunities. Additionally, I found that the positive relationship between potential 
value and likelihood of investment is enhanced more by knowledge relatedness 
when general human capital is high than when it is low. 
In the following sections, I discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of these findings (summarized in Table 10).  I do this by first 
providing context for the findings and then discussing the potential contributions 
that flow from these findings. This is done for both study one and study two, in 
turn.  I also discuss the limitations of both studies as well as future research 
directions. 
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Hypotheses and Propositions Support
H1 Firm founders will have lower decision-policy consciousness than non-firm founders. Supported
H2 Entrepreneurs who engage in knowledge codification will possess higher decision-policy 
consciousness than entrepreneurs who do not engage in knowledge codification.
Marginally 
supported
H3a Entrepreneurs with high incentives to articulate knowledge about a specific decision 
policy will have higher decision-policy consciousness than entrepreneurs without high 
incentives to articulate a specific decision policy.
Not 
supported
H3b Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity assessment will be higher for 
individuals whose incentives to articulate are framed in terms of a promotion focus 
(gains) than those whose incentives are framed in terms of a prevention focus (losses).
Not 
supported
H4 Entrepreneurs who use structurally similar analogies to describe their decision policies 
will possess higher decision-policy consciousness than entrepreneurs who do not use 
structurally similar analogies.
Not 
supported
H5a Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity assessment increases as 
entrepreneurs engage in codification of their knowledge, but does so at a faster rate for 
founders than for non-founders.
Supported
H5b Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity assessment increases as 
entrepreneurs’ incentives to articulate knowledge about a decision policy increase, but 
does so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders.
Not 
supported
H5c Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity assessment increases as 
entrepreneurs receive incentives framed in terms of a promotion focus (gains), but does 
so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders.
Not 
supported
H5d Decision-policy consciousness about opportunity assessment increases as 
entrepreneurs utilize structurally similar analogies to describe their decision policies, but 
does so at a faster rate for founders than for non-founders.
Not 
supported
H6 The higher the potential value (desirability) of an opportunity, the more likely an 
entrepreneur is to invest in (act on) that opportunity. Supported
H7a The higher the knowledge relatedness (feasibility) of an opportunity, the more likely an 
entrepreneur is to invest in (act on) that opportunity. Supported
H7b The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an opportunity increases with the potential 
value (desirability) of an opportunity, but does so at a faster rate when knowledge 
relatedness (feasibility) of the opportunity is high.
Supported
H8a The narrower the window of opportunity availability (environment), the more likely an 
entrepreneur is to invest in (act on) that opportunity.
Opposite 
Direction
H8b The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an opportunity increases with the potential 
value of an opportunity, but does so at a faster rate when the window of opportunity 
availability (environment) is narrow.
Not 
supported
H9a The fewer the number of potential opportunities available (environment), the more likely 
an entrepreneur is to invest in (act on) that opportunity.
Opposite 
Direction
H9b The likelihood of investing in (acting on) an opportunity increases with potential value of 
an opportunity, but does so at a faster rate when the number of potential opportunities 
available (environment) is few.
Not 
supported
P 1 Entrepreneurs’ opportunity evaluation decision policies will differ based on their attitudes 
about failure. Supported
P 2 Entrepreneurs’ opportunity evaluation decision policies will differ based on their 
perceived entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Supported
P 3 Entrepreneurs’ opportunity evaluation decision policies will differ based on their general 
human capital (educational experience) and specific human capital (industry 
experience).
Partially 
supported
Table 10: Summary of Findings
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Implications for Theory 
Context of Study One. In the introduction to this research study, I discuss 
a paradox related to individual expertise: as expertise increases, the ability to 
utilize this expertise decreases. This occurs as a result of knowledge 
proceduralization.  An analogous paradox is discussed in the strategy literature 
(Coff, Coff, & Eastvold, 2006; Rivkin, 2001). At the level of the firm a knowledge 
resource is most valuable when it is tacit and thus cannot be copied by 
competitors (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989); but at the same time, a tacit 
resource is also of limited use for a firm if it cannot be shared within that firm 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).   
Two notable approaches for resolving this paradox at the level of the firm 
have been presented in the literature. Rivkin (2001) suggested that a firm should 
balance the complexity of its knowledge.  This is because at both high and low 
levels of complexity, a firm cannot derive maximum benefit from the knowledge 
resource: at high levels of complexity, the firm does not benefit from the 
knowledge because it is not replicable within the firm; and conversely, at low 
levels of complexity the firm does not benefit from the knowledge because it is 
imitable by competitors. In both cases the result is a loss of any advantage that 
the knowledge would have afforded.  In theory, this approach has significant 
benefits: a firm with moderate levels of complexity in knowledge will outperform 
other firms with low and high levels of knowledge complexity because it can 
replicate its knowledge without it becoming imitable. In practice, however, this 
approach is difficult to implement.  Specifically, as Rivkin rightly noted, although 
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the role of the individual has been largely simplified in his analysis, individual 
decision makers affect the level of complexity in knowledge; and the 
determination of proper levels of complexity is not an easy feat, particularly given 
variation in the external environment.  Accordingly, a more complete picture (one 
that includes individual decision makers) is needed for this approach to be of use 
to individual decision makers.  
Coff et al. (2006) provided a second perspective on the resolution of the 
knowledge paradox that gives greater consideration to the individual decision 
maker. To situate their resolution of the knowledge paradox, they noted that in 
undertaking the important task of scaling scarce knowledge resources, greater 
codification of knowledge is frequently required. But this, they said, is at the crux 
of the knowledge paradox: “in transferring and codifying knowledge to achieve 
the requisite scale, it may lose strategic properties that keep it from rivals (2006: 
454).”  Their response to this is to utilize information technology that does not 
codify knowledge, but that instead creates even more tacit knowledge while also 
increasing specialization related to use of that knowledge.  This is achieved by 
allowing individual expertise to be utilized throughout a firm, without actually 
codifying the knowledge related to that expertise. They elaborated on what this 
might look like: 
One might ask what type of technology might leverage those with tacit 
knowledge while minimizing the codification required. We begin with an 
example of tacit knowledge in the form of pattern recognition, where an 
expert can observe a set of stimuli, discern patterns, and translate them 
into recommendations (Simon, 1987). While this type of knowledge might 
be amenable to expert systems, were it codified and reduced to a set of 
decision rules, as discussed, that might reduce the strategic properties of 
the knowledge. However, technology might still be used to organize and 
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track information. This would leave the key task of spotting trends in the 
information uncodified. However, the information that a decision maker 
would use could be collected and displayed in an interface that facilitated 
interpretation. In this way, a decision maker could become more 
productive without codifying or transferring the most critical knowledge—
how to interpret patterns in the data (2006: 458). 
 
They suggested that in utilizing such information technology, firms can leverage 
knowledge while not reducing its strategic value. But, as will be explained in 
more detail below, this proposal has its limits: it is not well suited to leverage 
opportunity-related knowledge. 
With respect to the above quotation, it is interesting to note that Coff et al. 
(2006) specifically viewed the codification of decision rules regarding a set of 
stimuli as negative. This is interesting since it is this very type of knowledge 
codification that is advanced in this research. Understanding the reasons that 
underlie these differences is important to understanding the contributions of this 
research.  Specifically, differences between approaches can be found in the 
distinctiveness of opportunity-related knowledge vis-à-vis knowledge regarding 
current competencies within a firm.   
First, unlike the knowledge underlying existing competencies where 
knowledge outcomes are understood, outcomes of opportunity-related 
knowledge are surrounded by ambiguity (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). Second, 
because the value of the knowledge underlying an existing competency has 
already been demonstrated, the leveraging of this knowledge is typically 
supported by key stakeholders within the organization. This is not the case for 
opportunity-related knowledge; rather, because of the ambiguous and untested 
nature of this knowledge related to new opportunities, commitment from other 
 128 
stakeholders is frequently difficult to obtain (Miller & Ireland, 2005). Third, the role 
of resources in utilizing the knowledge underlying an existing competency is 
different than the role of resources in utilizing opportunity-related knowledge.  In 
the case of knowledge underlying existing competencies, resources are devoted 
to scaling up the knowledge underlying the competency (Coff et al., 2006); 
however, in the case of opportunity-related knowledge, resources must be 
invested in both the scaling up of the knowledge and the exploitation of the 
untested opportunity presented by that knowledge. In this sense, special 
consideration is needed for the paradox of entrepreneurial expertise beyond 
existing perspectives. 
Theoretical Contributions of Study One. An enhanced understanding of 
the differences between the knowledge underlying an existing competency and 
the knowledge underlying a new opportunity has broad implications. Specifically, 
the theory and findings of study one provide a resolution for the knowledge-
scaling paradox in that they focus on different types of causal ambiguity as well 
as the mechanisms that can best leverage these different types of ambiguity.  In 
the following paragraphs, I offer a number of ways in which the theory and 
findings of study one contribute to the literature. 
New View of Entrepreneurial Knowledge 
Taken together, the differences between knowledge underlying existing 
competencies and knowledge underlying an entrepreneurial opportunity indicate 
the importance of resolving the knowledge paradox in the entrepreneurial 
context. In the entrepreneurial context, the cost of not being able to articulate 
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knowledge related to expertise is high, particularly given the paucity of resources 
in entrepreneurial firms (Aldrich, 1999).  Leveraging knowledge-resources in 
entrepreneurial environments can be crucial to both the early survival (Thornhill & 
Amit, 2003) and subsequent performance (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003) of 
entrepreneurial firms.  In this sense, an understanding of how to utilize 
knowledge without putting at risk the advantage to be gained from that 
knowledge is fundamental to the process of new enterprise development. In this 
research, such an understanding is gained by advocating an approach mirroring 
that of Rivkin (2001), but providing specific steps that individual decision makers 
can take.  Instead of uni-dimensionally attempting to achieve moderate levels of 
complexity in knowledge, a multi-dimensional approach can be taken in which 
moderate levels of complexity in knowledge on average are achieved through a 
division of knowledge in terms of the expected benefit of knowledge articulation. 
The two types of causal ambiguity cited in chapter one—characteristic 
ambiguity and linkage ambiguity (King & Zeithaml, 2001)—clarify the benefits 
that can be gained by a division of knowledge. Specifically, ambiguity about the 
attributes of a specific entrepreneurial opportunity represents characteristic 
ambiguity; and ambiguity about the relationship between a specific opportunity 
and value creation represents linkage ambiguity. Because linkage ambiguity has 
been found to be negatively related to performance (King & Zeithaml, 2001), the 
investigation within this study centered on ways to reduce ambiguity about the 
relationship between a specific opportunity and value creation without reducing 
ambiguity about the attributes of a specific entrepreneurial opportunity.  In the 
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case of opportunity evaluation decisions, opportunity/value relationship ambiguity 
is due to the proceduralization of knowledge related to the opportunity decision 
(Mitchell et al., 2005). Because this intuitive, procedural knowledge is rooted in 
expertise, it has the potential to confer a competitive advantage insofar as it can 
be meaningfully and accurately articulated to other stakeholders (Hill & 
Levenhagen, 1995; Miller & Ireland, 2005).  Thus, a division of knowledge can 
resolve the knowledge-scaling paradox once an understanding of the 
mechanisms that facilitate the reduction of linkage ambiguity—while preserving 
characteristic ambiguity—is gained.  The identification that such a division is a 
potential course of action strikes at the foundation of the thinking processes that 
are fundamental to new enterprise development. The results of study one provide 
insight into the ways in which this can be done. 
An Expanded View of Expertise and Intuition 
The finding that founders possess lower decision-policy consciousness 
than non-founders informs previous research relating entrepreneurial expertise 
and entrepreneurial intuition (Crossan et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 2005). First, the 
findings indicate marginal support that those who profess to use intuition do, in 
fact, have lower decision-policy consciousness than those who do not profess to 
use intuition.  Moreover, the significant effect in hypothesis 1 illustrates that an 
increase in founder-related expertise is in fact related to a decreased 
consciousness of the knowledge related to that expertise, providing evidence for 
the knowledge proceduralization process (Gordon, 1992). This effect supports 
the theory put forward by Mitchell et al. (2005) in the sense that greater founder-
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related expertise (what they term domain competence) results in greater 
entrepreneurial intuition. 
Understanding the Benefits of Knowledge Codification 
The finding that knowledge codification does indeed increase decision-
policy consciousness is important for a number of reasons. First, the applicability 
of knowledge codification has been criticized because of its associated costs 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002).26 The results of study one suggest, however, knowledge 
codification can be beneficial with little cost to the entrepreneurial decision maker 
above the time required (which on average was less than six minutes).  In this 
sense, blanket assertions that knowledge codification is an expensive 
undertaking are overly broad.  While the costliness of codification of course 
depends on the knowledge that is being codified, in and of itself, codification 
need not be expensive. 
Second, the marginal support for hypothesis 2 provides evidence that 
knowledge codification facilitates the articulation of intuitive procedural 
knowledge.  This finding is of particular relevance to research on entrepreneurial 
intuition (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005), in that it provides a key to opening the 
previously unopened black-box explanation for entrepreneurial outcomes.  In the 
past, outcomes that have been ascribed to entrepreneurial intuition have been 
taken on faith alone.  The results here, however, provide a mechanism for 
developing an understanding, albeit preliminary, of the internal workings of 
entrepreneurial intuition. 
                                                 
26 I hasten to note that while Zollo and Winter (2002) pointed to cost as a primary drawback of 
codification, the overall tenor of their article is that a strong case can be made for the benefits of 
codification.  
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A third benefit that is gained from the findings related to knowledge 
codification is that they may broaden our understanding of the Tacit-Articulable 
Knowledge Dimensions (see Figure 3).  Specifically, Winter notes that “tacit skills 
may be teachable even though not articulable” (2003: 171).  What the findings of 
study one may indicate is that the tacit-articulable continuum may actually be 
wider than previously thought. What was once considered tacit (and thereby not 
articulable) may actually be articulable.  If what was once tacit in new enterprise 
development can be made explicit, then further advances in understanding the 
fundamentals in new venture formation are within reach. In particular, the finding 
that what has previously been “locked up” in entrepreneurs’ minds can actually 
be made accessible creates hope for achieving a better understanding of 
founding processes in new venture formation. Moreover, if the tacit-articulable 
continuum is wider as a result of knowledge codification, what was previously 
thought to be “not teachable” may, in fact, be “teachable.”  This is a fruitful area 
for further research. 
Dynamic Capabilities in Entrepreneurship 
Dynamic capabilities have been defined to be “learned and stable 
pattern[s] of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved 
effectiveness” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 340).  As has been previously noted, the 
processes whereby intuitive procedural knowledge is made transferable 
represent a potential dynamic capability for a firm (Winter, 2003) because skill at 
transferability processes can be used to develop and adapt other strategic 
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capabilities and routines (Zollo & Winter, 2002).  Based on the findings in study 
one, knowledge codification can facilitate the creation of dynamic capabilities 
insofar as it facilitates diffusion of the knowledge related to a specific capability 
(Nonaka, 1994; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  In this case, the capability is the 
knowledge related to the link between an opportunity and value.  A dynamic 
capability is created insofar as an understanding of codification can be used to 
reduce linkage ambiguity across situations and circumstances. 
Moreover, as Collis (1994) noted, because dynamic capabilities can 
always be superseded by higher-order capabilities, researchers should not 
simply extol the virtues of capabilities devoid of context, but should rather 
“generate lists of the enormous variety of capabilities and develop normative 
prescriptions for actually building those capabilities” in a particular temporal 
context (1994: 151).  The findings of study one represent such a step.  
Specifically, the marginal support for hypothesis 2 suggests that codification 
facilitates the reduction of linkage ambiguity in the context of opportunity 
evaluation decisions; moreover, the findings related to hypothesis 5a suggest 
that this codification is more efficacious for founders than non-founders. Both 
instances provide evidence of contextual effects of a codification-based 
capability. 
Measurement of Intuition 
Cognitive constructs are inherently difficult to measure.  This is because 
the processes that underlie the constructs being measured are not directly 
observable, but are only observable by their effects.  This has been particularly 
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problematic from the standpoint of entrepreneurial intuition because theory 
progresses no faster than its propensity for measurement (Nunnally, 1978). 
Thus, while measures do exist for a number of other cognitive constructs in 
entrepreneurship (Baron & Ward, 2004), a useful measure of entrepreneurial 
intuition does not exist apart from self-report measures of intuition (e.g., Allinson 
& Hayes, 1996).  And while such measures are useful in their own right, they are 
limited in the sense that these measures are susceptible to hindsight biases. 
Moreover, when self-report measures are used, intuition is not necessarily 
distinguished from false intuition (Covin & Blume, 2005). 
Accordingly, it may be that the lack of theoretical development in the area 
of entrepreneurial intuition to date may be the result of inadequate measures.  
Thus, a major contribution of study one is the measurement of decision-policy 
consciousness, which resembles a measure of entrepreneurial intuition.  As 
Mitchell, Friga and Mitchell (2005: 669) noted, measurement of entrepreneurial 
intuition must: (1) take into account the process dynamism of entrepreneurial 
intuition, (2) accommodate both conscious and unconscious processes, and (3) 
be applicable to the multiple sub-domains within which an opportunity can be 
identified.  The measure of decision-policy consciousness does just this. First, 
the measure of decision-policy consciousness takes into account the process 
dynamism of entrepreneurial intuition in its reliance on the expertise of the 
entrepreneurial decision maker in a decision domain. Second, decision-policy 
consciousness measures both unconscious and conscious processes in the 
combined measurement of in-use and espoused effects. Lastly, decision-policy 
 135 
consciousness controls for differences in (and is applicable to) multiple sub-
domains insofar as it is measured in the context of an individual’s current 
opportunities. 
Moreover, the evidence presented in study one provides preliminary 
support for the assertion that decision-policy consciousness is a measure of 
entrepreneurial intuition in that professed use of intuition is marginally related to 
decision-policy consciousness (i.e., higher professed use of intuition corresponds 
with lower decision-policy consciousness), but entrepreneurial self-efficacy, 
general self-efficacy and overconfidence are not related to decision-policy 
consciousness (Covin & Blume, 2005).  In this sense, the measurement of 
domain competence provides a measure for entrepreneurial intuition that can be 
used in the further development of entrepreneurship theory.  This is important 
because intuition is frequently cited as a reason for entrepreneurial behavior 
(Agor, 1984; Block, 1990; Fox, 1981; Hayashi, 2001; Isaack, 1978; Klein, 2003).   
Expertise- and Heuristic-based Decision Making 
Research in entrepreneurial decision making has been approached from a 
number of different frameworks (e.g., Dickson & Giglierano, 1986; Eisenhauer, 
1995; Sarasvathy, 2001). From a cognitive perspective, two stand out. Viewed 
through the lens of an expertise-based perspective, differences in entrepreneurial 
decision making is taken to be the result of differences in the knowledge 
structures of entrepreneurs (e.g., Gustafsson, 2004; e.g., Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell 
et al., 2000).  Viewed through the lens of a heuristics-based perspective, 
differences in entrepreneurial decision making is seen to be the result of 
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differences in the use of various heuristics and biases (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 
1997; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000).  Both 
perspectives have been successful in explaining differences in entrepreneurial 
decision making, but it is unclear in the literature how the two perspectives relate.  
Indeed, some might suggest that the two perspectives are at two opposite ends 
of a spectrum—e.g., Baron and Ward’s question as to whether entrepreneurs 
prefer heuristic or systematic thinking (2004).  The findings of study one address 
this gap in the literature and begin to situate both perspectives in the context of 
the opportunity evaluation decision. 
As is described previously, the findings related to the effect of founder 
status on decision-policy consciousness suggest that those with greater firm-
related expertise have lower decision-policy consciousness than those with 
lesser firm-related expertise.  This finding is consistent with an expertise-based 
view of entrepreneurial decision making. Namely, differences in the decision-
policy consciousness of founders compared to non-founders may result from 
differences in the knowledge structures possessed by founders compared to 
non-founders (Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell et al., 2000). In this sense, knowledge 
codification in opportunity evaluation decisions helps founders to leverage their 
expertise by assisting them to increase their decision-policy consciousness 
related to these decisions. 
Similarly, an interesting effect is exhibited in the findings related to 
hypothesis 5a.  Knowledge codification is found to benefit founders more than it 
benefits non-founders.  The reasoning behind this effect is that founders tend to 
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utilize the representativeness heuristic more than others (a result of their 
assumptions about the link between information inputs and predicted outcomes), 
which allows them to economize on limited processing resources. However, 
because the process of codification challenges these assumptions, its effect is 
enhanced for founders compared to non-founders.  In this sense, codification 
plays an important role. While use of the representativeness heuristic can be 
advantageous (Busenitz, 1999: 337), it also has its limits.  As Baron noted,  
Since entrepreneurs are, by definition, breaking new ground in terms of 
the products or services their companies provide, they must also engage 
in careful analysis of situations and events and formulate strategic plans 
(2004: 235). 
 
Thus, knowledge codification can be viewed as a mechanism that regulates use 
of the representativeness heuristic.   
Taken together, these results suggest that both expertise and heuristics 
play a similar role in facilitating entrepreneurial decision making through 
acceleration of the decision-making process—expertise through knowledge 
proceduralization and heuristics through decision-shortcuts—while also retaining 
their unique contributions to this process.  Expertise is fundamental to achieving 
successful entrepreneurial outcomes (Mitchell et al., 2000), while heuristics are 
essential to decision making in fast-paced, high risk environments (Simon et al., 
2000). But ironically, as the findings related to hypothesis 5a would seem to 
indicate, it is the tendency of founders to utilize heuristics-based processing more 
than others that increases the efficacy of knowledge codification in increasing 
decision-policy consciousness, thereby enabling them to benefit from their 
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expertise.  In this sense, the absence of either heuristics or expertise can limit 
the usefulness of the other. 
Literature Related to Study Two.  I had two aims in study two. First, I 
sought an increased understanding of the content of the opportunity evaluation 
decision policy; and second, I sought an enhanced understanding of how this 
decision policy differs between entrepreneurial decision makers. Key to both 
goals was entrepreneurial action.  McMullen and Shepherd (2006) proposed two 
stages of entrepreneurial action: opportunity attention and opportunity evaluation. 
They suggested that opportunity attention involves questions of why 
opportunities are recognized and acted upon in general and that opportunity 
evaluation involves questions of why opportunities are recognized and acted 
upon by specific individuals.  The primary focus of study two has been on the 
opportunity evaluation aspect of entrepreneurial action. As has been touched 
upon previously, perceptions of opportunity desirability and feasibility affect the 
decision to act on that opportunity through investment. In addition, the presence 
of uncertainty also affects the decision to act on an opportunity through 
investment (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).  
The reasons that likelihood of entrepreneurial action increases as 
desirability of an opportunity increases are self-evident.  Indeed, as Shane and 
Venkataraman noted, “entrepreneurship involves the nexus of two phenomena: 
the presence of lucrative opportunities and the presence of enterprising 
individuals” (2000: 218). The value afforded by an opportunity is a necessary 
condition of entrepreneurial action because it compensates entrepreneurs for the 
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time, money and effort that are required to identify and exploit an entrepreneurial 
opportunity (Venkataraman, 1997).  In an investigation of entrepreneurial 
discovery, Shane (2000) found that prior knowledge plays a central role. 
Specifically, he found that entrepreneurs discover opportunities that are related 
to the knowledge that they already enjoy. Relating this to the decision to act on 
an opportunity, an individual’s belief that they have the requisite knowledge to 
successfully exploit an opportunity is linked to the intention to act on that 
opportunity (Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994).  In this sense, prior 
knowledge leads to entrepreneurial action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).  
Perceptions of the opportunity environment also affect the decision to act; 
indeed, the uncertainty surrounding an opportunity (or set of opportunity 
alternatives) presents a decision-making challenge (Eisenhardt, 1989). But as 
McMullen and Shepherd noted, 
The willingness to bear the perceived uncertainty associated with an 
entrepreneurial act is representative of a belief-desire configuration, in 
which belief of what to do is a function of knowledge and desire of why to 
do it is a function of motivation (2006: 148). 
 
In this sense, an understanding of uncertainty is, to some measure, achieved 
through an understanding of the desirability and the feasibility of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. And conversely, the desirability and feasibility of an 
opportunity can be better understood in the context of environmental uncertainty. 
Theoretical Contributions of Study Two.  Entrepreneurs pursue 
opportunities that have higher potential value (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  
Said differently, increases in the desirability of an opportunity lead to increases in 
the likelihood of investment in that opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).  
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This proposal is confirmed in the findings related to hypothesis 6, wherein an 
increase in the potential value of an opportunity is shown to increase likelihood of 
investment in that opportunity.  As previously noted, this finding is self-evident, 
but necessarily investigated to facilitate an understanding of the other aspects of 
opportunity evaluation (because, as McMullen and Shepherd (2006) noted, 
desirability and feasibility must be considered in tandem).  It is to these findings, 
and their respective contributions, that I turn. 
Virtuous Circle of Knowledge 
Knowledge is a valuable resource (Penrose, 1959).  It is crucial to 
discovering opportunities (Shane, 2000); and, as is indicated in the findings 
related to hypothesis 7a, is crucial to the decision to act on these opportunities.  
This finding confirms the argument put forward by McMullen and Shepherd 
(2006) that the perceived feasibility of an opportunity increases an individual’s 
likelihood to act on that opportunity.   
In addition to demonstrating the importance of knowledge in 
entrepreneurial action, I find an important link between knowledge and value.  
The findings of hypothesis 7b suggest that likelihood of entrepreneurial action 
increases as value increases, but does so at a faster rate when knowledge 
relatedness is high than when it is low.  This interaction between value and 
knowledge may represent the beginning of a virtuous circle.  Specifically, when 
knowledge is high the likelihood of investing in a high value opportunity is 
increased. The application of this knowledge in the exploitation of the 
opportunity, in turn, can generate new knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1995) which 
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then leads to the discovery and exploitation of new high value opportunities 
(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shane, 2000).  In the application-generation-
discovery process, described in the previous sentence, is revealed the potential 
for a virtuous circle of knowledge. It appears that an understanding of this 
virtuous circle of knowledge might operate at the foundations of new enterprise 
development. 
But there is a potential cost to invoking this virtuous circle of knowledge.  
The knowledge that we possess may be the very key to our undoing as new 
innovations that are unrelated to current knowledge make useless this current 
knowledge (Christensen, 1997; Schumpeter, 1942).  How is it that this trend can 
be countered?  This is where study one and study two merge.  In their theory of 
action, Argyris and Schön (1974) talk of the importance of double-loop learning, 
which is distinguished from single-loop learning in its relationship to an external 
environment. 
In single-loop learning, we learn to maintain the field of constancy by 
learning to design actions that satisfy existing governing variables. In 
double-loop learning, we learn to change the field of constancy itself 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974: 19). 
 
This interaction between knowledge and value that is evident in hypothesis 7b 
represents the possibility of single-loop learning that is described as a virtuous 
circle of knowledge.   
To achieve double-loop learning, however, Schön (1983; 1987) noted the 
importance of reflection-in-action.  And as is previously noted, the process of 
knowledge codification (Zander & Kogut, 1995) is thought to facilitate such 
reflection (Zollo & Winter, 2002).  As has been demonstrated, knowledge 
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codification can increase decision-policy consciousness in opportunity 
evaluation. In this sense, the single-loop learning that is evident in the interaction 
between value and knowledge in their effect on entrepreneurial action can be 
nudged toward a process indicative of double-loop learning through codification 
of the opportunity evaluation decision policy. 
Uncertainty, Risk and Action 
The findings of study two suggest that window of opportunity availability is 
related to likelihood of investment, but in the opposite direction of what was 
hypothesized.  Specifically, wider windows of opportunity availability are 
associated with an increased likelihood of investment.  What this suggests is that 
entrepreneurs prefer investment under long-term uncertainty, over immediate 
certainty.  This result may be due to a tendency of individuals to view each 
decision independent of other decisions. Indeed, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) 
proposed that:  
Overly optimistic forecasts result from the adoption of an inside view of the 
problem, which anchors predictions on plans and scenarios (1993: 17). 
 
In this sense, the preference for opportunities with a wide, but uncertain, window 
may reflect a tendency to rely on opportunity-specific information (i.e., the value 
and the knowledge) while ignoring salient external information (i.e., the window of 
opportunity availability).  Again, this fits with the proposition that the willingness to 
act in the face of uncertainty is due to perceptions of opportunity desirability and 
feasibility (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). 
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Environmental Munificence and Entrepreneurial Action 
Similar to the findings related to window of opportunity availability, the 
relationship between number of potential opportunities and potential value was in 
the opposite direction of that which was hypothesized. Specifically, the greater 
the number of potential opportunities available, the more likely an entrepreneurial 
decision maker is to invest in an opportunity.  As is noted previously, the number 
of alternatives in decision making has been found to be related to speed of 
decision making: faster decision making is associated with many alternatives, 
while slower decision making is associated with few alternatives.  Moreover, slow 
decision makers tend to seek out new alternatives when old ones are no longer 
feasible (Eisenhardt, 1989).  These findings may inform our understanding of the 
results in this study related to number of potential opportunities.  Specifically, 
while the rationale behind hypothesis 9a focused on the individual’s perceptions 
of an opportunity within an opportunity environment, it may be that the 
explanation lays in entrepreneurial decision makers’ perceptions of themselves 
within an opportunity environment. 
From this perspective, an environment with few potential opportunities 
may be seen as lacking resources and/or hostile to progress: an environment 
where scarce resources are best preserved.  In contrast, an opportunity 
environment with many potential opportunities may be seen as munificent and 
wide open to new growth.  Such environments are thought to attract new 
development and growth because they can accommodate such growth (Specht, 
1993). Moreover, a munificent environment is thought to represent potential 
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knowledge flows, which positively influence performance (DeCarolis & Deeds, 
1999). In view of this, the number of potential opportunities may represent 
prospective knowledge flows for an entrepreneurial decision maker.  When there 
are many opportunities, the environment is perceived as munificent and is 
therefore an appealing place to operate. When there are few opportunities, 
however, an environment is seen as hostile and to be avoided.  
In this sense, the choice to pursue opportunities in environments with 
many other opportunities represents an attempt to increase knowledge stocks by 
being open to new knowledge flows (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Thus, in spite of 
having (1) more alternatives than can be pursued, (2) increased competition as a 
result of a munificent environment (Specht, 1993), and (3) increased complexity 
in decision making, the benefit of new knowledge flows that results from 
operating in munificent (high opportunity) environments is seemingly well worth it 
in the minds of entrepreneurial decision makers. 
Contributions of the Propositional Findings.  As Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) noted, in the decision to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities individual differences matter.  In a series of three propositions, I 
investigated how individual differences affect entrepreneurial decision makers’ 
decisions about entrepreneurial opportunities.  Specifically, I explore how fear of 
failure, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and human capital affect the opportunity 
evaluation decision and highlight the contributions of these findings. 
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Fear of Failure 
As is described in the results section, fear of failure significantly influences 
the effect of both potential value and number of potential opportunities on the 
likelihood to invest. Those with a high fear of failure are less likely to invest in 
opportunities with low value than those with a low fear of failure, but are equally 
likely to invest in higher value opportunities.  This would seem to make sense. 
Those with a high fear of failure will tend to preserve resources when the value of 
an opportunity is low, rather than risk failure in pursuit of that opportunity.  But 
when value is high, the benefits outweigh the costs. An irony, however, is 
presented in the findings relating to fear of failure and the number of potential 
opportunities in an environment.  While equally likely to invest in an opportunity 
when few are available, those with a high fear of failure are less likely to invest in 
an opportunity when many are present.  As described previously, environments 
with many available opportunities may be viewed as munificent. Thus, while they 
are equally likely to pursue high value opportunities as those with a low fear of 
failure, those with a high fear of failure are less likely to seek out high value 
environments.  To add insult to injury, environments with many opportunities are 
the safest bets because they provide fallback positions; if one alternative fails, 
there are other alternatives from which to choose (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
So what might explain these results?  One possibility is that the high-fear-
of-failure entrepreneurial decision maker is more likely to become overwhelmed 
by the number of alternatives in a high velocity environment (Damrad-Frye & 
Laird, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989): those with a high fear of failure may be overly 
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deliberate in their actions about opportunities because to do otherwise may be 
overwhelming.  In this sense, the findings here may provide additional insight into 
the findings of Eisenhardt (1989).  Her analysis focused on the differences 
between fast and slow decision making, finding that fast decision makers 
evaluate more opportunities than slow decision makers.  The results of this study 
may answer an unanswered question in her study: why do some individuals look 
at many opportunities and others look at few?  The answer may lie in fear-of-
failure differences.   
Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy 
The result regarding differences in entrepreneurial self-efficacy is 
interesting for two reasons.  First, it is interesting because it is a significant 
between-individual effect on a non-significant within-individual effect.  That is, 
while there is not a significant interaction effect between number of potential 
opportunities and potential value on likelihood to invest for the sample as a 
whole, entrepreneurial self-efficacy does significantly impact the interaction 
between these two variables.  The second reason that this effect is interesting is 
found in the result that the positive relationship between potential value and 
likelihood of investment is enhanced more by a high number of opportunities 
when entrepreneurial self-efficacy is low than when it is high (see Figure 13). 
Relating this to the previous discussion regarding environmental munificence, 
potential value is more important in munificent environments to those with low 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy than those with high entrepreneurial self-efficacy.   
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Thus, it might be that those with low entrepreneurial self-efficacy do not 
believe that they can extract higher value in low-munificence environments and 
as a result only invest when munificence is high; whereas those with high 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy do believe that they can extract higher value in either 
environment.  In other words, those with low entrepreneurial self-efficacy are 
influenced more by environmental factors than those with high entrepreneurial 
self-efficacy.  As Boyd and Vozikis noted in their discussion of entrepreneurial 
self-efficacy: 
A sense of personal efficacy that is both accurate and strong is essential 
to the initiation and persistence of performance in all aspects of human 
development (1994: 74). 
 
But it may be that it is not the sense of self-efficacy alone that is essential to 
performance, but also the interaction between the sense of self-efficacy and the 
“aspects” of the environment that are essential.  In this sense, future research 
should investigate the potential interaction between entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
and environmental factors, particularly the munificence of the environment. Such 
an investigation could extend previous research that highlights the importance of 
person–entrepreneurship fit (Markman & Baron, 2003), by increasing our 
understanding of person–entrepreneurship–environment fit.   
General Human Capital 
As described in the previous analysis, there is partial support for 
Proposition 3. General human capital is shown to have a significant effect on the 
relationship between potential value and likelihood to invest.  Specifically, 
compared to those with high general human capital, those with low general 
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human capital are more likely to invest in opportunities with lower value; but for 
opportunities with higher value, those with low general human capital are equally 
likely to invest as those with high human capital.  This is an interesting finding 
because it runs counter to previous research findings which suggest that those 
with a high general human capital are most likely to pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Reynolds, 1991: 63).  
There are a number of potential explanations for this finding.  The first is 
that the experience of overcoming the hurdles to business entry (e.g., through 
founding) may make those with low general human capital better able to 
recognize the value of value.  In their minds, when they recognize an opportunity 
that has value (albeit not as much as other opportunities) and they know 
something about the opportunity, why not pursue it.  It may be that such a 
mentality is what led them to be successful in the first place. A second 
explanation is that those with high education may be better able to recognize the 
risks associated with low value opportunities.  Because of their training, they 
know what to avoid.   
Third, the finding that the impact of high knowledge on the importance of 
value is greater for those with high levels of general human capital than for those 
with low levels of general human capital (see Figure 15) may suggest that 
perceptions of how to best apply knowledge in the pursuit of opportunities might 
differ between those with low levels of general human capital and those with high 
levels of general human capital.  It may be that those with high levels of human 
capital recognize what they know and recognize how important this knowledge 
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actually is.  They may see knowledge as best applied in high value situations 
wherein it can generate new knowledge related to high value opportunities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995). In this sense, those with high levels of general human 
capital may recognize virtuous circles of knowledge to a greater degree than 
those with low levels of general human capital.  Given the variety of potential 
explanations for these effects, additional research is needed. 
Individual Differences 
In her work questioning the questions that are asked in entrepreneurship 
research Sarasvathy (2004) suggested a refocusing of efforts in 
entrepreneurship research.  She proposed: 
Instead of classifying individuals as entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs, 
we might want to create a taxonomy of categories within entrepreneurs. 
Each category would be homogenous along certain parameters and 
heterogeneous along others, allowing us then to look within each 
subcategory for similarities and also differences between categories in 
specific aspects of entrepreneuring, such as opportunity formulation, 
financing strategies, failure management, and so on. Therefore, instead of 
trying to relate characteristics across a variety of entrepreneurs (e.g., self-
efficacy) with performance, we would be relating specific subcategories 
with specific aspects of performance (2004: 712). 
 
In my exploration of Propositions 1-3, I have attempted, in part, to enact her call.  
In particular, I have sought to understand how differences between 
entrepreneurial decision makers lead to differences in their decisions to exploit 
opportunities to create new value (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  While only a 
preliminary step, a number of interesting differences have been found to exist.  
Obviously, this investigation was merely exploratory; but what the results suggest 
is that there is a need (and a reason) to undertake additional research on 
differences between entrepreneurs. 
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Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Of course, no study is without limitations. Within this section, I discuss the 
limitations of this study and link them to the yet unanswered questions that they 
imply.  This is then followed by a general discussion of the future research 
directions that flow from this research. 
First, because this research is a true field experiment, it has high external 
validity/generalizability (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Cook & Campbell, 1979).  
However, because the research participants were entrepreneurial decision 
makers at technology companies in one geographical area, true generalizability 
of the results is limited to these types of companies in one geographical area.  
Thus, future research should seek to understand: (1) whether the mechanisms to 
transfer intuitive, procedural knowledge in opportunity evaluation decisions apply 
in multiple industries and multiple geographical areas; and (2) how the specific 
content of the opportunity evaluation decision differs between entrepreneurial 
decision makers. To answer these questions, future research can be designed to 
test hypotheses 1-9 in other industry contexts and settings. 
Second, because of the experimental nature of study one, error variance 
is controlled through random assignment to experimental conditions.  Compared 
to laboratory experiments, however, field experiments are less able to control for 
confounding effects.  In this sense, the field experiment provides a stronger test 
of the hypotheses, but also means that significant effects may go undetected.  
Therefore, a better understanding of the mechanisms described in hypotheses 2-
4 might be developed through investigating whether knowledge codification, 
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presence of decision communication incentives and use of analogy will affect 
decision-policy consciousness in a laboratory setting.  While the generalizability 
of such an investigation will be limited, the internal validity of the resulting effects 
may provide greater insight into the mechanisms that are hypothesized to affect 
decision-policy consciousness. 
Third, the decision communication incentive manipulation may not be 
strong enough to stimulate the hypothesized effects. Namely, this manipulation 
may not represent the high-stake incentives that are thought to motivate 
entrepreneurial decision makers (e.g., hypothesis 5b, which asserts that founders 
are likely to be influenced by the manipulation more than non-founders). 
Additionally, because of low reliability in the regulatory-focus manipulation check, 
it is unclear whether the decision communication incentive manipulation actually 
manipulates entrepreneurial decision makers’ situational regulatory focus.  In this 
sense, it is uncertain whether the lack of significant findings related to situational 
regulatory focus is due to the manipulation itself, or whether it is due to other 
confounding factors.  Accordingly, before the impact of decision communication 
incentives on decision-policy consciousness can be adequately researched, 
additional work is needed to verify the efficacy of the associated experimental 
manipulations.  
Fourth, conjoint analysis is limited in the number of profiles that individuals 
can manage. As the number of attributes increases, the number of profiles that 
individuals are required to evaluate also increases (Hahn & Shapiro, 1966); this 
results in biased responses on the part of decision makers (Green & Srinivasan, 
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1990). Thus, in addition to using an orthogonal fractional factorial design, only 
four attributes were included in study two in an attempt to make the task more 
manageable.  One drawback of this approach is that it requires individuals to 
simplify aspects of a complex process.  For instance, in study two entrepreneurial 
decision makers were asked to make a series of assumptions regarding the 
opportunity profile: they had access to the resources; the opportunity was similar 
to other opportunities they see, etc.  But interesting research questions went 
untested due to the limitations of the technique.  Thus, future research can 
investigate other aspects of the opportunity evaluation decision that could not be 
tested in this study.  For example, future research can investigate how 
opportunity evaluation decisions are made in environments requiring resource 
tradeoffs; and how might individual differences influence the resulting decisions. 
Fifth, this research has investigated how intuitive, procedural knowledge 
can be articulated such that it can be a resource to a firm.  Taking direction from 
Mitchell et al. (2005), this has been done in the context of an opportunity 
evaluation decision because this decision is frequently described as being 
intuitive (e.g., Block, 1990).  However, not all intuitive procedural knowledge 
relates to decisions about opportunities. Indeed, because procedural knowledge 
is based on expertise (Mieg, 2001), other types of expertise-based decision 
making may be worthwhile to pursue. In this sense, it is worth asking whether 
similar mechanisms increase the decision-policy consciousness of procedural 
knowledge in other decision-making contexts. 
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Sixth, as is noted previously, the investigation of the propositions related 
to differences between entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation 
decision policies has been exploratory.  While exploratory research is beneficial 
in management research (Bettis, 1991), it only represents a first step.  Hence, as 
a next step, future research should seek to replicate the exploratory findings 
reported here in order to increase understanding about the differences between 
entrepreneurial decision makers. 
Lastly, one of the key outcomes of management research is the 
explanation of why some firms outperform others (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 
2006; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991).  And while there are significant 
performance implications for this research, differences in performance were not 
explicitly investigated.  Thus, the relationship between decision-policy 
consciousness in opportunity evaluation decisions and greater performance 
remains purely theoretical.  In this sense, additional research should seek to 
address: (1) how reductions in linkage ambiguity related to opportunity evaluation 
decision (through increasing decision-policy consciousness) affects the 
exploitation of an opportunity, and the overall performance of a firm; (2) what 
effect increasing decision-policy consciousness (reducing use of intuitive, 
procedural knowledge) has on the exploration and exploitation of future 
opportunities; and (3) whether transferring codified knowledge about an 
opportunity evaluation decision leads to better exploitation of opportunities 
throughout a firm.   Each of these questions represents a crucial link to 
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understanding how the cognitive aspects of opportunity evaluation affect 
entrepreneurial performance (Mitchell et al., 2002). 
In addition to addressing the above limitations, future research should give 
additional consideration to the processes that lead to lower decision-policy 
consciousness.  While linked to expertise, it is unknown whether there are other 
factors that moderate the relationship between expertise and decision-policy 
consciousness.  It may be that an increased understanding of the processes 
whereby decision-policy consciousness is formed can further increase 
understanding of the mechanisms that enhance decision-policy consciousness, 
thereby enlarging our understanding of when and how decision-policy 
consciousness should and can be increased. 
Further research should also address the relationship between decision-
policy consciousness and other cognitive constructs. Following Sarasvathy 
(2004), future research is needed that addresses the effect of differences 
between entrepreneurial decision makers on decision-policy consciousness. 
Such an examination can increase understanding about performance differences 
between entrepreneurs, barriers to pursuing opportunities, and so forth; but will 
also situate the construct of decision-policy consciousness—as well as the 
construct of entrepreneurial intuition—in the broader nomological net (Peter, 
1981; Schwab, 1980) of entrepreneurial cognition research.   
Lastly, it is also important that further research consider the effect of firm 
and environmental factors on decision-policy consciousness. Indeed, as Covin, 
Slevin and Heeley (2001) found in their investigation of decision-making style, 
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firm structure and environmental technological sophistication, the effect of the 
decision-making style/firm structure interaction on performance differed 
depending on the environmental technological sophistication. A similar effect 
might be expected when considering decision-making differences between 
entrepreneurial decision makers with respect to decision-policy consciousness. It 
may be that both firm and environmental considerations impact the effect that 
decision-policy consciousness has on performance. 
Implications for Practitioners 
As Kurt Lewin remarked: “there is nothing so practical as a good theory” 
(1951: 169).27  Thus, having acknowledged the limitations of this research, there 
still remain a number of very practical implications for practitioners. First, in 
revealing a process whereby entrepreneurs can better articulate their tacit 
knowledge, the findings of this research study suggest how the ventures they 
create can proceed along a new enterprise development pathway with a clearly 
demarcated set of growth milestones.  This field experiment with 127 
entrepreneurial decision makers in high potential ventures provides a practical 
solution to the paradox of expertise in entrepreneurship.  Through codification of 
their knowledge, entrepreneurial decision makers can articulate their intuitions 
about potential opportunities to create new value.  In so doing, they can gain 
access to critical resources from stakeholders who might otherwise withhold 
resources due to high ambiguity about the link between an opportunity and 
performance.  
                                                 
27 Some attribute this to James C. Maxwell, a Scottish physicist who lived from 1831-1879. 
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Second, this research has practical implications for resource providers. 
Specifically, it suggests that founders and non-founders differ in their ability to 
articulate their knowledge, and accordingly that they differ in their ability to deliver 
on their resource promises.  And as Will Rogers is said to have remarked: “it isn’t 
what you don’t know that hurts you; it’s what you know that ain’t so.”  Armed with 
knowledge about the impact of knowledge codification on the articulation of 
opportunity evaluation decisions, resource providers can help entrepreneurial 
decision makers to understand and articulate their intuitions so that they are 
known to others, and thereby these “others” can make better investment 
decisions. Moreover, by understanding the differences between founders’ and 
non-founders’ ability to articulate knowledge, resource providers can then 
customize their own interactions with entrepreneurial decision makers according 
to their founder status.   
A third implication of this research for practitioners, which makes intuitive, 
procedural knowledge measurable, is that such knowledge can be portrayed to 
others in credible terms. For years, this has been one objective of teaching and 
research in entrepreneurship. To accomplish this objective we, as a field, have: 
listened to war stories, promoted heroic lectures, invited guest speakers, and 
read hundreds of popular-press books. We have gained much from these 
activities, but credibility has always been a lurking issue. In this sense, the 
credible portrayal through this research of intuitive, procedural knowledge 
represents a very firm next step forward in our capability to more accurately and 
usefully benefit from the experiences of those who have “done it.”  
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A fourth implication of these research results is that they provide 
entrepreneurial decision makers with a workable tool to leverage their resources 
through policy and procedure specification and dissemination.  Specifically, once 
understood, knowledge codification can lead to the creation of the organizational 
and structuring documents and systems that are the foundation of replicable 
routines within a new venture (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This creation process is 
literally the basis for injecting new dynamic capabilities into new enterprise.  That 
is, entrepreneurial decision makers who understand how to benefit from 
knowledge codification in one area of new enterprise development (i.e., 
opportunity evaluation) can then replicate these new routines for articulation in 
other areas of expertise-based decision making. 
A fifth implication that these results suggest to practitioners is that they 
can assist in the management of their individual beliefs vis-à-vis opportunity 
evaluation.  This means they can calibrate their thinking (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). By understanding the effects of fear of failure and self-efficacy on 
decisions to invest in opportunities, individual entrepreneurial decision makers 
can leverage these beliefs when they are beneficial to the overall outcome (e.g., 
high self-efficacy when opportunities are few) and mitigate these beliefs when 
they are detrimental (e.g., high fear of failure when opportunities are many). 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
Within this study, I have addressed a number of gaps in the literature.  
The first gap relates to a paradox of expertise: as expertise increases, the ability 
to utilize this expertise decreases.  Viewed from different perspectives, the lack 
of transferability of this expertise can be viewed as either positive or negative.  
From a resource-based vantage point, this lack of transferability is beneficial 
because the expertise is protected from imitation (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989).  An alternative view, however, is that lack of transferability reduces a 
firm’s ability to generate rents as a result of factor immobility (Lippman & Rumelt, 
1982).  At the root of this these opposing views is differences in types of causal 
ambiguity (King & Zeithaml, 2001).  And while previous research has attempted 
to reconcile the two views in general (Coff et al., 2006; Rivkin, 2001); none have 
adequately addressed the paradox of expertise in entrepreneurial environments 
where causal ambiguity is thought to be high (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). 
Thus, a primary theoretical contribution of this research is in its 
reconciliation of the conflicting views with respect to entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, I attempted to resolve the paradox of entrepreneurial expertise by 
addressing the ways that ambiguity about the relationship between a specific 
opportunity and value creation can be reduced, because reductions in ambiguity 
about how a competency is linked to competitive advantage have been shown to 
be positively associated with performance (King & Zeithaml, 2001); and because 
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hard-to-communicate decisions about entrepreneurial opportunities are thought 
to be based in entrepreneurial expertise (Mitchell et al., 2005).   
Empirically, I addressed the linkage ambiguity gap in the entrepreneurship 
literature through an investigation of entrepreneurial decision makers’ decision-
policy consciousness.  Decision-policy consciousness represents the extent to 
which individuals can articulate their intuitive, proceduralized expert knowledge.  
Because intuitive, proceduralized expert knowledge is thought to be the result of 
expertise, it was hypothesized that firm-founders would have lower decision-
policy consciousness than non-firm founders.  In other words, firm founders were 
expected to be less able to articulate their procedural knowledge related to 
opportunity evaluation. Consistent with this expectation, the findings support this 
hypothesis: firm founders exhibited lower decision-policy consciousness 
compared to non-firm founders.  In this sense, firm founders are thought to be 
more intuitive in their decision making than non-firm founders. 
I drew on the strategic capabilities and organization learning literatures to 
propose three mechanisms that were expected to increase decision-policy 
consciousness (i.e., reduce ambiguity about the relationship between a specific 
opportunity and value creation): knowledge codification, decision communication 
incentives, and use of analogy.  The first of these, knowledge codification, was 
found to have a marginally significant effect on decision-policy consciousness.  
Moreover, knowledge codification was found to be more efficacious for founders 
than for non-founders.  The insignificant effects of the other mechanisms may 
either be due to confounding effects in the field experiment setting, or to weak 
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operationalizations of the constructs.  As is previously noted, additional research 
is necessary to understand the lack of significant effects of these variables on 
decision-policy consciousness. 
A second gap in the literature that I addressed in this research was a lack 
of empirical research on the opportunity evaluation decision.  Specifically, 
McMullen and Shepherd (2006) noted that the decision to act on an opportunity 
is distinct from the identification of that opportunity. Opportunity evaluation 
involves the decision to act and is the result of perceptions of opportunity 
desirability and feasibility.  In a conjoint study—and in the context of a larger 
experiment—I investigated the content of the opportunity evaluation decision 
policy and found that desirability and feasibility do indeed combine in their effect 
on the decision to act.  Moreover, I found that the environmental effects also 
influence this decision to act, but do so in an unexpected manner. That is, 
entrepreneurial decision makers are more likely to invest in an opportunity when: 
(1) there are not any external forces pushing them toward investment; and (2) 
there are many other opportunities available to invest in. 
A third gap in the literature that I address in this study is suggested by 
Sarasvathy (2004).  Specifically, she noted that there are different categories of 
entrepreneurs that need to be investigated.  By understanding the differences 
between entrepreneurs, she suggests, we can better understand when and how 
facilitation of entrepreneurship will be beneficial.  Thus, within this study I 
explored a number of factors that are thought to differentially affect 
entrepreneurial decision makers’ opportunity evaluation decisions.  The findings 
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indicate that fear of failure, entrepreneurial self-efficacy and general human 
capital each have some bearing on the decision to invest in an opportunity.  
Consistent with Sarasvathy (2004), these findings suggest a need for additional 
theorizing and exploration of differences between entrepreneurs. 
In light of these findings, this research contributes to a variety of 
literatures.  First and foremost, this research adds to the entrepreneurial 
cognition literature both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it contributes 
in the suggestion that at the root of opportunity-related intuitive, procedural 
knowledge there is negative ambiguity that can be reduced. Empirically, it 
contributes in the measurement of decision-policy consciousness, capturing the 
degree to which an entrepreneurial decision maker exhibits entrepreneurial 
intuition.  It also contributes empirically to the entrepreneurial cognition literature 
in the finding that founders exhibit lower decision-policy consciousness than non-
founders, providing evidence for the suggestion that entrepreneurial intuition is, 
in part, proceduralized entrepreneurial expertise.  A third contribution of this 
research to the entrepreneurial cognition literature is that it has empirically 
demonstrated the content of the entrepreneurial evaluation decision policy, while 
also establishing the differences that exist between entrepreneurial decision 
makers in their individual decision policies.  This research also contributes to the 
strategic capabilities literature in the empirical findings related to knowledge 
codification; specifically, that at the level of the individual, knowledge codification 
can be beneficial with little investment of resources.   
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Einstein is said to have remarked: “The only real valuable thing is 
intuition.”  While not limiting my view of value to intuition alone, with this 
research, I have nonetheless attempted to reconcile a paradox that limits the 
value of intuitive knowledge in entrepreneurial decisions.  The findings reported 
herein, particularly with respect to knowledge codification, represent a step 
toward understanding how to better leverage the value of intuitive knowledge—
both for theory and for practice. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A – Interview Guide 
 
Goal One – Industry Opportunity environment 
• How would you describe your industry? 
• How would you define the overall availability of opportunities in your 
industry? 
• How might opportunities differ in your industry? 
 
Goal Two – Approach to opportunities and Opportunity Evaluation 
• How would you define an entrepreneurial opportunity? 
• In your view, where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from?  Are they 
created?  Or are they found? 
• How do you know that something is an opportunity? 
• Do you differentiate between [recognizing/finding/creating] an opportunity 
and deciding to invest in an opportunity? If so, how? 
• What is it that you do to [recognize/find/create] specific opportunities? 
 
Goal Three – Opportunity Evaluation 
• What kind of factors do you consider when deciding whether or not to 
invest in a specific opportunity?  Describe this process? [With this 
question, if theoretically important concepts are suggested, rephrase the 
response to see if theory is consistent with the ideas of the entrepreneur; 
conversely, if concepts are suggested that go against theory, ask for 
explanation and clarification.] 
• What else do you consider? [Repeat until a fairly exhaustive list is 
obtained.] 
• How would you describe the choice to invest in a specific opportunity 
[when it is chosen from a set of potential opportunities]?  How would talk 
about these potential opportunities?  What would you do to describe them 
to others? 
• How do you communicate your decisions to others?  What is their 
response? 
• When evaluating opportunities, would you say that you have a number of 
opportunities you are considering?  Or do you tend to focus on one 
opportunity at a time?  What does this involve? 
• Do opportunities that you may not decide to pursue stick around? Or are 
they fairly short-lived?  What is it that shortens or lengthens this lifespan? 
Do you ever abandon opportunities?  If so, why? 
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• Do you usually consider the cost of investing in an opportunity?  Or do you 
focus more on the benefits that can come from investment in an 
opportunity? 
• How would you describe any uncertainty that must be dealt with when 
deciding to pursue a specific opportunity? 
 
Goal Four – Approach to Failure 
• How do you define failure when thinking about entrepreneurial 
opportunities? 
• Have you previously had an entrepreneurial failure? 
• What is the role of failure in the pursuit of opportunity 
 181 
APPENDIX B – Recruitment Materials 
 
Appendix B1. Recruitment Letter 1 
 
Dear Name, 
 
I am writing to solicit your support for a study currently being developed at 
Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business.  The purpose of the study is to 
develop a practical model focused on understanding how individuals evaluate, 
assess and communicate the potential of business opportunities. 
 
This is important research, as the goal of the project is to develop a framework 
that we can take into the classroom and present to our entrepreneurship students 
as a tool for assessing the viability/potential of business opportunities. 
 
As a resident of Indiana, you are undoubtedly aware of our status as one of the 
elite business schools nationwide, with entrepreneurship being a particularly 
strong program.  It is because of research programs such as this one, where the 
research goals focus both on academic inquiry and on real, tangible benefits for 
how we teach, that our entrepreneurship program has received national 
recognition. 
 
With this letter, I have enclosed a letter of introduction from Rob Mitchell and 
Professor Dean Shepherd, as well as more specific details about their request to 
help with the research.  Rob and Dean are leading this research effort.  I ask that 
you take 45 minutes and help them in this research effort.  Doing so will go a 
long way toward furthering the progress we have already made toward realizing 
excellence in entrepreneurship teaching and research in business schools. 
 
As always, thank you for your support. 
 
Dr. Donald F. Kuratko 
The Jack M. Gill Chair of Entrepreneurship 
Professor of Entrepreneurship & Executive Director 
Johnson Center for Entrepreneurship & Innovation   
 
 182 
Appendix B2. Recruitment Letter 2 
 
Dear Name, 
 
We are writing to solicit your help as part of a study being conducted at the 
Kelley School of Business at Indiana University.  The purpose of the study is to 
understand how individuals make and communicate decisions about potential 
business opportunities. 
 
This research represents an important step toward our goal of being able to 
deliver a practical, first-class education in business and entrepreneurship to the 
students at the Kelley School.  This research is special in that one of our primary 
goals is focused on improving how we teach entrepreneurship to our 
undergraduates and MBA students, and by participating in this study you will 
directly further that goal.   
 
Based on our research, we have identified a small group of individuals whose 
level of expertise and experience qualifies them to participate in this study.  
Please note that this was not simply a mass mailing, but quite the opposite in that 
you were identified and selected to participate in this study based on your unique 
background and experience.  Given the small number of qualified individuals, we 
sincerely hope you will participate in this study. 
 
This study will focus on your approach to potential business opportunities and will 
take approximately 45 minutes to complete.  We will call in a few days to see if it 
is possible to set up a time for us to meet and for you to participate in the study. 
Should you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact 
Rob Mitchell at 812-855-8666, or by email at jrmitch@indiana.edu. 
 
Thank you in advance for helping us further excellence in business and 
entrepreneurship education at Indiana University. We look forward to talking with 
you further. 
 
 
 
 
Rob Mitchell      Dean Shepherd 
PhD Candidate     Associate Professor 
Kelley School of Business    Dean’s Research Fellow 
Indiana University     Kelley School of Business  
       Indiana University 
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Appendix B3. Follow-Up Phone Script 
 
Hello, may I speak with Mr./Ms. BLANK? 
 
Mr./Ms. BLANK, this is Rob Mitchell from Indiana University.  Dean Shepherd 
and I recently sent you a letter inviting participation in a series of interviews as 
part of my dissertation research.  Did you receive this letter? 
 
[YES] 
Great.  Have you had a moment to 
consider this request? 
[NO] 
Do you have a moment for me to 
explain this? 
 
 
[YES] 
Are you willing 
to participate 
in this study? 
 
[YES] 
 
When would 
work for you? 
 
[NO] 
 
Thank you for 
your time.
[NO] 
When would 
be a good time 
to call back? 
 
[YES] 
Thank you.  
[Recite first 3 
paragraphs 
from the 
previous 
letter]. 
Are you willing 
to participate 
in this study? 
 
[YES]  
When would 
work for you? 
 
[NO] Thank 
you for your 
time. 
[NO] 
When would 
be a good time 
to call back? 
For those that answer yes to the interview, I will then set up a time and a place 
for the interview, will answer any other questions that they may have and then 
end the phone conversation. 
 
For those that are not able to talk at this time, I will set up another time to call, 
at which time I will re-use the above script to assess willingness to participate. 
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APPENDIX C – Verbal Protocol 
Experimenter: The purpose of this study is to evaluate how individuals make 
decisions on whether or not to pursue opportunities. As part of this participation, I 
am required by Indiana University to have you initial and sign a consent form 
affirming that you understand important information about the study. Will you 
please take a moment to read over this and sign it? 
[Experimenter gives participant a copy of the consent form.] 
[Participant reads and signs consent form.] 
Experimenter: As the head of a company in a technology-related industry, you 
are ideally qualified to make decisions about whether or not to invest in potential 
opportunities.  The first activity that we will do involves these decisions. I have 
here a copy of the instructions for this activity. Please read the instructions 
carefully and ask me any questions that you may have. Please also carefully 
read the definition of terms on the front page. 
[Experimenter gives participant a copy of the: Study Instructions with the 
Descriptions of Terms and waits for participant to respond and ask any 
questions.] 
Participant: [Response.] 
[Experimenter answers any questions the participant may have.]  
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
You should do 
very well. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
You shouldn’t do 
poorly at all. 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
 
 
Experimenter: To make this activity go faster, we will use a computer. This first 
section should take about 8 minutes. 
[Experimenter enters the correct condition for the subject—low codification (1) or 
high codification (2)—and places the computer in front of the participant.]  
Experimenter: In order to help you become familiar with the task, the first profile 
that you will be presented is a practice profile. Feel free to ask me any questions 
you may have.  
[Experimenter watches the participant fill out the practice profile.] 
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
Well done!  
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
Not bad! 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
Experimental Protocol 
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Experimenter: Please let me know when you are finished. 
Participant: [Finishes the nineteen profiles and then responds.] 
Participant: [Response.] 
[Experimenter looks at the computer and then responds.] 
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
Perfect!  
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
Not bad at all! 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
 
 
Experimenter: There are some additional questions to ask about your decisions. 
[Experimenter refers to the first page of Evaluation Form A and verbally asks the 
participant the questions on the form.] 
Participant: [Response.] 
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
Experimenter: You 
did a great job, well 
done. This is going 
marvelously and will 
be very helpful to my 
research. Thank you 
for your help. Let’s 
move on to the 
second part of the 
study. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
Experimenter: Not bad 
at all. I don’t think this 
will spoil my results. 
Thank you. Let’s move 
on to the second part 
of the study. 
 
 
 
Low incentive 
condition 
Experimenter: Let’s 
move on to the 
second part of the 
study.  
 
 
 
[The experimenter begins to remove the codification materials from container 
they are carried in and begins to place them on the table/desk.]
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High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
Experimenter: What 
we are going to do 
now is quite 
important. It is the 
focus of the study, 
the part that I am 
most interested in 
and the part where 
you can help the 
most. I am going to 
ask you additional 
questions about 
these investment 
decisions. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
Experimenter: What 
we are going to do 
now is quite important. 
It is the focus of the 
study, the part that I 
am most interested in 
and where I need you 
to be most careful. I 
am going to ask you 
additional questions 
about these 
investment decisions. 
 
Low incentive 
condition 
Experimenter: I am 
going to ask you 
additional questions 
about these 
investment decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High codification condition:  
Experimenter: I have here depictions of 
factors that may be important in your 
decisions.  
[Experimenter gives participants a set of 
five labeled figures]  
Experimenter: Using these weighted 
arrows will you please use these 
depictions of factors to visually describe 
how you make investment decisions?  
Participant: [Response.] 
Experimenter: The thick arrows 
represent high importance, the thin 
represent low importance and the 
double headed arrows represent one 
factor depending on another. 
Experimenter: [Once a model is 
developed.] Using this visual model, will 
you talk me through three of the profiles 
that you previously scored?  [This is 
done for each of the three profiles]. Is 
there anything that needs to be 
changed? 
 
Low codification condition 
Experimenter: I am interested in 
how your decisions relate to your 
firm. I have here depictions of the 
potential aspects/levels of firm 
structure.  
[Experimenter gives participants 
pictures that represent functional 
and divisional structure.]  
Using these weighted arrows—
thick representing high importance, 
thin representing low importance, 
the two-way arrows describing joint 
decisions and no arrows 
suggesting that a particular 
aspect/level is not important—will 
you please visually describe who in 
your firm has an important role in 
making decisions about whether or 
not to invest in an opportunity? 
Participant: [Response.]  
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[If the participant is unwilling to use the pictorial representations of the variables 
to build a model, the experimenter can have the participant walk him through the 
building of the model.] 
Experimenter: Do you mind if I take a picture of this? [Experimenter takes a 
picture of the model that was created and then responds.] 
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
That is exactly right. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
That is definitely not 
wrong. 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
 
 
[Experimenter removes the visual depictions of the factors.] 
Experimenter: Based on your evaluations of the hypothetical opportunities, will 
you please give an example of a decision in another area of your life that is like 
your decisions about opportunities—such as family decisions, political decisions 
or decisions about interests or hobbies that you may have—and then describe to 
me how this decision is similar to your opportunity evaluation decisions.] 
Participant: [Response.] 
[These responses are recorded and subsequently coded for use of structural 
analogical similarity between decisions using a nine point continuous scale 
anchored by high structural similarity (9) and low structural similarity (1).] 
 
High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
This is going well. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
This isn’t going badly. 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
 
 
Experimenter: The third part of the study involves another set of opportunity 
evaluation decisions. The process for doing this is the same as in the first part of 
the study. 
[Experimenter places a computer in front of the participant.]  
Experimenter: Please let me know once you are done with all the profiles. 
Participant: [Response]. 
[Experimenter looks at the computer and then responds.] 
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High/promotion-
focus incentive 
condition 
This is going 
smoothly. 
High/prevention-
focus incentive 
condition  
This isn’t going poorly 
at all. 
Low incentive 
condition 
[No response]. 
 
 
High/promotion- 
focus incentive 
condition  
Experimenter: Similar 
to the first activity, 
there are some 
additional questions to 
ask about your 
decisions. Based on 
the previous discussion 
of your decisions, it is 
important that you 
successfully report the 
factors that most 
closely represent your 
actual decisions. 
Again, this is the 
essential part of the 
study. Thank you for 
taking it so seriously. 
High/prevention-focus 
incentive condition 
Experimenter: Similar to 
the first activity, there are 
some additional questions 
to ask about your 
decisions. Based on the 
previous discussion of 
your decisions, it is 
important that you do not 
mistakenly report the 
factors that don’t most 
closely represent your 
actual decisions. Again, 
this is the critical part of 
the study. Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
Low incentive 
condition 
Experimenter: Similar 
to the first activity, 
there are some 
additional questions to 
ask about your 
decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Experimenter refers to the first page of Evaluation Form B and verbally asks the 
participant the questions on the form.] 
Participant: [Response.] 
Experimenter: To wrap up, I would like to ask some follow-up questions about 
yourself and your industry that relate to opportunity evaluation. While you do this, 
I will calculate the results of your decision to show you before I go. Please let me 
know when you are done. 
[Experimenter removes computer and calculates the results.] 
[Experimenter then discusses the experiment with the participant and answers 
any questions that he or she may have and thanks them for their participation.] 
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APPENDIX D – Analogy Coding Instructions 
 
Overview 
In this study, participants were asked to make a decision about whether or not to 
invest in fully exploiting a potential opportunity based on a combination of four 
factors—potential value, knowledge relatedness, window of opportunity 
availability and number of potential opportunities (see appendix for definitions)—
each of which was varied at two levels. The purpose of this coding exercise is to 
quantify the degree to which participants utilized analogy in their verbal 
responses to the following question: 
Can you give an example of a decision in another area of your life that 
might be like your decisions about opportunities, whether it’s a family 
decision, political decision or decision about hobbies or interests; and then 
describe how it’s similar to your decisions about opportunities? 
Verbal responses will be coded based on the surface similarity and structural 
similarity between the two decisions. To assist in understanding these two 
different types of similarity, I include an example of comparison based on the 
work of Gentner (1983) and—using the example to explain the terminology—
describe her theoretical framework on structure-mapping to provide a context for 
coding participants’ responses for both surface similarity and structural similarity. 
 
Comparison Example – Rutherford Analogy 
At the center of our solar system is the sun. The sun is hot, yellow and massive. 
A number of planets revolve around the sun. The sun is more massive than 
these planets and is hotter than these planets. The sun attracts the planets that 
revolve around it, and the planets that revolve around the sun attract it (although 
to a lesser degree). These planets also attract each other.  
The atom is like the solar system. At the center of the atom is a nucleus. A 
number of electrons revolve around the nucleus. The nucleus is more massive 
than the electrons. The nucleus attracts the electrons that revolve around it, and 
the electrons that revolve around the nucleus attract it (although to a lesser 
degree). 
 
Terminology 
A number of terms will help in understanding the two types of similarities that are 
potentially important to comparison (Gentner, 1983). These terms are included 
below, and refer to the above analogy for clarification. 
Domain: A system of objects, object-attributes and relations between 
objects (p. 156). Example: The solar system is a system of objects, that 
has specific attributes and relationships between the objects. 
Analogy: An assertion that a relational structure that normally applies in 
one domain can be applied in another domain (p 156). Example: The 
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structure of the relationships between the objects that make up our solar 
system can apply to the structure of the relationships between the objects 
that make up the atom. 
Object attribute: A predicate taking one argument (p. 157). Example: The 
sun is hot, yellow, and massive. 
Relationships between objects: Predicates taking two or more arguments 
(p. 157). Example: Planets revolve around the sun. 
Target: The domain being explicated (p. 157). Example: The atom. 
Base: The domain that serves as the source of knowledge (p. 157). 
Example: The solar system. 
Surface similarity: Similarity of object-attributes from target to base. 
Example: The nucleus of an atom is yellow, just like the sun is yellow (not 
true, of course). 
Structural similarity: Similarity of relationships between objects from target 
to base. Example: Electrons revolve around the nucleus of an atom just 
like planets revolve around the sun. 
 
Types of Similarity and Comparisons 
According to Genter (1983), not all comparisons are analogies. Other types of 
comparisons also exist. Comparisons can be characterized by the type of 
similarities. In the 2X2 matrix below, four types of comparison are shown. 
Surface Similarity  
Many Few 
Many I. Literal 
Similarity 
II. Analogy 
Structural 
Similarity Few III. Mere 
Appearance 
Match 
IV. Anomaly 
Box I describes a literal similarity. Using the solar system as the base, a 
comparison with a target that involves literal similarity is: the K5 solar system is 
like our solar system. In this example, there are many surface similarities (e.g., 
attributes: both have a massive sun), and many structural similarities (e.g., 
relationships: both have planets that revolve around the sun). 
Box II describes an analogy. In the Rutherford above analogy, there are few 
surface similarities (e.g., attributes: sun is yellow while the nucleus is not), but 
many structural similarities (e.g., relationships: planets revolve around sun and 
electrons revolve around nucleus). 
Box III describes a mere appearance match. Using the solar system as the base, 
a mere appearance match is: the school bus that has been in a parking lot for 
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many hours on a bright summer day is like our solar system. In this example, 
there are many surface similarities (e.g., attributes: the sun is hot and the school 
bus is hot), but few structural similarities (e.g., relationships: planets revolve 
around the sun while nothing revolves around a school bus). 
Box IV describes an anomaly. Using the solar system as the base, an anomaly 
is: milk is like the solar system. In this example, there are few surface similarities 
(e.g., attributes: the sun is yellow, milk is not yellow), and few structural 
similarities (e.g., relationships: planets revolve around the sun while nothing 
revolves around milk). 
 
Coding the Responses 
In the case of the current study comparing an individual’s opportunity investment 
decision policy to a decision in another area of their life that might be like their 
decisions about opportunities, their investment decision policy is the base and 
their response the target. After viewing the breakdown of significant factors in a 
participant’s actual decisions, and the direction of the significant effects, you will 
read a transcript of their verbal response and assign a score between 1 and 7 for 
both surface similarity (1 being few object-attributes and 7 being many object-
attributes) and structural similarity (1 being few relationships between objects 
and 7 being many relationships between objects). You will also assign an overall 
score as to whether the comparison displays more surface similarity (-3) or more 
structural similarity (3). 
Surface Similarity Guide 
The participants are asked, based on combination of the four factors: how they 
would rate the likelihood that they would invest in fully exploiting a potential 
opportunity? In this decision context, surface similarity is based on four primary 
object-attributes inherent in the decision to invest in the opportunity. It involves: 
1. A business opportunity (i.e., profit seeking); 
2. A significant monetary investment; 
3. An investment of time and effort; and 
4. The full-scale exploitation of the opportunity. 
Thus, ratings for surface similarity would be: 
• High (7) if the target decision contained all four of the above object-
attributes; 
• High-Medium (4 to 6) if the target decision contained two or three of the 
above object-attributes; 
• Low-Medium (2 to 4) if the target decision contained one or two of the 
above object-attributes; and 
• Low (1) if the target decision contained none of the above object-
attributes.  
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Structural Similarity Guide 
As is noted previously, participants are asked to make decisions to invest in fully 
exploiting a potential opportunity based on the combination of four factors, each 
varied at two levels. In this decision context, structural similarity is based on the 
relationship between the decision to invest and the factors that are used in that 
decision to invest. These can be seen from each participant’s breakdown (by 
percentage and sign) of significant factors, for both main and interaction effects. 
Thus, ratings for structural similarity would be: 
• High (7) if the target decision was related to 80-100% of the decision 
factors/decision factor interactions; 
• High-Medium (4 to 6) if the target decision was related to 50-80% of the 
decision factors/decision factor interactions; and 
• Low-Medium (2 to 4) if the target decision was related to 20-50% of the 
decision factors/decision factor interactions; and 
• Low (1) if the target decision was related to none of the decision 
factors/decision factor interactions.  
Combination Rating Guide 
This final question is whether surface similarity is utilized more in the comparison 
or whether structural similarity is utilized more in the comparison. In this decision 
context, ratings of overall similarity are based on the overarching nature 
(structural as opposed to surface) of the comparisons from the target to the base.  
Thus, ratings for the overall similarity would be: 
• High (3) when most, if not all, of the comparison of the target to the base 
is anchored in structural similarity; 
• High-Neutral (1 to 2) when more than half, but not all, of the comparison of 
the target to the base is anchored in structural similarity; 
• Neutral (0) when the comparison of the target to the base is equally 
anchored in (or not anchored in28) structural similarity and surface 
similarity; 
• Low-Neutral (-1 to -2) when more than half, but not all, of the comparison 
of the target to the base is anchored in surface similarity; 
• Low (-3) when most, if not all, of the comparison of the target to the base 
is anchored in structural similarity; 
 
Example 
On the following pages, there is a coding example to illustrate the coding 
process. The top of the page contains the breakdown (by percentage and sign) 
of significant factors and a place to make notes on the base decision. Below this, 
there is a place to give ratings for both types of similarity. Additionally, there is a 
                                                 
28 When a comparison contains neither surface nor structural similarity. 
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space to make notes about the reasons for assigning the score. This is then 
followed by the text of the target decision. Sample scores have been assigned 
and reasons given for the target example, relative to the base (an actual example 
from pre-testing). 
Additionally, to help in understanding any interactions that might be part of the 
base decision that is used in the comparisons, the following figures depict the 
nature of the most likely interactions (both positive and negative) for these 
decisions.  
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References:  
Gentner, D. 1983. Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. 
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Case #: PRACTICE 
Coder #: PRACTICE 
Variable % +/- Notes: 
Value (V) 39.7 + 
Knowledge 
(K) 32.8 + 
Window 
(W) 12.1 + 
Number (N) 15.4 - 
V*K   
V*W   
V*N   
K*W   
K*N   
W*N   
V*K or W*N    
V*W or K*N   
V*N or K*W   
 
High value and knowledge seem to be the most 
important. Having a few opportunities is also 
important. And, least important is a wide window of 
opportunity (although it still plays a role). No 
interactions. 
 
Similarity Ratings 
The marriage decision involves an 
investment of time and effort, but (as  
is explained by the participant) is not 
profit seeking and is not just  
exploitation of an opportunity. 
Surface 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Notes:  
 
Used knowledge (compatibility), 
profitability (emotional and social  
stability), and referenced window of 
opportunity as less important in the  
decision. Did not reference number of 
potential opportunity, while it was  
Structur
al 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Notes
: 
while it was still used. 
This seems to have more structural 
aspects than non-structural aspects,  
but also seems to reference the business 
decision.  
 
Surface
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Structural 
Notes
: 
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PRACTICE Analogy Answer 
Experimenter: So based on your evaluations of the hypothetical opportunities, 
will you give me an example of a decision in another area of 
your life that is like your decisions about opportunities; whether 
it be family decisions, political decisions, decisions about 
sports, hobbies, interests; and then describe to me how this is 
similar to your opportunity evaluation decisions. 
Participant: OK. I guess it’s easiest to stop, start with the example... 
Experimenter: OK. 
Participant: …say, for example, marriage. Maybe, maybe that’s an 
example used a lot, I don’t know. But, uh, you know, you don’t 
want to marry someone with whom you’re incompatible. Just 
as you don’t want to pursue that you don’t have the resources, 
capabilities to actually pursue. It’ll just make things a whole lot 
more difficult if you’re not a good match in the first place. Um, 
let’s see, uh. Obviously, um, you know, this doesn’t work so 
well with marriage, but an important criteria is the, um, 
profitability. Um, marriage isn’t really profitable. But um, you 
know, when you’re making a decision to do something you 
want it to be profitable for you. Whether or not that’s money or 
not. You know, maybe marriage is profitable if you’re not 
considering the money aspect, but whether the, but instead the 
emotional or social stability that comes from it. That could be 
the profit from that. Um, other than that, you know, those to me 
are the two most important pieces of making a decision. Is 
whether it fits with the person I am or the company that we are 
and whether it’s going to be beneficial to me or the company? 
Um, besides that, I think that, um, you know, the things that 
were listed, so like window of opportunity, maybe not as 
important. 
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APPENDIX E – Espoused Decision Policy Measurement Script 
 
1. When assessing the previous profiles, what things did you consider when 
making your investment decisions? 
 Potential Value of an Opportunity  
 Knowledge Relatedness of an Opportunity 
 Window of Opportunity Availability 
 Number of Potential Opportunities 
 Effect of ____________________ on ____________________ 
 Effect of ____________________ on ____________________ 
 Effect of ____________________ on ____________________ 
 Effect of ____________________ on ____________________ 
2. Are you more likely to invest when: 
a. Potential Value of Opportunity is: 
b. Knowledge Relatedness of Opportunity is: 
c. Window of Opportunity Availability is: 
d. Number of Potential Opportunities: 
3. A.  Is having high/higher/wide/many__________________________: 
  MORE important OR    LESS important when 
__________________________ is high/higher/wide/many? 
B.  Is having high/higher/wide/many__________________________: 
  MORE important OR    LESS important when 
__________________________ is high/higher/wide/many? 
C.  Is having high/higher/wide/many __________________________: 
  MORE important OR    LESS important when 
__________________________ is high/higher/wide/many? 
D.  Is having high/higher/wide/many __________________________: 
  MORE important OR    LESS important when 
__________________________ is high/higher/wide/many? 
 Higher  Lower   Not Important 
 High     Low      Not Important 
 Wide    Narrow Not Important 
 Many   Few      Not Important 
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4. Please assign a score between 0 and 100 for each of the factors you use in 
your decisions based on its importance to your decisions: 
a. Potential Value of an Opportunity:     _____ 
b. Knowledge Relatedness of an Opportunity:     _____ 
c. Window of Opportunity Availability:     _____ 
d. Number of Potential Opportunities:     _____ 
e. Effect of __________________ on __________________:  _____ 
f. Effect of __________________ on __________________:  _____ 
g. Effect of __________________ on __________________:  _____ 
h. Effect of __________________ on __________________:  _____ 
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APPENDIX F – Study Two Materials 
 
Appendix F1. Task Instructions 
 
Instructions 
 
Your Task 
As the head of a company in a technology-related industry, you are ideally 
qualified to make decisions about whether or not to invest in potential 
opportunities.  In this part of the study you will be asked to evaluate a series of 
hypothetical opportunities.  Your task is to decide whether or not to invest in the 
full-scale exploitation of each opportunity.  When making these decisions assume 
that: 
• Other than the information provided in the profiles, the hypothetical 
opportunities presented are assumed to be similar to other entrepreneurial 
opportunities you have “seen” in all respects;  
• You have the resources (or access to the resources) to invest in an 
opportunity, if you choose to do so 
• You are making decisions about these opportunities for your current firm; 
and 
• You are making decisions about these opportunities in the current industry 
and economic environment.  
I also ask that you consider each profile as a separate decision, independent of 
all the others—please do not refer back to profiles already completed.   
For each and every profile, refer to the definitions on the following page and use 
your expertise to make the requested decision. 
Important Notes 
It is important that you respond to all questions as incomplete surveys cannot be 
included in the statistical analyses.  
Again, please be assured that your individual responses will remain anonymous 
and completely confidential.  No reference will be made, in any report or 
publication, to individual responses in a way that would enable the identification 
of any respondent. 
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Appendix F2. Description of Terms used in Task 
 
DESCRIPTION OF TERMS 
Please detach this sheet and refer to it as you complete the task 
 
Knowledge Relatedness of an Opportunity 
High The knowledge that is necessary to exploit this potential opportunity is 
very similar to the knowledge that you already possess. 
 
Low The knowledge that is necessary to exploit this potential opportunity is 
very different from the knowledge that you already possess. 
 
Potential Value of an Opportunity 
Higher The predicted profit from investment in the full-scale exploitation of this 
potential opportunity is higher than other opportunities you have 
successfully pursued after the predicted expenses (i.e., time, money and 
effort) have been taken into account. 
 
Lower The predicted profit from investment in the full-scale exploitation of this 
potential opportunity is lower than other opportunities you have 
successfully pursued after the predicted expenses (i.e., time, money and 
effort) have been taken into account. 
 
Window of Opportunity Availability 
Wide The next six months are free from changing conditions in the 
environment that will considerably shorten the length of time available to 
profitably invest in this potential opportunity. 
 
Narrow The next six months will bring about changes in the environment that will 
considerably shorten the length of time available to profitably invest in 
this potential opportunity. 
 
Number of Potential Opportunities 
Many There are several potential opportunities with unknown potential value, 
knowledge relatedness and opportunity windows that you could choose 
to invest in and exploit. 
 
Few There is one potential opportunity that you could choose to invest in and 
exploit, the potential value, knowledge relatedness and opportunity 
windows of which are given in the opportunity profile. 
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Appendix F3. Task Practice Profile 
 
PRACTICE PROFILE: OPPORTUNITY XTU 
1. Knowledge Relatedness of an Opportunity - high  
2. Potential Value of an Opportunity       - higher 
3. Window of Opportunity Availability       - narrow 
4. Number of Potential Opportunities       - many 
 
Likelihood of Commitment 
Based on the above opportunity attributes, how would you rate  
the likelihood that you would invest in fully exploiting this potential opportunity? 
(Circle the number that best represents your response) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very  
Likely to 
Invest in this 
Potential 
Opportunity
Very 
Unlikely to 
Invest in this 
Potential 
Opportunity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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APPENDIX G – Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
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APPENDIX H – Regression Diagnostics 
 
Appendix H1. Centered Leverage Value Index Plot 
 
 
 
  209 
Appendix H2. Externally Studentized Residuals Index Plot 
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Appendix H3. Cook’s D Index Plot 
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Appendix H4. Q-Q Plot: Decision-Policy Consciousness 
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Appendix H5. Q-Q Plot: Change in Espoused Prior to Transformation 
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Appendix H6. Q-Q Plot: Structural Similarity of Analogy 
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Appendix H7. Q-Q Plot: Change in Espoused Following Transformation 
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Appendix H8. Studentized Residuals and Independent Variables 
 
Decision-Policy Consciousness: 
Time 1 
 
Structural Similarity  
 
 
 
 
Espoused Change  
(Transformed) 
Founder Status  
(Fuzzy) 
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Codification Contrast  
(Fuzzy) 
Incentive Contrast: High v. Low 
(Fuzzy) 
  
Incentive Contrast: Gain/Loss  
(Fuzzy) 
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